Narsingh Dev Jamwal
Being a constant reader and admirer of Col. J.P Singh’s writing, I was surprised to read ‘Saviour of Kashmir’ (Daily Excelsior June 14, 2015).
First of all , this was 116th and not 125th Birth Anniversary of Brig. Rajinder Singh Ji.
1) When Capt. Naseeb Singh was sent to Uri on 22nd Oct’ 47 to demolish Uri Bridge, was it possible for our own troops and their vehicles to reach Garhi after crossing this partially destroyed bridge. So much so, after their withdrawal from Garhi, the entire contingent comes to Baramulla and again goes to Uri after receiving a letter from his highness. If they can make use of this partially destroyed bridge without any hindrance, who stopped the invaders from their mission to reach Srinagar; particularly when they have already cleared their way by eliminating a state battalion at Domel-Muzaffarabad and again forced this little contingent to retreat from Garhi. They could have easily followed this retreating contingent upto Baramulla same day.
It is funny to note that the invaders did not launch a determined attack. Why? When their utmost mission was to capture Srinagar as soon as possible. Why should they wait for the State contingent to reach Uri again, thus to waste other three precious days only to damage their own mission.
Actually, Uri bridge was demolished, may it be partially when the retreating State troops under Brig. Rajinder Singh Ji crossed Uri, only to create an obstacle for the enemy vehicles to follow them and also be ready for the next encounter. And they succeeded in it only because of the sacrifice made by the leading platoon of Ist JAK under Subedar Duni Chand (a unsung hero) who took over the command after Capt. Prithi Singh was injured and returned to the rear. This platoon at Garhi without any instructions such as ‘to the last man and the last bullet, dutifully stopped the enemy for 4 to 5 Hrs to enable Brig Rajinder Singh ji dithdraw safely and plan comfortably for the next encounters. The storming enemy passed over the dead bodies of these brave soldiers, only when the starts start twinkling in the sky. About 90% casualty. Only three survivors out of thirty or so and those three too became prisoner of war not on the same day but after many a days hectic conditions and that too through the civilians of the surrounding areas.
We must remember that sensing the presence of State force after Garhi encounter, the invaders did not take risk to follow the retreating contingent during night time. And when in the morning they reached Uri, their march came to a halt because of damaged bridge and firing from the other side of Uri Nallah. The day and the following night was therefore spent at Uri to prepare a temporary track on the upper side of the nallah to facilitate the movement of their vehicles beyond Uri. This was not so easy under heavy firing from the State troops and no ways out until and unless this problem is solved.
2) Any officer on ADC duty is out of this unit, hence no troops to command nor any other activity for that period. Capt. Prithi Singh belonged to 1st JAK stationed at Kalsyan (Poonch). Being D Coy. Commander, he along with his company was posted at Plandri, when he was ordered to move to Domel Muzaffarabd as an advance party to relieve 4 JAK by Ist JAK.
This order, however, did not mature and in between this company was detained at Badami Bagh, Srinagar and put on as His Highness Palace Guard. This is why, what has been said that milking of units rear parties (Kashmir Brigade) out of one hundred or so combatants who left Srinagar under Brig. Rajinder Singh Ji on 22nd Oct evening (23rd Oct. is not correct) half of the contingent belonged to Ist JAK including Capt. Prithi Singh.
3) Does not it look more funny that Brig. Faqir Singh in-charge Kashmir Brigade, whose area has been invaded by the enemy, one of his battalion almost eliminated, and the intruders are advancing towards Srinagar, he only delivers a letter of Maharaja to Brig. Rajinder Singh Ji at Baramulla and his responsibility as a Brigade Commander is over whereas his duty is being performed by this senior the COS of J&K State.
Actually, the said letter from Maharaja was delivered by Capt. Jawala Singh, who reported to Brig. Rajinder Singh Ji alongwith Mortar and MMG squards to re-enforce the fighting contingent. After that he was also a part of that contingent for the remaining two days.
No doubt, this small contingent of brave Dogra soldiers under the command of Brig. Rajinder Singh Ji a perfect warrior with sufficient knowledge and experience of warfare, thwarted all attempts by the enemy from 23rd to the night between 26 and 27 Oct’ 47. All of them sacrificed their lives to save the Valley falling into the hands of the enemy. Hence when we calculate the number or the percentage of killings during this operation, we must take into account the leading platoon of Ist JAK, who actually faced the first blow of the enemy at Garhi, where Capt. Prithi Singh was wounded and retreated to the rear. This is further not correct that as the column reached Garhi they came under heavy fire, resulting casualties in the leading vehicles, hence immediate withdrawal was ordered. Instead, this contingent was fully aware of the situation and the number of the invaders, through fleeing civilians, who met enroute. Hence every one was cautious while moving ahead of Chanari. And as soon as they reached near Garhi, on seeing black clouds of smoke covering the town and hearing the voices of firing shots, they stop marching ahead and instead covered the area in such a way that as soon as the enemy reaches there, they should face a tough resistence. Total contingent divided into 3 parts. First batch under Capt. Prithi Singh covering a sharp and blind curve of the road whereas remaining gun men as also the second batch to tackle the enemy when they debuss and start covering hill side on the other side of the road is flowing river Jhelum, a soft and safe zone. And no doubt, taken unaware, they faced heavy losses but numbering in thousands they did not care for it and started covering the hill for counter attack. Meanwhile Capt. Prithi Singh was injured and left for the rear. Only after that the withdrawal was decided at the stake of the leading platoon who was miserably engaged in fighting. And as already said, if they to were ordered to withdraw, none of this entire contingent could have reached Uri to plan further encounters including the demolition of Uri Bridge… This is what has been already put on records. Anything contradictory to it requires genuine and acceptable reasoning.
Trending Now
E-Paper
Follow our WhatsApp channel