Lt Gen. Bopinder Singh (Retd)
Reciprocal “surgical attacks” notwithstanding, globally, terror attacks are on the rise. Traditionally, places like Baghdad, Peshwar, Jerusalem and Kabul dominated the terror headlines, not anymore, terror in 2016 has struck Paris, Brussels, Orlando to Istanbul. No country is safe from the bloodlust and we have our own Pampore, Pathankot and now Uri. The asymmetric nature of the terror apparatus and operations has acquired sophistication, institutionalization and ‘franchisees’ that often blur and challenge, preemptive deciphering – Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu describes these spontaneous new patterns as, “a new kind of terrorism”.
The postscript of the Uri attack has expectedly triggered the debate on the ostensible intelligence-failure and the operational lapses on the ground. Clearly, there will be security and operational lessons to be learnt and internalized by the deployed units, which would be conducted by its own investigations and that of the other specialised agencies like the NIA, to plug henceforth – however, questions on ‘intelligence’ are more complex. With the backdrop of the current strife in the valley, a recently foiled fidayeen attack in the Poonch sector and the widely reported “spectacular terror attacks” on Indian military bases, the perennial “high-alert” would have been established, prior to the attack. However, it is not as simple as that, “high-alert” is virtually an existential reality of the valley and without specific/tangible information (which is usually not the case), it almost acquires a certain sweeping blanket-generality, leading to multiple wolf-cries and the slipping of that one fatal “hit”, owing to the dangerous onset of habituation. Post-facto dots are easy join, but the myriad security structures of the Indian Army, the Para Military and the State Police (along with multiple intelligence agencies) are a networking challenge by themselves. The reality is, surely certain lapses (be it intelligence, operational or deployment related) must have occurred as the LOC was breached along with the three tier counter-infiltration system, and thereforean urgent review and fix is inevitable – though, modern day terror comes unannounced and from the most unexpectedquarters. Therefore, the criticality of having the civilian population in psychological support of the deployed Army to deny terrorists cover, expose networks and create counter-pressure on the terror eco-system – today, this is a clear casualty of the political impasse in the Kashmir Valley (therefore the fertile possibility of sleeper-cells in the near vicinity).
Importantly, the dynamics of a suicide attack are different from the conventional “shoot-and-scoot” tactics of terrorists, who essentially live to fight another day. Typically the strike-impact of a suicide attack results in four times the fatality of a non-suicide attack (in August, more than 80 people were killed in the suicide attack in the Hospital in Quetta). Surety and a certain “scale” accompanies a suicide attack as the terrorist fed on religious-indoctrination moves brazenly towards maximum impact zone. But, classical counter-suicide attack measures like suspect arrests, targeted profiling and preemptive killings are constrained as the principal system of the terror industry in Kashmir is across the border and not within the sovereign reach of the Indian Army – in Kashmir, proximity to LOC ensures that the best hope is for a non-conducive civilian environment for the terror strain to survive without detection.A combination of reverence and fear of the terrorists by the civilians is less likely to lead them to inform of any suspicious movements or prospective terrorists and more likely to support, by simple but deadly, inaction.
However, for a terror industry to survive in a region, the presence of a benevolent state in active pursuit of terror as a state-policy is mandatory. The cold professionalism of a Pathankot attack or now the Uri attack, has clear watermarks of a “trained-professional” who operates with the know of certain military tactics and configures that go beyond the skillsets of the rag-tag training afforded by the terror organizations. The duplicity and complicity of the Pakistani establishment in the terror networks is a known fact, the Americans like the Indians and the Afghans are at the receiving end of Pakistan’s “Strategic Assets”, however geopolitical necessities and the presence of certain US assets deployed and invested in Pakistan ensures a certain behavioral ambiguity that stops short of calling the Pakistani bluff. Uri is in that sense not a new revelation or even an “inflexion” point, it is reflective of a nefarious state policy that has remained invested, irrespective of the optics and shenanigans in the bilateral dialogues or multilateral forums.
Baying for retaliation and “settling the score” after the Uri attack was both understandable, required and kosher, however the “surgical strikes” will not the end of terror dynamics in the region. The Indian Armed Forces are not designed to forgive or forget and they will continue retaliating at places and at the time of their choosing – the de riguerPakistani saber-rattling of nuclear weaponry as witnessed before the “surgical strikes”, was also witnessed in the build-up to Kargil, as well.
A strangulating combination of plugging the security-gaps, “naming and shaming” Pakistan at all international forums (providentially, the spin of “Islamizing” the cause of Kashmir can be cut short with ready support from both Afghanistan and Bangladesh) and reinitiating the process of thawing the freeze with the Kashmiris, is required in a seamless continuum. The reality ofwhat is possible, and what is beyond the very expansive gridlines of the Indian constitution needs to be clearly established. A credible and alternative political platform for meaningful engagement, beyond the Hurriyat (who have boxed themselves into non-negotiating positions) needs to be initiated at a furious pace. Beyond the popular war-bugles lurks the sober reality of the only successful counter-insurgencies in Punjab and Mizoram, which necessitated the meaningful integration of the disaffected civilians, before the tide turned firmly in favour of the Indian state. It is this political expansion, rapprochement and journey that is suspect and prone to failures – the Indian Armed Forces can and will take Uri on their chins to incorporate the tactical lessons and give back the terrorists and the Pakistanis, a lot more than what they received, like in the recent “surgical” retaliation – but the crippling political impasse has persisted for a very long time and there is no light at the tunnel on this front.
It is this part of the Kashmir algorithm that is requires an urgent fix and attention – the Indian Army can only do so much, already it is doing the additional tasks that are way beyond its pay and stated mandates, all other institutions of Governmental arms like the politicos, bureaucracy and the police agencies have to similarly punch, at least at their weights, if not above their weight like the Indian Army.
(The author is former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Puducherry)
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com
Follow our WhatsApp channel