Srihari Avuthu
26th July 2020 marks the twenty first anniversary of Kargil Vijay Diwas. Landmark events in country’s military history are commemorated to gratefully remember and pay homage to the martyrs, salutations to war heroes and recall the lessons and reflect upon their contemporary and future relevance in order to plan for a more secure future.
The Kargil war took place when a caretaker government was in power at the centre and midterm election to Lok Sabha were due. The limited war at Kargil took place in less than one year after both India and Pakistan officially became nuclear powers. India was stabbed in the back within months after Prime Minister Vajpayee undertook historic bus journey to Lahore with a message of peace and friendship.
In early 1999, the enemy took advantage of Indian troops temporarily vacating forward posts during winter as had been the annual practice till then. He had surreptitiously occupied mountain heights and placed himself in immensely advantageous position. Thanks to the emphatic directive of the political leadership not to cross Line of Control (LoC) in order to avoid the war being escalated into a full-fledged war which could mean a nuclear conflict, the armed forces had to fight the war within our side of LoC, which had put severe restrictions on war strategy and tactics. In spite of extreme inhospitable climate, difficult mountain terrain, having to mount the attacks from below to top of the mountains with steep peaks, the war could be won thanks to the raw courage, grit and determination of our brave soldiers. But the victory came at grate human cost.
Of the thousands of soldiers who took part in Kargil war, 527 became martyrs and came back draped in tricolor, and 1,363 got wounded. If we were having better intelligence, better surveillance and better war preparedness in terms of weapons and equipment, could we have reduced casualties to a great extent? Probably yes and therefore imbibing the lessons of the Kargil war is of utmost importance for efficiently ensuring our national security.
The Indian army was caught by surprise with the intrusion. Even after detection of the intrusion by chance intelligence by a local shepherd, it took about three weeks for the army to access the extent of the intrusion. Wily Pakistan denied its involvement and tried to portray it as a mujahideen operation. But Pak’s deceit was exposed with Indian intelligence intercepting and releasing to the media a series of three conversations between then Pakistan Army Chief Pervez Musharraf, speaking from Beijing with his Chief of Staff, General Aziz and Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan.
In the initial weeks, Indian army suffered heavy casualties and serious setbacks and many a time the troops could not make out where exactly the enemy fire was coming from. Several times, the troop moment was exposed to clear enemy view. Even the national highway No. 1 connecting Srinagar and Leh came under enemy fire putting constraints on troop moments. Army vehicles had to move at nights without lights to avoid enemy attention.
Though Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) was initially reluctant to permit use of air power to avoid risk of escalation, it finally gave green signal for use of air power. While Indian Army named the Kargil operations as ‘Operation Vijay’, the Indian Air Force undertook ‘Operation Safed Sagar’ and the Indian Navy too had put pressure on Pakistan through a deterrent deployment under ‘Operation Talwar.’ India lost two aircrafts – one MiG-21 and one MiG-27 – and a Mi-17 helicopter within three days of the launch of air attacks. Thereafter, aircrafts had to be flown at higher altitude to avoid the reach of enemy’s shoulder-mounted surface to air missiles.
Israel rendered great timely help by supplying laser guided bombs and technical assistance in integrating them with Mirage-2000 fighter bombers. Precision bombing by Mirage-2000 helped in somewhat softening the targets on mountain peaks and defeating the morale of the enemy. The major turnaround in the war in India’s favour came after Tololing top was recaptured by Indian army after winning an epic battle on June 13. There after the Indian army moved forward winning several battles peak by peak and the enemy was on the run within a few weeks and Indian army finally declared complete eviction of the intruders on 26th July 1999.
Immediately after the Kargil war, Vajpayee government appointed Kargil Review Committee (KRC) to review events leading to Pakistani aggression in Kargil and recommend measures to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions. KRC to its credit had swiftly undertaken its assignment and finalized its report by December 1999. While some recommendation of the KRC were implemented, some are yet to be implemented.
Over 75% of the casualties India suffered during Kargil war were due to the enemy artillery fire. Artillery locating radars were in army headquarters requirement list since 1994. Pakistan was having them well before 1999 and was able to focus its artillery fire on Indian gun positions. In 1997, the US had cleared sale to India of superior weapon locating radars than it had supplied to Pakistan, but the file was pending in the office of the Indian Defence Ministry due to bureaucratic lethargy. Had Indian army been in possession of artillery locating radars, we would have been able to reduce our casualties and inflicted greater casualties on the enemy. Though there was an already signed agreement between India and Russia under which Russia was to supply high resolution satellite photos, the agreed amount was hastily paid by India a few weeks after the start of the Kargil war and we got the photos only thereafter.
When the war was going on, the then Army Chief Gen VP Malik answering a question told media, “We will fight with whatever we have,” implicitly meaning ‘despite lack of sufficient ammunition and equipment.’ The ban on Bofors had to be lifted after the start of the war to facilitate urgent import of spares. It was unfortunate that ammunition and equipment were in depleted state during the Kargil war and the government had to rush for emergency purchases.
Kargil war emphasised the need to operationally and logistically integrate the three-armed forces and establish a seamless command structure to meet the challenges of modern warfare. While the post of Chief of Defence Staff, which was recommended by KRC in 1999, was created in 2019 after the twentieth anniversary of Kargil war, much needs to be done in respect of creating integrated theatre commands and also integration of Ministry of Defence with service headquarters and bridging the civil military gap.
KRC recommended framing of a National Security Doctrine, a vision document from which military security strategy and force planning would follow and this recommendation was reiterated by Shekatkar Committee on reforming the armed forces in 2017, but is yet to be implemented. In view of growing China Pakistan nexus and India having to face continuously adamant Pakistan and increasingly aggressive China, we need to have a high-level defense preparedness at all times.
(The author is an advocate and Organising Secretary of Social Cause.)
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