Indo-Pak talks

I have lost count of the number of times I have professionally been involved in writing on and about the numerous initiatives by India and Pakistan- each described at the time as very promising- to sort out their bilateral problems. Sometimes the expectations were very high indeed, at other times it was, in the words of a former Chief Minister of Kashmir, a matter which usually ended with “nishastam’, guftam, shneedam and raftam”, which translated from his Persian version meant “we met, we talked, we heard and we left”.
The summing up would in fact be more appropriate, given the harsh reality on each such occasion was that when hopes of a possible settlement were raised, the two countries in fact looked further apart than before. The worst such meetings, Gen. Musharraf’s Agra summit (with AB Vajpayee) apart, was the one at Shimla which brought Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and his daughter Benazir, a comely teen-ager then, to the picturesque Himachal capital, which once served as the summer capital of India for the British rulers in times long gone by.
The Shimla “accord” -discord it turn out to be- rankles in particular, because it did provide a great opportunity for top leaders of the day to work out a lasting settlement.
In the event, the clever Z.A. Bhutto was keen only to get back his 90,000 Pakistani POWs after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and in the process he raised visions of a lasting settlement at the end days of hard-bargaining, which on Bhutto’s insistence, committed the two countries to resolve all outstanding disputes “including Kashmir” bilaterally.
Four decades later, another Pakistani leader who had raised high hopes of a peaceful relationship between the two neighbours, sent the dialogue back in time, to the realm of impossibility, invoking UN resolutions, nearly six decades old, and overlooked by him in his earlier stints as Prime Minister. Indo-Pak relations, long held hostage to the Kashmir conflict, have according to indications from the ground, yet again been allowed to go out of hand, thanks mainly to the continuing face-offs along the cease-fire line and, more ominously, along the well defined international boundary in parts of Jammu province.
Protests have been lodged, warnings issued but with no end in sight to the cease-fire violations. And in the midst of all this comes the prospect of a meeting between the External Affairs and Mr. Sartaj Aziz, a one-time Foreign Minister and currently a top adviser to the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Sartaj Aziz is an old hand at Indo-Pak negotiations. He has led several rounds of talks with Indian counterparts in the past.
The problem with Mr. Aziz to me appears to be the same as it has been with his Indian counterparts : both represent a past mired in mutual suspicion and clouded by bureaucratic myopia which has never allowed the two to understand that all “unsettled” issues between need to be given a “fresh” look, placing fresh ideas before one another rather than repeating the old hackneyed positions, coloured by long decades of mistrust and hostility. Sartaj Aziz, advisor on foreign affairs and national security to Nawaz Sharif, is to come to New Delhi next month for the Asia-Europe meeting (Nov. 11-12), a 51-menber body comprising 49 European and Asian countries and two regional groups, the European Union and ASEAN. The prospects, one is told routinely, are very bright as of now for Mr. Aziz and Salman Khurshid to try their hand at restoring a semblance of normality to bilateral relations.
Aziz is no stranger to tensions between the two countries and has met Khurshid twice already which will make their next month’s meeting their third. But unfortunately for Khurshid, he suffers from the disadvantage of his government being virtually on its last legs and his recent gaffe about Chinese incursions in Ladakh having cost him some of his credibility. Aziz, on the other hand, represents the hardliners, by which I don’t mean he will be unreceptive to fresh ideas put before him. The truth, though, is that both sides are in no position just now to make sharp departures from their well-trodden positions.
Mr. Sartaj Azaz, I may recall for the record, was one of the originators of suggesting the altering of demography on our side of the high features along the LOC, particularly in Jammu region, seeking to ensure the forced departure of the Hindu population from their homes along the high mountain regions, thereby making sure these were accessible to Pakistanis. This has in fact been done to a large extent. The idea was floated by him some two decades ago.
I am mentioning this to highlight Mr. Aziz’s hawkish position then and in this context I don’t see his talks with Salman Khurshid yielding much. But, then, to keep talking is indeed far better than not talking at all.
My problem essentially lies with the failure of both sides to think in positive terms, moving to a more rational and balanced approach to resolving bilateral problems, more particularly Kashmir. I would be happy if the two sides for the present at least limit themselves to ensuring peace on the LOC and the IB and simultaneously resume confidence building initiatives, a task which had been well begun during the Musharraf era.
For New Delhi the Immediate and short term response to internal developments in Jammu and Kashmir will have to be increased vigil and tough measures to counter the threats. But care must be taken not to further alienate the people in the name of counter-insurgency
Irrespective of what Pakistan can or cannot do, militancy can only be contained and defeated with the support of the people of the State. In political terms this means a search for ways to meet the democratic aspirations of the Kashmiris which has to be integral to India’s Kashmir policy. Reports from the ground suggest a growing upsurge in the simmering anti-India sentiment in the valley. The main stream political parties in the State must be encouraged in efforts to contain the discontent. This can be done. I remember how Mufti Muhammad Sayeed , particularly during his term as the Chief Minister, succeeded in creating a special bond between the people and the administration he headed. He had in fact managed to successfully address some of the causes of discontent among sections of the people in the valley. His People’s Democratic Party was then seen as a positive force in the Jammu region as well. The Mufti, even out of power, should try to build up on what he had achieved then. This is not to accuse Omar Abdullah and his party of having failed on this score but only to emphasise that the Mufti commands much respect and influence on a wider scale in the valley.