Two decade-long terrorist experience in J&K has shown us that despite all-out efforts to upstage foolproof anti-terrorist preparedness, the jihadis, especially the fidayeen, are not short of options to strike and cause as much damage as they can. They make our security forces defensive. Defending a long and porous international border or the LoC in J&K is not that simple and easy as critics might imagine. The point to be stressed upon and understood is that Pakistani army has raised the jihadi brigade as its “strategic asset.” It created and supports at least six dozen jihadi groups within Pakistan under different names but with one common purpose of “bleeding India by a thousand cuts.” Extreme religious hatred, dismemberment of East Pakistan, and failure in Kashmir are the elements that mould Pakistan Army’s fossilized mindset. Its percolation down to jihadis/fidayeen brigades through the seminary system of which there are at least fifty thousand outlets across that country brings up the tail end.
Our country has to make supreme sacrifices to maintain territorial integrity. In particular, our valiant soldiers and security men are laying down their precious lives in the defence of the country. The nation owes them a debt. But the nation must go. The Jammu twin attack is not the last in the “Hundred-Year War.” A lot more is in Pak Army’s kitty. Noticeably simultaneous with the Jammu twin terrorist attack, a large group of about thirty-five armed jihadis were reported to have infiltrated into Karen, Tithwal sector. Their purpose was to destabilize Kashmir region’s security and hardening of postures that would scuttle contemplated interface between the two Prime Ministers in New York.
The question hotly debated is this: Should we talk to Pakis or not? This question needs to be analyzed coolly and without emotions. Those against talks argue that Pak must first stop jihadi infiltration and subversion. There is weight in their argument. A powerful, aggressive and belligerent India would certainly take strong position. But it is not, whatever the reasons primarily that wise nations understand war is no solution. What do we do then? The elected government in Pakistan is at loggerheads with the Army as usual. Mian Nawaz’s friendly overtures towards India, after he was sworn in as Prime Minister, have not only irritated but also activated the hawks in that country to scuttle the dialogue process. After all, Pak Army has built its profile on the basis of projecting India as the most despised and hated enemy. It will do all it can to scuttle the contemplated NY talks on the sideline of UN General Assembly session. It loses its credibility and influence if Kashmir question is bilaterally resolved by the elected leadership of two countries. Hence It is in the interests of India to bring internal pressure on Pakistan Army and widen the canvas of Army-civilian Government divertive perceptions. If war is not a solution of conflicts, pro-active diplomacy must deliver.
It has to be recollected that the process of comprehensive dialogue between the two countries was originally initiated by late Inder Kumar Gujral, the then Prime Minister of India at Male Summit of SAARC in 2004. Eight items were identified for detailed discussions between the official delegations of the two countries. Kashmir was one of these. The process was actively carried forward by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Mian Nawaz Sharif through backdoor diplomacy. The high watermark of that diplomacy was the visit of Vajpayee and the consequential Lahore Declaration. The two leaders had held broad spectrum talks, including Kashmir resolution options based on the Comprehensive Dialogue Process and Track II diplomacy. It was widely known in knowledgeable circles in Islamabad and New Delhi that differences on Kashmir had been narrowed down and a broad-based commonality of view on options of resolving Kashmir dispute was outlined and agreed to. A solution was in sight after great skullduggery on either side. Sensing that the impending agreement on Kashmir was going to relegate Pak Army to insignificance, General Pervez Musharraf staged the Kargil war keeping his PM in dark. Under pressures from President Clinton of the US, Mian Nawaz agreed to withdrawal of Pakistan troops from Kargil, thus further fuelling army’s chagrin. In frenzy General Musharraf sent Mian on exile to Saudi Arabia and then stirred the strings of talks with New Delhi hoping to add a feather to his hat. Vajpayee decided to talk to the military ruler and the Track II diplomacy was revived. The Agra fiasco would not have happened if General Pervez, responding to his commando mindset, had not rejected the visa of Vajpayee’s interlocutor K.P Mishra, who had asked Pak embassy in Singapore for a visa to fly direct to Islamabad for pre-Agra Summit discussions. General Pervez wanted to impose a diplomatic victory on India but was no match to the Indian bureaucratic establishment who left him bruised and mauled.
The purpose of recounting this story is that responsible diplomats and politicians in both the countries have often said that Vajpayee and Mian Nawaz had almost arrived at an agreement on Kashmir and it had only their signatures had to be affixed. At the eleventh hour the entire effort fell through. That was also the case with Rajiv-Benazir talks in 1990s. Now that Mian Nawaz Sharif is back in power and with a thumping majority, and that our Prime Minister has not adopted rigid stance but has shown resilience to continue the talks, why should we not take the opportunity of carrying forward what had already been achieved by the two Prime Ministers under democratic mechanism. We know that the terrorist attacks would create some hiccups, but astute diplomacy demands what should hinder us in carrying forward the process that has already been brought to final stage. Furthermore, let us not confine to Jammu and Kashmir only; we need to visualize the ramifications of withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014, its impact on the sub-continent and the role that regional powers in general but Pakistan in particular will be called upon to play. Should we adopt ostrich-like behavior and become blind to developments in the region?
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