Dr S Saraswathi,
A united front of 14 Opposition parties took out a march to Rashtrapati Bhavan and presented a memorandum to President Pranab Mukherjee against the Land Bill, passed by the Lok Sabha. It is intended to stall the passing of the bill in the Rajya Sabha.
The incident is noteworthy more for its political significance than for the Bill’s contents. Opposition parties are not inclined to debate and improve the bill. They want to see it defeated in the Rajya Sabha, where they have a majority and score a political victory or force consideration of the bill by a Select Committee. This may force the Government to seek a constitutional method of pushing the bill.
In its enthusiasm to march fast in economic reforms that are considered absolutely necessary, the NDA Government has proclaimed a number of ordinances. It is now facing the problem of regularizing these by duly passing these in the two Houses of Parliament else these will lapse at end of Budget session.
The Constitution provides that except Money Bills, all others can originate in either Houses, but have to be passed by both. Any amendment should also be passed by both. In the present Parliament, the NDA has 395 members (including the Speaker) in the total of 543 in the Lok Sabha, and 59 out of 243 in the Rajya Sabha. Its numerical weakness in the latter is a big obstacle to its legislative ambitions. Winning Lok Sabha election is not enough for a party or alliance to carry out its policies, it needs Rajya Sabha support.
Among the ordinances considered most important for the next stage of economic reforms, the one on amending the Land Law passed by the previous Government is facing bitter opposition from many parties and by the public directly.
This law pertains to compulsory acquisition of land by Central or State Governments for Government projects, PPP projects, and private projects taken up for a “public purpose”. When the Land Law was passed in 2013 to replace the outmoded Act of 1894 – a relic of the British Raj – Congress and the BJP were able to cooperate. Perhaps, both had to assume people-oriented posture on the eve of election. Once the elections were over, they have reverted to normal time non-election politics.
The Bill was passed with nine amendments by the Lok Sabha on 10th March. Even an ally of the NDA, Shiv Sena abstained from voting, scared of opposition by farmers in Maharashtra and by Anna Hazare movement. Members of SAD & LJP, allies of BJP, had some misgivings, but finally extended support. The BJD MPs did not participate in voting. A total of 52 amendments were defeated or were not pressed.
Both the supporters and the opponents stick to their stand while neither is able to convince the other the validity of their stand. Opposition parties appear to have more faith in playing street-level politics than in debating issues in the Parliament.
In the cases of Mines Development & Regulation Bill and the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Bill passed by the Lok Sabha, the Government had to concede to the demand of the Rajya Sabha to constitute Select Committees for “detailed scrutiny” of the bills, which would lapse by 5th April, if not passed by the Houses.
In the case of amendment to the Land Law, the Government may consider re-promulgation of the ordinance so that it gets another six months to obtain the support. It can convene a Joint Session of Parliament to pass the Bill after its rejection in the Rajya Sabha. True, the Constitution has deliberately provided for a joint session. It is a legitimate procedure.
All bicameral Constitutions face the problem of differences between the two Houses in their legislative work. A way out is devised in a provision for a joint session, but it is rarely used as an instrument for enacting a law.
A reference to the Australian Constitution is unavoidable in discussing about “Joint Session” which provides for joint sitting of the Senate and the House of Representatives to overcome their differences. A deadlock is declared if a bill is rejected twice by the Senate at an interval of at least three months after which what is called “double dissolution election” can be held. If the new Parliament is also unable to pass the bill, a joint sitting of the two Houses may be convened and the bill is declared passed if voted by a majority of the total members.
In 1974, the Australian Parliament adopted the Health Insurance Bill providing for universal healthcare at a joint session. It also voted for Commonwealth Electoral Bill introducing the principle of “one vote, one value”. Thereafter, this parliamentary instrument has never been used.
In the UK, if a bill passed by the House of Commons is blocked in the House of Lords, it can be passed again in the Lower House and sent to Royal assent.
In France, Joint Committee, a device used often to resolve differences between the two Houses, can be formed to consider any bill other than constitutional bills. The bill should have been considered three times or twice if classified as “urgent” before a Joint Committee is formed. If this committee also fails to arrive at a compromise, the lower House has the final say.
So also, in Germany, Joint Committee has been instrumental in passing many bills. In matters relating to federal units, the upper House has the power of veto. In Canada, there is no provision for a joint session.
The Indian Constitution authorizes the President to call a joint meeting of the two Houses if a bill passed by one House is rejected by the other, or the two Houses don’t agree on the amendments proposed, or the Bill lies with the other House without being passed for more than six months. The fate of the bill is decided by majority of the members of the two Houses present and voting. No fresh amendments can be brought in the joint sitting. Constitutional amendments are beyond its purview.
In the history of the Indian Parliament, three legislations have been passed by Joint Session of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha – law prohibiting dowry in 1961, Banking Commission Act in 1978, and the POTA in 2002.
The Constituent Assembly did not regard joint session as an ideal solution to resolve conflict between the two Houses on any legislation. It did consider other alternatives like providing for passage in the Lok Sabha a second time, or allowing lapse of a prescribed time and thereafter approval by the Speaker, but rejected them.
In the present political scenario, when party animosities overtake public interest, legislations depend purely on the strength of numbers and not on the concept of national interest or public good. Sadly, the members of the Rajya Sabha today represent their parties and not the States. Hence, we face a situation not anticipated by the authors of the Constitution. Law making has become a political contest. The merits and de-merits of the legislations are lost in the race for mustering support. People don’t know the real import of proposed legislations, for there is no serious debate on the contents. The intention behind the provision for Joint Session is erased in practice.—INFA