Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
The recent burning fires in Kashmir have mostly been in the area of South Kashmir where the New Militancy has raged for the last four years or so. Before that it was mostly the badlands of Handwara, Sopore, Lolab and Bandipura in North Kashmir. Yet South Kashmir’s relevance has always existed; it is only that we have been mistakenly relegating its strategic importance in the proxy conflict.
Why has South Kashmir become the new turbulent zone? What was it like at the commencement of the proxy conflict and near midway around the turn of the millennium? There are various ways in which one can look at South Kashmir. It hugs the vast Pir Panjal and Kishtwar ranges bordering Jammu region. The infiltration into it comes from all directions; filtered from the north through the urban areas of Srinagar and Budgam, via the Mahadeo Ridge to Tral and the infamous Meadow in the Pahalgam heights, across Doda-Kishtwar into the Kapran valley, directly via the Pir Panjal axis from Rajouri and through the gullies such as Chinamarg and Chor Panjal to the karewas of the Beerwah belt. Unlike the north where the Wullar severely restricts and channelizes movement, the south is open country only restricted by the flow of the rivers from the Pir Panjal, Jhelum, Rembiara and Vaishav plus Lidder from Pahalgam. There are karewas (broken plateaus), forests and densely packed villages which dot the area. The line from Qazigund to Pir Panjal road which hugs the Pir Panjal range is heavily populated. It is this area which has been largely ignored by us in our deployment in recent years.
It was because the local hold of the Hizbul Mujahideen was far greater here that Pakistan perceived the movement slipping from its hands, as early as 1991. Without its direct control the direction it wished for the movement to take would have actually not materialized. That is why we found the Lashkar e Taiyaba (LeT) taking primacy after 1996 and announcing its arrival here with every major atrocity.
South Kashmir has traditionally been the bread basket of Kashmir, the land of the white collared citizens from Anantnag and Pulwama and of rich apple laden orchards. It is in Kulgam that the seat of the Jamat e Islami (JeI) Kashmir exists; the Amir e Jamat resides and functions from here. While the population all over Kashmir is restive, in South Kashmir the awareness levels are much higher. Leadership among terror groups has usually rested in the hands of locals. There have been some very high profile and long lasting leaders such as Amir Khan, Engineer Zaman and the wily division commander Shabir Baduri. That a Burhan Wani arose here should never have surprised people.
So what was it like in South Kashmir when I took charge as the Colonel General Staff of HQ Victor Force {planning and coordination of operations, intelligence and training are the responsibility of this appointment in a division headquarters (HQ)}. It was and is still located at Avantipura just above the National Highway. It was May 1999. The Kargil intrusion had just been discovered and 15 Corps was in flux. For us, on that day three operations were simultaneously on, two in 1 Sector’s Chhatergul and Aishmuqam areas and one in 2 Sector’s Kapran valley. Helicopters were whizzing across from Srinagar to pick up casualties in Chhatergul. Three terrorists had also been killed there while in Kapran a huge Afghan terrorist had been killed. This was to become a routine affair for the next two years where at times I was monitoring five major operations simultaneously.
There is much that characterized South Kashmir in 1999 but three issues demand mention. First, the area had an IED threat even greater than what the Army faced in Sri Lanka. The route from Victor Force HQ to Avantipur airfield was itself so unsafe that moving in vehicles was fraught with risk. There were a number of IED doctors (fabricators) among the terrorist ranks; an IED was always referred as Roti or Chapati in all radio communication which was intercepted by us. With trained monitoring it was always possible to home on to a general area where an IED was being prepared to be laid; the exact point could not be ascertained. The National Highway was always vulnerable. The road from Kulgam to the National Highway near Khudwaini was even worse. Through Jun-Aug 1999, Victor Force was also responsible for the safe movement of ammunition convoys from Khundru where the large ammunition depot exists. The 18 km route from Khundru to Khanabal at the National Highway had 110 Hume Pipe crossings; each such crossing was a potential IED site and one successful IED meant the loss of momentum of the ammunition movement for the Kargil operations. To top it the road did not even have tarmac, it was just macadamized. This was the area where Army dogs from our outstanding Dog Units along with their handlers carried out operations all the time. There is but one way to prevent the emplacement of an IED and that is day and night domination. It means identified segments of the roads or tracks have to be under constant surveillance of static and patrolling troops by day and night. It is a sapping operation which requires dedication and stamina. Today IEDs have completely dried up. The last one with any major effect was on 20 Jul 2008, at the crossing of the roads from Srinagar to Gulmarg and Baramula. Nine soldiers proceeding on leave lost their lives when their bus got targeted.
