Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
Director General of Police, J&K, SP Vaid is absolutely correct. The trend of flash mobs being concentrated at encounter sites in the Valley is now witnessing a virtual suicide tendency on the part of many local Kashmiri youth. Suicide terror has never been associated with the local terrorists. The so called Fedayeen actions have seen involvement of local terrorists but these are essentially ‘resist unto death’ type of actions, not the classic suicide bombing activities witnessed in sub conventional conflicts in parts of the Islamic world. Chest baring young men are now daring the security forces (SF) to fire at them. The dilemma for the state and its organizations is usually intense whenever such violence has to be dealt with. Punitive actions by the security forces in typical law and order situations are calibrated to detract people taking law in their hands; those situations are temporary and overcome with turning the screw just a bit. However, what is being witnessed in J&K is not a law and order situation but one involving serious public disorder with threats to national integrity. In rest of India there are negative passions galore recommending extreme steps by law enforcing authorities with advisories not to soft pedal such brazen anti national acts. Anger in rest of India is legitimate as brazen resistance against law enforcers cannot go on with impunity. Yet, enforcing authorities are also not expected to abide by public advisories which may be ridden by passion and irrationality. What is definitely expected is that these situations are to be seriously war gamed and solutions found. The problem is not local alone, it is national. It therefore cannot be left to the state authorities alone. The stamp of application of experience and mind needs to be nationwide.
We need to be clear about what exactly is happening and how the situations pan out in the events being witnessed. Let me explain from experience and observation. For many years one is aware just how strong and how widespread are the structures of the Separatists. District, tehsil and block wise hierarchy exists with ‘specialists’ who are given their responsibilities. The virtual intelligence arm of the Separatists is well embedded. There are rabble rousers ready to respond in quick timeframe. Outreach to media is instant, to get the first point of view home. Care is taken to ensure no over exposure of this level of leadership. One of the known ways of preventing the SF intelligence from being effective is that the stone throwers and flash mobs are usually brought from neighboring towns and villages so that they are not easily identifiable to the local troops and police. The local level leadership is faceless and diffused with power concentrated in the hands of many rather than a few. This prevents compromise and identification. The front face is projected to be of juveniles so that there is reluctance to arrest and prosecute. Social media groups employing mobile technology are extremely active. Many of them are controlled from across the LoC with constant flow of instructions from handlers who have the benefit of analysis of data being fed on daily basis. The entire mechanism is professional and designed to irritate and instigate the Indian public, government officials and SF personnel. Passionate responses from the rest of India such as “exterminate them all” are exactly what the Separatists and their handlers wish to see. These are exploited on social media to spread greater anti-India emotions. More the negative emotion greater is the achievement level of the intent of those instigating the event.
In the face of the above situation how does one define national interest? Is it the appeasement of public opinion or the attainment of a professional aim arrived at through gaming, ideating, discussion and more such exchanges to overcome a situation to the state’s interest? I can recall a few examples of response to the threats in the past. In 2003 the then Chief Secretary of J&K, the GOC 15 Corps and the DG JKP undertook a mission to of cooperation and coordination with a civil military interface. It was also the best use of the Unified Command concept. The challenges then were different but effectiveness was extremely high considering the threats of that time. It was the regular meetings of the Core Group and Unified Command in 2010 which delineated responsibilities and identified SF vulnerabilities which finally overcame the challenge of that year. The situation today is admittedly far worse necessitating a more comprehensive response which must first rest on defining the meaning of ‘engagement and outreach’. These are terms being loosely pandered around in the media without an understanding. It is unfair to expect from the political leadership bold and meaningful initiatives in the middle of serious violence prone situations notwithstanding the fact that initiatives should have come long ago. If anything the initiative has to be quiet, behind the scenes and the outreach has to be to the right quarters. While it may be partially right to assume that the mainstream Separatist leaders have lost their significance the inability to identify the new executive leadership is putting the authorities in quandary. This leadership is diffused and has remained under wraps probably under guidance from across the LoC. Interrogation reports of detained rabble rousers have not been made public but from these the intelligence authorities would probably have a fair idea where the brain trust lies. This is the intelligence problem which needs immediate action.
The issue of ‘outreach’ always recommended to the political leadership by intelligentsia needs a measure of explanation. Even in stable times outreach has not been easy; in these challenging times it may be even more difficult. With vigilantism of the young, less educated and reasonably mindless, it is difficult to organize public meetings without expecting trouble at these. No one wishes to create negative situations. Thus outreach has got to be first to personalities and these can be from all walks in different towns and villages. The clergy has an important role to play and must be taken on board. The outreach is primarily an exercise in listening, something most important people are not comfortable with. It is about confidence building all over again, the ability to listen and withstand much venom against the state, against leaders and against institutions. Small gestures and concessions which can make a difference to the public are given in such meetings. This spirals higher as confidence enhances along with public curiosity. This is not the blueprint for solutions to the intense problem which has captured the Valley. It is only suggestive of ways and means by which better understanding can prevail. In terms of harsher measures if the situation deteriorates the authorities will probably consider a full blanket on internet and mobile services as in 2016. It is to India’s credit that the media remains completely free even in as challenging a situation as was witnessed in 2016 or could potentially be witnessed in 2017. That is our national strength and that is how it must remain.
In dealing with Separatist machinery, while principally we have been acting against the visible face of the Hurriyat leaders, detaining them and placing them under house arrest, the seriousness of tackling the infrastructure at their command appears limited. That seems to be mostly intact considering the ease with which public ire is aroused and enacted. Perhaps the focus needs to shift even as the eye is not taken away from the visible leadership. The police and intelligence set up is competent to do this when it decides to act. There have been preventive detentions and arrests. The police know how to take this further and would need full political backing.
The vulnerability of the local police personnel has also come into question. In 2016 the targeting of police families demoralized the personnel. The situation was overcome fairly early but it appears the adversaries continue to identify this as a major vulnerability. It needs astute leadership to overcome the problem. It cannot be left to the police hierarchy alone and would need political cooperation between all parties. Police stations are the core institutions whose sanctity cannot be compromised. They must remain strengthened with CRPF reinforcement and stand by arrangements for Army response. Local police personnel need recognition and empathy which must come in droves.
Lastly, the one thing that such situations do not need is unprofessional advice and instigation of security forces against the public. The situation is admittedly bad but India, its security forces, intelligentsia and political leadership have faced worse before. The nation will not bend before malicious attempts to pressurize it even as it responds with the correct blend of head and heart. A nation of India’s reputation will always do that.
(The author is former GOC of Srinagar based 15 Corps)
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