Tsering Dawa
Immediately after the decision of August 5th, 2019, China responded strongly. The spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Hua Chunying said, “China is always opposed to India’s inclusion of the Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India boundary into its administrative jurisdiction and this firm and consistent position remains unchanged.” She further said, “We urge India to exercise prudence in words and deeds concerning the boundary question, strictly abide by relevant agreements concluded between the two sides and avoid taking any move that may further complicate the boundary question”. In a meeting with India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, the Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi said “Indian Government’s announcement of the establishment of the Ladakh Union Territory, which involves Chinese territory, has challenged the country’s rights and interest in sovereignty”.
From the above-quoted remarks of Chinese officials, it is apparent that China was highly disappointed by the 5th August decision of complete integration of Ladakh with the Union of India. The tremor of this decision reached Beijing and raised serious questions on the credibility of the Communist Party of China (Gongchandang) on sovereignty (Zhuquan) and territorial integrity (Lingtu wanzheng) issues. After all, for Gongchandang the Zhuquan and Lingtu wanzheng are always a litmus test of their credibility among Chinese citizens. Evidently, there are several historical diversionary patterns that Gongchandang always recreates whenever it confronts public criticisms. Following India’s 5th August 2019 decision in June 2020, the tragic Galwan face-off happened, which according to many China watchers was a knee-jerk reaction of China against the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A and bifurcation of the erstwhile state of J&K into two union territories. Likely that Gongchandang has again taken a leaf out of its “deception with Chinese characteristics” manual. To what degree it will help. Is to be seen.
China didn’t hold the horses there, recently on 23 October 2021, during the 31st meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress, China introduced ‘The Land Border Law’ (NPC, 23 October 2021). According to Major General Ashok Kumar (retd) of CLAWS, this law has turned a border dispute into a sovereignty dispute. He further highlights that this law aims to make all of China’s territorial claims valid with the stroke of a pen. In Global Times, Liu Zongyi posits that “the fundamental reason why China has resolutely opposed India’s provocation in the border area is that India has been implementing its Forward Policy”. Now, will ‘Statehood’ demand also fall in the lexicon of Gongchandang as a ‘forward policy’? Is to be seen.
China is also concerned about India’s infrastructure boost along the border regions. More specifically in Ladakh, after the formation of a Union Territory, all sort of infrastructures is accelerated. So much so that on 14th October 2020, Zhao Lijian, the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said “China opposes the infrastructure India had built for the purpose of military detection and control, and does not recognise the “Union Territory of Ladakh” and ” Arunachal Pradesh” set up illegally by the Indian side”. This statement of Zhao Lijian came just a day after on 13th October 2020, the Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, dedicated 44 bridges constructed by the Border Road Organization (BRO) in five states and one union territory including Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim in the North East. The insecurity of China further accentuated in its Land Border Law, which prohibits the construction of permanent facilities ‘near’ China’s border without permission from Chinese authorities. Major General Ashok Kumar (retd) posit that “the vague wording could be interpreted to include both sides of the border, creating the potential for additional friction”. If we analyse China’s vexation from a geopolitical strategy perspective it is assuring that India’s gradual shift from ‘defensive’ to ‘offensive’ policy are some of the possible reasons. Strategic projects like Zojila tunnel, Chisumle-Demchok Road, Umling la, Nimmo-Padum-Darcha Road, adds migraine to PLA. According to recent China’s Border Law, any changes at the contested border will become a sovereignty issue, therefore China will not hesitate to use PLA, as the law provides legal cover to likely actions of PLA. Will Xi Jinping intend to be the leader of the “Second Hundred” (Mao Zedong is considered as a leader of the “First Hundred”) go back-foot and compromise on Zhuquan and Lingtu wanzheng? To be seen.
The other reasons why I consider the statehood demand for Ladakh as a ‘ticking bomb’ are certain domestic repercussions. It is well established that stability in Northeast India is vital for India’s internal security. Given the various fractions demanding statehood: Bodoland, Gorkhaland and Greater Nagaland or Nagalim. The materialisation of statehood for Ladakh will surely resurrect some of these demands which might later manifest in security spillovers in Northeastern states. Likely that our strategic pundits also brainstormed about it. It is also obvious that a stable and prosperous Ladakh is in the interest of the larger geopolitical ambitions of India. This is so because it would be challenging to justify and persuade the global audience about our rightful historical claims over the Gilgit-Baltistan region if our own house is on fire. Creating political instabilities in Ladakh for many decades may not serve the welfare and developmental purpose.
Internally the demand for ‘Statehood’ is not appealing majority of Ladakh because firstly majority of Ladakh was not consulted. The demand is also devoid of grassroots support and in a democracy it is critical. Demography of Ladakh is the other reason. In 1956, when Tripura was created as UT (without legislature) its population was 639,000 (1951 census). Thereafter only in 1971 Tripura was given Statehood status, its population then was 1,556,000 (1971 census). Similarly, Manipur was UT in 1956 with a population of 578,000 (1951 census), it was also given Statehood in 1971 with a population of 1,073,000 (1971 census). Likewise the case of Mizoram and Himachal Pradesh. Whereas, Sikkim being the odd case where Statehood was given to a population of 300,000. It is critical to highlight that internal political outcry against the monarch Chogyal Paldan Thondup Namgyal leading to Statehood and merger with the India were all related.
The unsustainable revenue dimension also adds apprehensions among naysayers. To cite an example of Sikkim, the share of its secondary sector (processing, construction, infrastructure and industries) in its State GDP (GSDP 2019-20) is 62.7 per cent, while 10.2 per cent (primary sector) and 27.2 per cent (tertiary sector). Contrary to Sikkim, the tertiary sector (tourism) of Ladakh contributes almost 50 per cent of our GSDP. Now the moot question: will the fragile ecosystem of Ladakh sustain such over-burdened revenue demand? Even in State like Goa the entire tertiary sector constitutes only 38 per cent of its GSDP (2019-20), while secondary sector contributes 54 per cent. Lastly, as the demand of UT took decades to absorb, thousands of protests to assimilate and three of our brave souls were martyred. Therefore it is likely that ‘statehood’ demand (if sustain) will take many decades to justify among common people of Ladakh, and another many more decades to actualise. On that journey, if we lose sight of our original demand of ‘Constitutional safeguard’, then in my opinion Statehood demand is ado about nothing.
At this critical crossroads only constitutional safeguard protecting local interest should be the priority. The demand for ushering Constitutional safeguard for Ladakh on the lines of the provisions of Sixth Schedule under Article 244(2) and 275(1) of our Constitution to already existing Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDCs) may be a safer option. Whereas Statehood status for Ladakh will invite many domestic and international security dimensions. In the age of both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare the demand from the local population should also be well deliberated and calculated.
(The author is Ph.D Research Scholar Centre for East Asian Studies, SIS JNU, New Delhi)
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