Aryan Gandral
In 2021, former Indian diplomat Syed Akbaruddin said, “A fortnight is a long time in diplomacy.” In this light, the last three years of the rule of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan (IEA), that is, the Taliban regime, after a forceful takeover, have been riddled with uncertainty, hostility, and rollercoaster power politics.
A non-state actor (NSA), having survived and sustained a protracted war of 20 years with the USA, was seen as a terror outfit, using violence to achieve its ideals and impose its version of Sharia law. The fear among those opposed to the orthodox regime was personified in the desperate videos of people falling off aeroplanes and leaving the region in a bid to escape.
In this context, while the world watched, the Taliban regime intensified its hold on power and established itself as the undisputed authority, albeit lacking the legitimacy of the diverse Afghan society.
In India, the south block deliberated a course of action. The history of Taliban 1.0 was still fresh. A regime backed by the Pakistani deep state in the 1990s openly promoted terrorism in the Kashmir valley, aiding hijackers of Indian aeroplanes and pushing narcotics in the region. The official line was clear: as Ajit Doval said, “India will not abandon the permanent stakeholders in Afghanistan, that is, the people of Afghanistan.” Through the years of the Western-backed democratic regime, India had invested close to 3 billion USD in building infrastructure in the form of the Afghan parliament, Salma Dam, the Delaram-Zaranj highway, and hospitals; it also contributed to building human capital in the form of training Afghan Army personnel and even their cricket team. This has earned enormous goodwill and added to India’s soft power in the region, unlike Pakistan, which got the ire for promoting chaos.
While recognition was off the table, India sent a ‘technical mission’ following a devastating earthquake. Throughout the period, there were stark differences observed in Taliban 2.0. Firstly, its desperation to attain international recognition. Secondly, its positioning as an autonomous actor outside the influence of Pakistan. Thirdly, its stated objective is to crack down on the narcotics trade and ISKP-like terror outfits. It showed that the NSA turned government authority now wants to sit at the comity of nations. China became the first major country to officially recognize the IEA. Implicit was a quest to expand the BRI, exploit the abundant natural resources of Afghanistan, and place itself in the strategic vacuum of the region. With the West occupied with the Ukraine war and economic stagflation, India did find itself friendless in this situation. The trade-off was a strategic and intelligence black hole’ that was witnessed during the Taliban 1.0. In this background, the recent meeting of a senior joint secretary of the Foreign ministry with the Taliban Foreign minister in Kabul shows the approach India is adopting. It is ‘engagement without endorsement’, a form of strategic realism to secure its national interest and geopolitical ambitions while not compromising on its principles. “What does it entail?” That is the question. It’s a calibrated policy of constant evolution and feedback from the ground. Indian interests entail a region free of destabilizing forces in the form of ISI-backed elements like the Haqqani network, trade through the Chabahar port, and a democratization of the Afghan polity. Through engagement, we can work constructively on two of these issues, but the third is a concern. Given its ban on women’s public participation, persecution of minorities, and suppression of dissent, India would find it hard to balance its status as a ‘champion of democracy’ in the non-Western world.
Our strategy should involve three elements. First, engage with partners in West Asia like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, and Qatar, and use their channels to secure strategic depth. Secondly, through the Chabahar port, improve trade and connectivity, ensuring prosperity in the region.
Thirdly, continue investing in the ‘permanent stakeholders’ and further boost its soft power. In this Neo-Great Game of Taliban 2.0, China is the strategic rival to India and not Pakistan. While the short-term interest is security and peace in the region, the long-term interest should be the democratization of the Afghan polity. For that, India, with all its foreign policy instruments-hard and soft-should establish itself as an actor that the rulers of the IEA can’t ignore. Our standing as a partner of both the global north and south is a way for the Taliban regime to attain international recognition if it acts in ways conducive to the region, both in its domestic and foreign conduct. Through what S Jaishankar calls ‘energetic diplomacy’, India has transformed into a narrative shaper from a narrative taker. This should be the fulcrum of our Afghan policy: Track 1, followed by Track 2.
After all, our national interests are not just selfish pursuits but the philosophy of ‘Vasudhaiv kutumbakam’. It is this Indian version of ‘strategic realism’ that even the Arthashastra of Chanakya talks about: “The king should use all means to secure the national interest, but that should be guided by the end goal of enhancing the welfare of the people”.
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