Bangladesh between Cultural Identity and Islam

Ashok Ogra
Let’s first state two facts: There are more Muslims living between India and Indonesia than living between India and Morocco. And yet there is relative peace in Muslim-majority countries in East and Southeast Asia compared to the conflict-prone Middle East and Arab countries. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that in East and Southeast Asia, Islam has substantially integrated with local heritage and cultures, leading to a more moderate practice of the religion that emphasizes coexistence.
This contrasts with the Middle East, where different interpretations of Islam, including more radical ideologies, have often led to internal and external conflicts. How else does one explain the lack of unity among 22 Arab nations who share same religion, language and history?
Second, Arab Muslims often see themselves as religiously “pure” when compared to non-Arab ‘converted’ Muslims.
The challenge for these non-Arab Muslim-majority countries lies in preserving, promoting and balancing rich cultural expressions with adherence to core Islamic values.
Let me frame this within the context of the 1947. Pakistan was created as a homeland for Muslims. However, the country experienced another partition in 1971, leading to the emergence of Muslim-majority Bangladesh. The West Pakistan establishment wrongly assumed that religious faith would override all other identities among the East Bengalis. When Muhammad Ali Jinnah announced that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan in Dhaka in 1948, it sparked massive protests in East Pakistan, even though only a few months earlier, Bengali Muslims had supported the Muslim League’s demand for a separate homeland.
This raises a critical question: If Bangladesh was born out of cultural nationalism rather than religion, why has it continued to witness persecution and discrimination since 1971 against minorities who too played an active role during the Bangladesh liberation movement.
Let me briefly examine this ongoing tension between religious faith and cultural diversity in four non-Arab Muslim countries-Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Iran: Iran has managed to incorporate Persian cultural traditions within the framework of Islamic practices. The celebration of the Persian New Year (Nowruz) is a prime example. Iranians take offense when mistaken for Arabs, remembering them as conquerors.
Since the 1979 revolution, both the government and the clergy, has heavily promoted a strong Shia Islamic identity-sometimes at the expense of Persian cultural elements. However, most Iranians continue taking pride in their Persian heritage, leading to a nuanced identity that blends both Islamic and cultural elements.
Despite occasional discrimination minority communities such as Christians (117,000), Parsis (25,000), Jews (8,750), Sikhs, and Hindus (45,000) generally experience a degree of protection under the constitution, though Islam is the official religion. There are churches and synagogues across Iran, and also two Hindu temples and Gurdwaras. ISKCON also has presence in Tehran. The minorities are allocated a few reserved seats in the Iranian Parliament (Majlis).
Interestingly, Iran see Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia and Israel as their primary adversaries.
Indonesia: Islam spread gradually in Indonesia, starting in the 13th century, and the people have historically practiced a form of “cultural Islam” that integrates local customs, resulting in a unique expression of Islam that differs from more orthodox interpretations found in the Middle East. The Abangan, a dominant group of Muslims in Indonesia, practice a form of Islam heavily influenced by mysticism and pre-Islamic traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and animism.
Garuda, a mythical bird and the mount of the Hindu god Vishnu, is the national emblem of Indonesia. Wayang, a traditional form of puppet theater, often performs stories derived from Hindu epics like the Ramayana and Mahabharata, symbolizing the enduring influence of Hindu mythology in Indonesian culture. All religions have equal rights according to the Indonesian laws. There are few Hindus and Christians in the Indonesian military including at senior level.
However, in recent decades, groups like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) have advocated for a more orthodox interpretation of Islam, sometimes at odds with local traditions and cultural practices. This shift has led to incidents like the tragic Bali bombing of 2002 which shook the nation. But on the whole most Indonesians relate well with multiple religions.
Pakistan: Reconciling pre-Islamic cultural richness with Islamic customs and traditions remains a challenge for Pakistan. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), founded in 1941 by Abul Ala Maududi, has successfully projected Islam as the defining force behind Pakistan’s identity, often at the expense of its diverse cultural roots, particularly those linked to the Indian subcontinent’s shared history.
The constitution declares Islam as the state religion. During General Zia’s regime, diversity was replaced with homogeneity; Arabization was encouraged, resulting in an identity crisis for many Pakistanis, who are forced to adopt a Pan-Islamic identity devoid of cultural content.
Today, Pakistan also suffers from major fault lines: violent Sunni-Shia strife and intra-provincial and intra community discord. There are also growing voices questioning the primacy given to Urdu (introduced by Mohajirs) at the expense of local languages-particularly Punjabi and Sindhi.
Bangladesh: Islam arrived in Bangladesh in the 13th century, through Muslim traders and Sufi saints. Bengalis-both Muslims and Hindus-hold their culture and language dear. This is evident in the Language Movement uprising of February 21, 1952 (now celebrated as International Mother Language Day) that led to the liberation of East Pakistan in 1971.
