Remembering 1962

Col J P Singh, Retd
Introduction.
The Sino Indian War 1962, also referred as ‘Indio-China Border Conflict’, is known for its treachery. It was a war between friends turned foes on trivial issues. Border skirmishes which had started over a barren piece of  wasteland in Himalayas, where not a soul ever lived, led to this war. Series of violent border incidents started after India gave political asylum to Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama. To make matters worse India initiated a ‘Forward Policy’ by which it established military outposts, several even North of McMahon Line.  Unable to reach a political accommodation on the disputed territory along 3,500  kms long border, the Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh in the West and Tawang in the East on 20th October 1962. Chinese forces advanced over the Indian forces in both the theatres, capturing Tawang in the Eastern theatre as well as Rezang La in Chushul in the Western theatre within a week. The war ended when Chinese unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20th November 1962.
Motives
Two major factors led China to eventual conflict. (i) India’s stance on the disputed border and (ii) perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was a perception in Chinese mind of India having an objective of restoring the pre 1949 status quo ante of Tibet. The other was to punish India for its transgressions  along the McMahon Line.
Memories of the War.
54 years behind us, to this day there is continuing criticism of handling of 1962 crisis. Much of it is unknown / uninformed because of the veil of cover up that was deliberately drawn across the whole episode soon after the ceasefire. The Govt has not published all facts about that war or about the events or the policies that led upto it; presumably because they would reveal stupidity of political class involved besides the weaknesses of military commanders. Henderson Brook’s report should be made public to clear the mist.
Genesis of the Conflict.
The 1940s saw huge changes in South Asia. Indian Republic, Pakistan and People’s Republic of China emerged as new nations. Policy adopted by the new Indian Govt was to revive its ancient friendly ties with China and to maintain cordial relations. China started taking control of Tibet in fifties and after its complete annexation, China started making a road through Aksai-Chin. After Chinese occupation of Tibet, Sardar Patel forewarned Nehru against China in his letter on 7 November 1950 and said, “We have to consider what faces us today as a result of disappearance of Tibet and extension of China almost upto our gates. Through out our history we have seldom worried about our North East Frontiers. In our calculations we have to reckon with China which has definite ambitions and aims which do not seem friendly disposed towards us”. An army patrol sent to verify PLA presence in Aksai Chin was captured and kept in detention for two months. The dispute about Aksai-Chin came out in the open. Aksai Chin was claimed by India because it was part of princely state of J&K whereas China claimed it to be part of Tibet and Xinjiang. On 1 July 1954, Pt Nehru had stated in the Parliament that Aksai Chin had been part of Indian Ladakh region for centuries and the Western border was non negotiable. Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese. But access from India involved negotiating the Karakoram mountains and was much more difficult.  Aksai-Chin was as important for India as it was for China. None was ready to make any compromise over this barren wasteland which had never been visited leave aside inhabited by Indians. This war happens to have been fought over the ownership of this windswept desolated piece of land, ‘where not a blade of grass grows’ as per Pt Nehru’s statement in the Parliament.
Error of Judgement.
Why did India vehemently confront China on the border issue and finally suffered a humiliating defeat, is not known. It is incomprehensible that a govt headed by so highly regarded statesman as Pt Nehru could repeatedly make misjudgements after having miserably failed in Kashmir diplomacy earlier. As for the Army, its senior commanders allowed themselves be browbeaten into futile and implausible deployments along inhospitable Karakoram ranges. In 1960, Cho-En- Lai unofficially suggested that India drop its claim to Aksai Chin for withdrawal of Chinese claim over NEFA. But Nehru did not approve of it and declined to negotiate on the boundary issue till Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin. Implementation of forward policy was intended to prove Indian ownership of claimed territories. Initially Chinese troops withdrew from areas where Indian Army surfaced. CIA and Indian intelligence revealed that China would not react militarily to Indian occupation of advance positions. At first PLA avoided direct contact but later started encircling Indian positions. On 10 October Indian patrol 50 men was attacked by 1,000 Chinese troops. The stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin became cause of tension to the point that  internal forces succeeded in pressurising Nehru to take military stance against China.
Line of Actual Control (McMahon Line).
In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet met in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and British India. Whilst all the representatives initialled the agreement, Chinese govt objected to the proposed boundary and did not ratify it. Foreign Secretary of British govt Henry McMahon, who had drawn up the proposed boundary, decided to bypass China and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet. According to Indian claims, this border was to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas (watershed) as the areas South of it were traditionally Indian. However McMahon Line lay South of the watershed.  Chinese position is that the disputed areas in Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times.
Indian Defences in NEFA.
Incredible it may sound, responsibility for defence of NEFA at that time rested with ministry of foreign affairs and the force deployed was para-military Assam Rifles. Late in 1959 it was transferred to ministry of defence. After seeing Chinese presence in Aksai Chin, Nehru decided to extend Indian control over McMahon Line. As a result army was ordered to established military posts along the McMahon Line. Since there was no army in NEFA, 4 Div was uprooted from Ambala to assume defence role in North-East covering over 1,000 kms of border. On 12 October 1962, Nehru ordered the Army to ‘clear Indian territory in NEFA of Chinese invaders’ which was neither prepared, nor trained and not even equipped.
Causes of Indian Failure.
Following independence Pt Nehru continued to ignore military considerations in dealing with political issue. Gen Lockhart, 1st C-in-C of free Indian Armed Forces went to Nehru with a draft defence policy paper asking his directive. Glancing through it Nehru exploded, “rubbish, total rubbish. We don’t need a defence policy. Our policy is ‘ahimsa’ (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. As far as I am concerned, you can scrap the army. The police are good enough to meet our security needs”. China crossed over McMahon Line and attacked India on 20th October 1962 when Pt Nehru was at the helms to watch it helplessly. It is claimed that if any military minded leader had been in place instead of Pt Nehru, India would have met Chinese threat appropriately.
Peculiarities of the War.
The war is notable for the harsh mountain conditions under which the fighting took place entailing large scale combat at high altitude of over 14,000 ft. High altitude freezing conditions caused logistical and health difficulties. In the Italian Campaign of WW 1, more casualties occurred by the harsh weather conditions than enemy action. Sino-Indian conflict was no different with many soldiers on both sides dying of freezing cold. It is also known for non involvement of Navy and Air Force by either of the contending powers.
After the War.
Aftermath of war saw sweeping changes in Indian preparations for similar conflict n future. India reacted with surge in patriotism. Many Indians viewed it as betrayal of friendship. Indian govt commissioned an investigation resulting in ‘Henderson-Brooks’ report on the causes of war and the reasons for failure which was never declassified. Effort to increase its military capability started soon after the war resulting into making Indian Army third largest professional army of the world.
Lessons.
The moot question is have we learnt any  lesson form October 1962. Yes, we have. India is doing everything to counter Chinese meteoric rise by corresponding political, economic and military rise. In fact Indian foreign and defence policy has never been as focused as today as seen in govt initiatives in infrastructure development  and military build up along LAC.

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