Col Ajay K Raina
A lot has been speculated about the political leadership’s involvement in the decision-making process that saw the launch of Operation Koh-e-Pahima (also referred to as Operation Badr) in Pakistan. Obviously, sensitive information is seldom available in the open domain in real-time. However, With time, things reveal themselves, helping observers form an opinion about an issue. Amusingly, based on the transcripts of two telephonic conversations between the then Pak army chief, General Musharraf (who was in China) and his Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Aziz, released by the Indian Government after an interception of such communications by our intelligence agencies, many in India had raced 
at an amazing speed to give a clean chit to the then Pak PM Nawaz Sharif. After all, those bending over their backs to have so-called ‘Aman ki Asha’ going could not imagine Nawaz shaking his right hand with the visiting Indian PM at Lahore while waving his left one to signal Musharraf to launch the operation!
25 years, however, is a long time. The truth may be slow to come out, but it does emerge finally. As the nation celebrates the Vijay Diwas to commemorate our victory over the Pakis in 1999, a certain amount of clarity is now available. General Musharraf is gone, but not before giving interviews and writing a book; Nawaz is defunct but still the defacto PM, and the then foreign secretary of Pakistan, Shamshad Ahmed, is going around telling an anecdote here and a story there. As a result of all this and more, we have a fair idea about the involvement of Pakistan’s civil government in the issue.
Granting the devil its due, our peaceniks were partially right when they claimed that Musharraf had ordered the operation without taking Nawaz into confidence. But their further claim of the absolute innocence of Nawaz is completely misplaced. Drawing from personal interviews, deep research and investigative journalism, a Pakistani author, Nasim Zehra, wrote a book, From Kargil to The Coup: Events That Shook Pakistan, wherein she reconstructed the interactions during those eventful days. In the succeeding paragraphs, a gist of the inputs from the above-cited sources is given for a correct understanding of the issue.
PM Nawaz had a thorough operational briefing on Operation Koh-e-Paima on May 17, 1999, in the ISI’s Ojhri Camp office, which is located not far from Islamabad. It was carried out in response to Indian media claims alleging that Mujahideen had penetrated along the LoC in the Kargil sector.
A comprehensive presentation was delivered by Lt Gen Tauqir Zia, Director General of Military Operations. The whole Kargil clique was in attendance, including Army Chief Gen Pervez Musharraf, the CGS Lt Gen Aziz Khan, DG ISI Lieutenant General Ziauddin Butt, Commander 10 Corps Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed, and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) Brigadier Javed Hassan and a few key men from ISI. Nawaz Sharif, accompanied by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, the finance minister, the Minister for Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs, the Foreign Secretary and his principal secretary, attended the briefing.
This was the prime minister’s and his cabinet colleagues’ first interaction with the people who designed and carried out the Kargil operation. “Sir, as per your desire, we have made a plan to upgrade the freedom movement in Kashmir,” DGMO Zia said at the start of the presentation. He clarified that the first phase of the five-phase procedure had already been finished. He continued by displaying scores of spots that had previously been claimed on the map. However, the briefing was conducted using text-free military maps. They had only symbols on them and nothing written on them. Not even the LoC had a distinct border on the map. Even the LoC was not clearly demarcated on the map. Hence, during the presentation, when Pakistani and Indian positions were pointed out to the prime minister, he was unable to comprehend the locations of these posts fully. Instead, for him, the main focus of the briefing was the achievements of the Pakistani troops. There was no mention of Pakistani troops crossing the LoC nor of the Pakistani troop build-up five to 10 kilometres beyond the LoC.
The DGMO explained that, in phase two, “We will infiltrate freedom fighters into Leh and Ladakh, who will start the insurgency in the area.” In phase three, the general predicted that when pressure was applied on the Indian forces from the flanking sectors through the operations of these infiltrating groups, the Indians would start bringing their troops to Ladakh and Jammu, leaving the valley virtually drained of troops. In phase four, the DGMO explained, Pakistan would rush in large numbers of freedom fighters into the Valley and block the Banihal and Zoji La passes, thereby isolating the valley and occupying the area. The general predicted that in phase five, the final phase, the Indians would be on their knees begging for talks, and Pakistan could dictate its own terms.