It is noteworthy that while West Pakistan was engulfed in communal violence during the 1947 partition, East Pakistan remained largely quiet and tranquil. V.P. Menon’s remarks on the exodus of refugees are revealing: “It has been estimated that up to the middle of 1948, about 6,000,000 non-Muslims were brought across the border from West Punjab and other provinces of Western Pakistan. About the same number of Muslims moved into Pakistan from Indian provinces. During the same period, about 1,250,000 non-Muslims crossed the border from Eastern Pakistan into West Bengal. These figures illustrate that the communal exodus from East Bengal was but a trickle.”
In his seminal book ‘A Suppressed Chapter in History’, Tathagata Roy elaborates on the rich cultural heritage that continues to influence the average Bangladeshi. “Bengali Muslims have been deeply influenced by a wealth of literature-much of it written by Hindus-ranging from the Chorjapod of the 11th century to the poetry of Rabindranath Tagore. This rich cultural heritage has left a lasting impact on their identity.”
No wonder Bengali life is deeply rooted in cultural traditions, and the mother tongue is an inseparable part of their identity. According to Maulana Hussain Ali, noted thinker and spiritual teacher: “The biggest problem the Bengali Muslims have in embracing their identity is their inferiority complex. This complex arises from the complexity of Hindu-Muslim relations… this complex begins with the dream of making Bangladesh into an Islamic country. People want the soil of this country, but not its culture. But we shy away from being good Bengali Muslims out of fear of becoming or remaining like a Hindu.”
This tension between two identities is a common feature among all converted Muslims-non-Arab Muslims. As Sir V.S. Naipaul remarked in his book ‘Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions Among the Converted Peoples’: “Islam is not simply a matter of conscience or private belief. It makes imperial demands. A convert’s worldview alters. His holy places are in Arab lands; his sacred language is Arabic. His idea of history alters. He rejects his own; he becomes, whether he likes it or not, a part of the Arab story. The disturbance for societies is immense, and even after a thousand years, can remain unresolved.”
Bangladesh’s moderate version of Islam began to shift in the 1980s, partly due to the growing influence of Wahhabism, fueled by Saudi funds that enabled the building of madrassas and mosques, and support extended to radical Imams. At the same time, many Bangladeshis traveled to the Persian Gulf in the wake of the 1970s oil boom, where they were exposed to a more rigid version of Islam. They returned with their earnings and newfound religious zeal. The country’s largest Islamist political party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, courted these returning expatriates.
Soon, several radical Islamist organizations emerged, terrorizing the Hindu community and intimidating those who challenged their vision of Islam, including educators, journalists, and politicians. They have also encouraged the Arabization of popular culture. For example, Dhaka airport now features its name in bold Arabic letters alongside Bengali and English-a change that began in the late 1970s. The introduction of Islam as the “State Religion” by General Zia ur Rehman in 1988 further pushed the Islamization of the polity.
The silver lining is that Bangladesh’s civil society remains vibrant and capable of responding positively to such trends and injustices. The conservative The Economist recently described civil society in Bangladesh as “robust.” Despite attempts by successive governments to discredit and weaken civil society, it continues to work tirelessly across sectors, including in the space of culture and among disadvantaged groups, including minorities. Bangladesh is perhaps the only Muslim-majority country where Hijras are recognized and granted minority rights.
Islam in Bangladesh is like a mirror reflecting multiple colors under the sun: veil and lipstick, verses and azans (calls to prayer), jeans and beards-all coexist. As a nation, it celebrates Bangla New Year by singing Tagore songs.
Today, Bangladesh is at a crossroads, finding itself in a delicate balancing act between preserving its vibrant, diverse heritage and accommodating the increasingly homogenizing influence of Islam.
This is what Dhaka-based Nilay Kumar Biswas,Secretary, Bangladesh Journalism Students Council, who also participated in the protest movement against Sheikh Hasina, told me over phone: “there is a strong belief that the new generation, with its commitment to tolerance and unity, will not allow extremism to take root. Their resilience and dedication to upholding the values of secularism give hope for a future where peace and inclusivity prevail.”
Therefore, the pressing question is: Will Bangladesh forge its own path by embracing a model that harmonizes cultural pluralism with Islamic identity, drawing inspiration from Iran’s approach and Indonesia’s philosophy of “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (Unity in Diversity) as embodied in Pancasila?
Or will it risk following the path of Pakistan, where pluralism has been suppressed, and pre-Islamic heritage has been systematically erased from public memory, leading to a fractured and dysfunctional society? The answer to this critical question lies in the unfolding of time.
(The author works for reputed Apeejay Education, New Delhi)