Girish Linganna
As diplomatic efforts persist in addressing the ongoing border standoff between China and India, a fresh source of tension is emerging, centred around water resources. New Delhi is in the process of revitalizing 12 hydropower projects along the border, while China is actively constructing a substantial dam on Tibet’s Yarlung Tsangpo, also known as Zangbo River. This river serves as the upper course of the trans-boundary Brahmaputra, flowing through dramatic gorges to eventually reach northeastern India and Bangladesh.
India is embarking on the construction of new dams in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, with an estimated cost of US$15.3 billion. These projects are anticipated to collectively yield a substantial 11,517 megawatts of energy. It’s worth noting that Arunachal Pradesh has been a contested area, with China asserting claims to it, including in the present year.
India and China have a contested de facto border spanning 3,440 kilometres (2,100 miles), commonly referred to as the Line of Actual Control. The presence of rivers and lakes in the region contributes to the ongoing challenge of precisely demarcating this boundary, making it susceptible to shifts and disputes.
Shortly after Delhi’s declaration regarding the revival of its dam projects, on August 28, Beijing unveiled updated maps of China, which included claims to portions of Arunachal Pradesh and asserted its ownership of the entire Aksai Chin region. Aksai Chin is predominantly administered by China, while India contends it as a part of its larger Kashmir region. Historically, China has asserted its ownership of the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh.
According to a government statement released on August 12, India’s hydropower projects had been assigned to private companies for construction approximately 15 years ago, but they did not commence due to various reasons, remaining inactive during that time.
The prevailing belief is that these projects faced initial hurdles, primarily related to financing. However, Delhi has now made the decision to proceed with their construction. This action represents the most recent and significant effort by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to enhance infrastructure development in the contested region, especially during a period of strained relations with China.
In March, the Modi administration granted approval for the construction of what was termed the “largest hydroelectric power facility” in the country, situated on the Dibang River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra in Arunachal Pradesh. This project comes at an estimated cost of nearly US$4 billion.
India is in the process of planning a substantial hydropower project in the town of Yingkiong within the state, located approximately 200 kilometres (124 miles) from the Chinese border. This ambitious project, with an estimated cost of US$14.5 billion, aims to generate an impressive 10 gigawatts of power. Indian media reports have described it as a pivotal initiative in countering China’s ambitious water diversion efforts. To provide a comparison, generating 1 gigawatt (GW) of electricity would require the installation of over 300 wind turbines.
According to analysts, India’s significant drive in hydropower projects not only corresponds with its development goals but also serves as a means to assert territorial claims and protect itself against potential “psychological warfare.” This term was previously mentioned in a US research paper a decade ago, suggesting that China could utilize such tactics from upstream areas during times of conflict.
China’s ongoing construction of dams along the Yarlung Tsangpo has been a source of concern for an extended period. In its 12th Five Year Plan, which spanned from 2011 to 2015, China had intentions to advance “three additional” hydropower projects “on the primary course” of Tibet’s Brahmaputra river. This information was provided by India’s Ministry of External Affairs in response to a parliamentary inquiry in March of the previous year.
According to a 2023 report from the Lowy Institute think tank, there were already eleven Chinese dams either constructed or in the planning stages along the Brahmaputra River. In November 2020, Beijing unveiled plans for an enormous hydroelectric project with the potential to generate 70 gigawatts (GW) per hour, significantly surpassing the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam, which is presently the world’s largest with a capacity of 22 GW.
While the precise location of the new project remains undisclosed, clues suggest that it may be situated in the “Great Bend” area, a critical region just a few kilometers upstream from the Indian border. This area is significant as it marks a sharp turn in the river’s course toward Arunachal Pradesh.
As Medha Bisht, an associate professor in the department of international relations at Delhi’s South Asian University, pointed out to media persons, dams have indeed been constructed on the Yarlung Zangbo in Tibet over the past two decades.
The apprehension arises from China’s current emphasis on the lower sections of the river, which, as noted by Medha Bisht, an associate professor in the department of international relations at Delhi’s South Asian University, could potentially have ecological repercussions, including land degradation, changes in sedimentation patterns, and the risk of flash floods. Moreover, strategically, it raises concerns about the possible use of dams to redirect water towards the east. Compounding these concerns in India is the absence of a water-sharing agreement with China.
Opangmeren Jamir, a research analyst at Delhi’s Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, pointed out to media house that the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, through which the river courses, is a subject of dispute and claimed by China as its own. Consequently, it becomes highly challenging for India and China to establish a water-sharing arrangement in this area.
Instead, both nations depend on a memorandum of understanding established in 2002, which mandates that China shares hydrological data about the river during flood seasons. However, this agreement, which is renewed every five years, lapsed in June.
According to the Indian Ministry of Water Resources website, the agreement has not been renewed as of now. The absence of an official treaty creates a precarious gap, as experts argue that informal agreements are inadequate, particularly in periods of diplomatic tension.
Amit Ranjan, a research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies, explained to a media house that when both countries maintain positive relations, they engage in agreements, diplomatic discussions, and data sharing. However, when relations are strained, this approach becomes problematic. The potential dangers of depending solely on a memorandum of understanding are underscored by past events.
In 2017, during a period of escalated tension marked by a 72-day military border standoff at the Doklam trijunction involving China, India, and Bhutan, China suspended the sharing of water-flow data regarding the flood levels of the Yarlung Zangbo. While China contended that the data wasn’t shared due to technical issues, Delhi interpreted the situation as an indication of the potential weaponization of water in future conflicts.
A 2013 report from the US Naval War College’s Centre for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups also highlighted that China’s position as an upstream nation afforded it “the capability to disrupt the food supply of its largest neighbour, India.” This assessment pertained to the crucial role of the Brahmaputra River in supporting agriculture in the region.
The paper emphasized that China’s capacity to create dams could potentially lead to “triggering water and food scarcity” in India and Bangladesh, constituting a significant existential threat. In the past year, an Indian parliamentary committee voiced concerns regarding China’s dam construction, expressing apprehensions that it could involve the storage and controlled release of water to operate its own turbines.
According to the panel, such actions could potentially result in fluctuations in the downstream flow, which, in turn, might impact the Brahmaputra River and consequently hinder India’s efforts to harness the water resources in the region. Ranjan concurred that in the event of a significant deterioration in bilateral relations, the issue of water-sharing could be exploited as a strategic weapon.
In an ideal scenario, water-sharing discussions and diplomacy should remain distinct, but, as he pointed out, this isn’t always the case. Amit Ranjan noted that heightened bilateral tensions could potentially disrupt the basic data-sharing arrangement that currently exists between the two countries. He stated that when suspicions cloud the bilateral relationship, there are also uncertainties regarding the credibility of the shared data. However, Delhi’s strategy to initiate an extensive construction spree in Arunachal Pradesh, a well-known “ecological hotspot,” may also come with associated consequences.
Simultaneously with the Indian government’s announcement of the revival of the 12 dams, two activists were apprehended in the capital of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, for staging protests against the water projects. Local protests against the dams have previously been robust, primarily centred on concerns about the possible displacement of residents and environmental harm.
“Arunachal Pradesh is a biodiversity hotspot,” emphasized Jamir. “It is of utmost importance that both India and China take this into consideration when planning projects in the region.” (IPA)
(The author is a Defence, Aerospace & Political analyst based in Bengaluru)
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