The DGMO proceeded to share the four assumptions which, according to its planners, guaranteed the success of the five-phase Op KP. First, each post being held was impregnable. Second, the Indians did not have the will or the determination to take on Pakistan in a fight and would not make any serious effort to regain the heights. Third, as far as the international context was concerned, Pakistan needed not worry because there would be no external pressure. Fourth, the army recognised the economic crunch faced by the country, and therefore, the government would not be asked for any extra resources for the operation; the army would use its own resources to fulfil the financial requirements.
The main purpose of the briefing was to tell the civilian attendees that the operation would quicken the pace of jihad, that Pakistan was only offering logistical support and that the Mujahideen were alone in conducting the operations, and that the peaks they had captured militarily were unassailable. India would “make noise, then respond militarily, but the fighting to follow would be restricted to the operations area,” the planners of Operation KP were certain of. The participants were informed that at last, India would remain silent and announce to its people that it had recaptured the peaks.
It was obvious that the masterminds behind Kargil were not asking for permission to carry out the operation they had already started. Nawaz was presented with a fait accompli. The Kargil clique was looking for political and diplomatic cover for the operation because Op KP’s cover was about to be exposed and diplomatic pressure was about to mount. It was explicitly asked of Nawaz whether he and his team could use their unchallenged military record to project and advance the cause of Kashmir politically and internationally.
Following the DGMO, the CGS Aziz Khan rose to flatter Nawaz. “Sir, Pakistan was created with the efforts of the Quaid and the Muslim League, and they will always be remembered for creating Pakistan, and now, Allah has given you the opportunity and the chance to get India-held Kashmir, and your name will be written in golden letters,” he declared. CGS Aziz also invoked the PM’s Kashmiri descent and lured him with the possibility that “after Quaid, it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the Fatah-i-Kashmir.”
The ISI’s point man for Afghanistan and Kashmir, Lieutenant General Gulzar, also gave a presentation on the Mujahideen. Gulzar recounted the limitations of the Mujahideen, their inability to inflict heavy damage on the Indian Army, capable only of ‘softening’ the environment for the Pakistan Army to move in. He claimed that the only route available for the movement of Indian weapons, troops and supplies in the Srinagar and Leh area was where the Mujahideen could lay ambushes, attack isolated military posts, and blow up bridges and culverts.
After the briefing, the prime minister did not pose any challenging questions. The elected prime minister chose to accept the fait accompli that the military had brought to him, based on what he knew about the operation. He seemed to be confident that Operation KP would help him achieve his goal of finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute. The optimistic tone of the DGMO’s “victory all the way” presentation and the idea that he was well on his way to being the guy “whose name will go down in history in golden words as the man who liberated Kashmir” The prime minister took well to the words of the CGS that for the PM “after the Quaid it is a unique opportunity to be remembered as the Fatah-i-Kashmir.”
Flattery was in abundance. The CGS piled on more, “Sir, you will go down in the history of Pakistan as the PM in whose tenure Kashmir was resolved.” In response to this, Nawaz responded, “But then you didn’t tell me when you will fly Pakistan’s flag in Srinagar.”
The Prime Minister was assured of no military reverses, and he chose to believe his military commanders. Interestingly, at no point during the meeting was there any exchange between the PM and the military men signalling Sharif’s prior knowledge of the operation.
However, though a passing reference, one liner in the DGMO’s briefing gave away something very important, when he referred to the PM’s March approval given at the ISI-convened meeting to “upgrade the freedom movement in Kashmir.” Nawaz, unlike his cabinet colleagues, had been briefed earlier too! What he was told would never be known but he was told something for sure. As per various reports that are now out in the open, as the meeting drew to a close, the CGS proposed a joint prayer for the success of Op KP. The prime minister asked him to lead the joint prayer. He was already dreaming of becoming Fatah-i-Kashmir!
(The author is a military historian and a Founder-trustee of the Military History Research Foundation)
Follow our WhatsApp channel