Yet, it needs to be mentioned that the then GOC Victor Force, Maj Gen Raj Kaushal moved more by road than by helicopter. I almost always accompanied him but no one ever had an inkling of where we would go on a given day. That is the best precaution against IEDs.
The second issue of concern in South Kashmir was the ever present threat against minorities – Kashmiri Pandits still resided and there were many Sikhs all living in clusters. Vulnerability of minorities still remains a challenge although a well-guarded camp of Kashmiri Pandits exists at Wisu near Qazigund, on the highway. There are Sikh settlements which need dedicated protection, considering that local terrorists have shown no qualms about targeting even Lt Umar Fayaz who was unarmed and a Kashmiri.
The third observation; in 1999 our focus was once again on the Pulwama – Shopian – Kulgam – Bijbehara (PSKB) quadrangle where a mass of villages and orchards exist. Our deployment was right up to the Pir Panjal and in fact even beyond. In May 1999 the PSKB quadrangle was flush with troops; three mechanized infantry battalions less their main equipment (the BMPs), an armoured regiment less its tanks and almost two sectors of RR. Interestingly there was a unit HQ near Shupiyan, a sector HQ (a sector has three units under it) at Koyil near the Avantipura airfield and another sector HQ was at Kulgam. The west of the National Highway from Qazigund till Pampore had fairly heavy deployment except in Tral where the BSF did service. I would say that in May 1999, pre Kargil, Victor Force had a fairly good control over the situation and the units were not stretched.
From early Jun 1999 the depletion process of South Kashmir began and never ended. First the mechanized and armoured units disappeared almost overnight as war in the plains almost became a reality. Then the HQ and units from Kulgam and other areas moved for other tasks leaving Victor Force virtually in the lurch. Only in 2002, for a while we had redeployment with some additional strength coming in. The karewas hugging the Pir Panjal and the string of villages never ever had that density of deployment as existed in 1999.
Why was this so? In military operations assessment based deployment is the norm. In priority, counter infiltration in North Kashmir took the higher level in comparison to stabilization operations in South Kashmir. No one can fault this because from a military assessment angle it is absolutely correct. It is just that Victor Force and South Kashmir did not get what they deserved. In retrospect now it is easy for me to recount that local militancy was invariably given lower priority because the presence of foreign terrorists (FTs) always spelt greater threat and in the north there were more FTs. The south had them but not in the same measure.
The challenge for the forces today is how to balance deployment between south and north. With all the infiltration attempts (11 in four days) there seems desperation on part of Pakistan to fill up the north, gravitating the strength eventually to the south. The bids are also aimed to force the Army and other SF to strengthen deployment for the Amarnath Yatra due next month so that a degree of imbalance emerges. The PSKB quadrangle needs to be reinforced and the alignment hugging the Pir Panjal villages needs a much greater density of troops to prevent a free hand to the local terror groups. The Lidder Valley is also active but the Yatra deployment should cater for that if it stays on even after the event.
As the SF redeploy, the lesson for the future should stick to planner’s minds; never under estimate the power of the local. South Kashmir with its real estate and people cannot be relegated in importance, for military operations, winning hearts and minds and governance. This game will eventually be won through the wisdom of experience which says clearly, you cannot ignore the people.
(Adapted from the original piece by the author in Swarajya.com)
(The author is former GOC of Srinagar based 15 Corps)
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com
Trending Now
E-Paper
Follow our WhatsApp channel