Fidayeen attack on 166 Artillery Unit of the Army stationed just three kilometers from the Headquarter of 16 Corps, resulting in the martyrdom of seven army personnel including two officers, raises many disturbing questions which the army top brass and the Defence Minister will have to answer. This is notwithstanding the great sacrifices our soldiers are making while fighting Fidayeen. Defence Ministry will come out with its version of the story of this daring attack but anybody with serious interest in the security of the nation will do his exercise of analyzing the entire event of much consequence.
Geographically, Nagrota is not close to the border with Pakistan. There is not even a distant link between Pakistani border and Nagrota town. Yet the fidayeen have been able to reach the place of their choosing. It is a matter of serious concern that in the course of their movement upto the scene of operation in Nagrota, they were neither detected nor detained by any security agency.
A close look at the strategy and movement of the fidayeen right from the first short they fired on the sentry of the Artillery Unit to the last one they fired and fell to the bullets of the troops, shows that they had made very careful and intensive survey of the entire campus and had zeroed in on the family quarters of the soldiers, the most vulnerable target. Thanks to the wit and courage of the two women inmates who stonewalled their breaking into the quarters.
It is clear that fidayeen and their handlers have established a network in the State where they have sympathizers, guides, luggage carriers and those who can render assistance in logistics of an attack. On the one hand we have such a large posse of security personnel deployed all over the State and on the other hand we have allowed free and unchecked movement of armed jihadis upto Nagrota. It speaks volumes of involvement of many local traitors in the conspiracy. Let us accept that this is a clear security lapse that has cost us the precious lives of our soldiers including two officers at a young age.
We cannot accept the theory that a new Army Chief was taking over in Pakistan and that he wanted the Indians to know from day one that Pakistan army envisages not an iota of change in its policy of exporting jihad to Kashmir. The fact is export of jihad into Kashmir is the patent policy of Pakistan army and change of guard does not mean change of policy. Moreover, Nagrota attack has taken good deal of time to reach the culmination point. This type of fidayeen attack takes many days and weeks of preparation.
It is now Pakistan’s established policy to intensify proxy war in Kashmir. Even Kashmir chapters of LeT, HuM and JeM seem to have reinforced their ranks and calibrated attacks on army and BSF camps. Naturally, we also need to calibrate our response. It has to be a multi-dimensional response.
Our border have become porous, may be for two reasons. One is that the infiltrators have found new routes and entry points and the second reason is that more local people living across the border are committed to render support and guidance to the jihadis intending to sneak in. It is time that the Defence Ministry should consider revisiting its LoC and IB policy. Major infiltration takes place either across the Pir Panchal or the Shamsbari Mountains.
Recognizing the supreme sacrifice made by our soldiers martyred in Nagrota attack, we bow our heads while remembering them and send condolence to their bereaved families. This nation will remember them and their sacrifices for all times to come.