A C Chaturvedi
The Darba Ghati ambush of 25th May in Chhatisgarh has brought to the fore internal security issues in the country and their different facets. Political discourse can only distract but cannot detract from the core issues and whether lessons learnable from ”case studies” like Punjab situations of 1980s, Andhra experiments, the course of J&K experience since 1990, and even the distant Mizo Hills episode of 1960s, have been culled and translated into good practices for adaptation and use elsewhere.
One of the essential fundamentals of counter insurgency is not to offer, and certainly not on a platter, success-experience to the insurgents in armed activity. As to an ambush, and for it to materialize, the enabling prerequisite is “same time, same place” for the two parties. A recognition of the terrain and topography and its pluses and minuses helps avoid losses and failures.
Numerical deterrence in a normal scenario gets diluted if the other side gets a pre-emptive advantageous use of terrain.
In the Darba valley incident it appears from available reports that the only armed security cover were the PSO’s with limited ammunition. The motorcade got bunched up, making a compact target and easier for the ambushing Maoists to go about their objective.
A reinforcement is no substitute for manpower ready at hand, besides the reinforcement itself being open to predictable ambush.
Officers and men in the local area working day to day in such environment have to be accepted as knowing what to do even if things go amiss in the ‘where and when’ part of it even while exercising their unhindered judgment. What all actually contributed to the returning election compaigners driving into the trap at Darba Ghati and then suffering such loss of life should come out in some detail in the enquiry instituted.
That the gun fight ensured for an hour or so implies that the attacking extemists had an idea of the limited fire power with the convoy and had tactically decided to let it exhaust and then close in for success with little causality on their own side.
The so called “intelligence failure” is often talked about in such cases. The reality is that quite a lot of information, even if piece meal, keeps “oozing up” as it were, at the local police level and also for locally deployed security forces.
All wireless communication is a “broadcast” to all and sundry who care to tune in. Wireless chatter, and these days mobile chatter, is ready flow of information. In any case political rallies preceded by campaigning and crowd mobilization are known to every body and need no information ‘leakage’ to criminal elements.
In this case Darba Ghati is stated to be a known bad spot which every one would have known to be so. The likely time for motorcade to pass would also have been broadly known. The late afternoon time, closer to dusk, was good for ambushes.
Success cannot be expected without bolstering the State police comprehensively. In Punjab plains, the state police assisted by CRPF numbers took the lead. In J&K the State police has come a long way since 1990. In the earlier part of post independence era, big well-armed dacoit gangs with fair support in the rural areas in UP-MP-Rajasthan border region were major issues countered by the coordinated response of District Police forces themselves with stte armed police supplements at times. It is also worth recalling that it were state armed police battalions which were moved into NEFA (present Arunachal Pradesh) immediately after the 1962 debacle there; similar units were deployed on international borders in Tripura, Assam and other borders elsewhere till and beyond 1965 war.
Given the fairly long years that it has been around and geographical expanse it has come to acquire, Maoism-Naxalism is not likely to be neutralized any time soon. Police and supplementing Central forces cannot substitute for clearly visible and experienceable sign posts of development and good governance.
Imperatives of internal security go beyond delusive “statistical comfort zone” of seeming decrease of comparative numbers. The quantative is not the same thing as qualitative improvement.
In the classical counter insurgency doctrine the principle sums up the essentials as denying ‘military’ advantage including logistics to the insurgent and winning over of the common people to the Government side. The first element relates to the police and related security forces. The second lies overwhelmingly in the domain of the larger administration with its multitude of developmental schemes and projects on material and human resources.
Lack of intensive road networking hampers interconnectivity and handicaps the pre-remptive dominating presence of Government machinery and police agencies. In remoter areas it keeps rural communities in isolation and at the mercy of unlawful anti-national elements who sprout, flourish and multiply unhindred in such undisturbed “ungoverned” surroundings till they assume menacing proportions, no longer amenable to simpler remedies of an incipient issue.
The incident also, once again, draws attention to governance issues. Road connectivity in Maoist infested areas across the afflicted states is a critical force multiplier both ways it does not seem to exist positively for security operations. The excellent interconnectivity in J&K in south Kashmir area of Anantnag-Kulgam Shopian Pulwama may be luxury for other regions but it is a great example none the less; it is worth recalling that around 1991 many ready to use steel bridges were installed in these areas to substitute for militancy damaged bridges to sustain road linkage.
Extensive road network in these areas is lower cost, enduring solution and response to the ‘red corridor’. Tying down para- military forces in ever increasing numbers is a quantitative response to a qualitative issue, without logistics and greatly strengthened and widespread lines of communication this is unlikely to take any where other than providing periodical sensational ”success experience” to the Maoist. Tribals in forest regions may be attached to their surroundings but appropriate strategic terrain modification would seem necessary.
Extremists look to the conference (negotiation) table once their operations start getting into the situation of increasingly adverse cost-benefit ratio, ego issues emerge as schism in leadership and groups, defections and surrenders start happening and fatigue and disenchantment sets in their rank and file and supporters. So long as the Naxalities continue riding high, ‘talks’ in a overt or formal sense make little sense. The psychological aspect of response was recognized as an imperative in the very early 1990’s itself in the J&K situation. It is integral to response in disturbed areas anywhere to differentiate between the vocal minority and silent majority in any theatre.
Restoration of rural civil policing is one of surest indicators of progress towards normalcy.
In absence of infrastructure of good connectivity we will be letting the extremists operate out of force multiplying terrain of their chnoice and convenience, to the time and life consuming disadvtange of law enforcing agencies and the people.
As for the Darba Valley ambush of May 25 in Bastar Area of Chhatisgarh, whatever be the alleged or real political undertones or overtones or affiliations, the bottom line is that the “Maoist- Naxalite insurgents” have had a loud success experience coming their way on a platter. Enviable privilege.
(The author is former DGP)
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