Revisiting security scenario in Jammu

T K Singh
While Indian security sleuths begin to earn a striking reputation with serial arrest of Indian Mujahedeen (IM) top operatives from several parts of the country, an unpredicted fidayeen attack in Kathua, Jammu on 28 March 2014 shakes the nation in which, even both the Army and Border Security Force (BSF) Chiefs had to brief their Ministers on the incident. The attack was carried out by three Pakistani militants when security has been significantly revamped for the upcoming Lok Sabha poll in Jammu on 10 April 2014. Though they were neutralised by security forces at the spot, the consumption of 12 long hours in the operation apparently indicates the weakness or questioned the skills of military combatants. Such meticulous attack, not only threatens the safety and security of the forthcoming election, but also reveals the lapses of security arrangement including the intelligence proceedings.
The unfortunate incident in Kathua took place few days later a number of top IM operatives were arrested with arms and ammunition in sequence. Many including security agencies and political leaders believed that the arrestees were intended to disturb the election campaign especially that of Bharatia Jananta Party’s (BJP), and attack on security personnel. The first significant arrest took place on 22 March 2014 when a team of Delhi and Rajasthan Police arrested Zia Ur Rehman aka Wakas, a Pakistani national and his three other associates along with huge cache of explosive materials, detonators and electric circuits/devices from Ajmir and Jodhpur in Rajasthan. Based on Wakas interrogation, the second important arrest happened on 25 March 2014 when Tehseen Aktar aka Monu, current operational Chief of IM (after Yashin Bhatkal arrest in August 2013) was captured from Indo-Nepal border in Pani Tanki area of Naxalbari village, Darjeeling, West Bengal. The last achievement of the security agencies was observed when Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) of Uttar Pradesh arrested Karachi (Pakistan) residents Faheem and Murtaza with AK47 rifles and .30 Chinese pistols from a railway station in Gorakhpur on 27 March 2014.
While security agencies are celebrating their success on the serial arrest of IM members, the gruesome fidayeen attack in the midst of high alert in Jammu captures national attention. The Union Home Minister Sushilkumar Sindhe and Defence Minister A K Anthony demanded explanation on the incident from their service Chiefs D K Pathak (BSF) and Bikran Singh respectively. Apparently, both the heads agreed that there was a security lapses in the region. At around 04.47am on 28 April 2014, the three alleged Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) members, heavily armed with automatic rifles and explosive devices intercepted a Bolero car at Tarnah Bridge at Dayala Chak near Hiranagar in Kathua District and killed two civilians who were on board. They rode the hijacked vehicle for 19 Km long, passing security checkpoint and major towns (Chadwal, Rajbagh and Palli) on Jammu-Pathankot National Highway without any intervention from security forces. As soon as they reached an Army camp in Janglot, the trio began to fire and carried out their last suicide mission. One soldier was killed by the militants, before they were neutralised by the Army and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Regrettably, the encounter took nearly 12 lengthy hours.
As the strength of a horse is tested by the journey it travels, the capability of the militants was shown by their endurance ability during the operation. Their extended survival in the skirmishes signifies the fidayeens skilful tactics. However, it contrarily exposed the weakness of combatants too. For those experienced forces who posted in Indian sensitive zones (disturbed areas), the counter operation that the full combined forces fought from 07.00am till 06.30pm to contain mere three militants possibly had occupied extra time. This error is common in India and one of the classic examples is the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack in which forces took almost 72 hours (three days) in combating nine Pakistani terrorists.
The Kathua incident not only highlights the avoidable prolonged operation, it also throws a big challenge to the technical intelligence (TECHINT) communities that monitored infiltration and exfiltration activities in border areas. Unlike in other fidayeen attacks, there is no sign of the trio using communication devices which can be traced down in real time. This somehow questioned if the modus operandi of the current terror operatives are being modified, fighting without communication devices. Even though AK rifles, pistols and IEDs are recovered from the slain militants, no mobile handsets or satellite phones except a torn Global Positioning System (GPS) was confiscated. Unfortunately, like other communication devices, this electronic system (GPS) may not be traceable in real time except for back traced data retrieving. Nonetheless, the recovered GPS system can help in discovering the past travelled direction of the three militants, which otherwise could prove their infiltrated route.
Infiltration has been the main concerns for security establishments for the safety conduct of upcoming election in Jammu. In fact, the slain militants that earlier launched a fidayeen attack in Sambha, Jammu on 26 September 2013 which took the lives of eight security personnel and two civilians were believed to be infiltrated from Pakistan, though the claim was denied by the BSF authorities. As disturbance by infiltrated militants seems to be imminent in the run up of this election, high extra security has been alerted in the bordering areas even with specific concerns from Chief Minister Omar Abdullah. Soon after the Kathua firing incident, he had directed BSF to take stern actions against infiltration and occupied free spaces along the Indian border.
Interestingly, the fidayeen attack in Kathua took place three weeks later the Jammu and Kashmir Director General of Police (DGP) Ashok Prashad on 02 March 2014 had stated that the region has been sanitised from potential threats, and a security grid is being established conducive for fair election. He further assured that suitable strategies are chalked out to prevent any untoward incidents during the event. Also to maintain the law and order situation better, the Chief Electoral Officer Umang Narula on 27 March 2014 declared that 5618 licensed weapons are deposited to the authority and 2553 police check post has been functionalised. While all the initiatives are indeed admiring, the recent fidayeen attack regrettably compels the security establishments to review the security scenarios in the region.
As it has been learned from the Kathua terror attack that the current security implementation needs to be augmented, authorities may like to revisit the security arrangement in the region. All the check post on the highways may be well manoeuvred to avoid free escapes of any miscreants/militants. As fidayeens have apparently changed their tactics or operated without communication devices, the monitoring agencies may consider other alternative methods while it continues to remain its traditional means. For a longer achievement, skills of the security personnel, especially those operated in sensitive zones can be enhanced to aloof from unworthy prolong operations. An extra addition of physical security apparatus (personnel) on the border areas or within, at least during the time of Lok Sabha poll could help in diverting another lost of innocent lives in Jammu.
(The author is is an Assistant Professor at the Department of National Security Studies in the Central University of Jammu, India.)