Shreya Upadhyay
China’s recent takeover of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port has set the cat among pigeons in New Delhi and Washington with both losing sleep over another addition to Beijing’s ‘String of Pearls’ viewed as an attempt to encircle India along-with countering US presence in the region. Notwithstanding, Beijing assertions it was strictly for economic interests.
According to State-run daily The Global Times Gwadar would open China’s access to the Arabian Sea and facilitate oil supplies. It also dismissed India and Western fears that China planned to build naval bases there. The Chinese Foreign Minister too feigned ignorance about Islamabad’s request that it would be more grateful to Beijing if a naval base was constructed at Gwadar.
Underscoring, that neither was China so powerful, nor India so weak that the transfer of a civil project could be interpreted as an attempt to “encircle” India. Given that Islamabad calculated allowed China to develop the Port which till now remained under-exploited due to the Government’s failure to develop rail and road links and connect Gwadar with the rest of the country.
Significantly, Islamabad’s decision could also be viewed as an attempt to get Beijing to commit more deeply in Pakistan. Incidentally, the Gwadar port is only about 400 km away from the important oil shipping lane Strait of Hormuz.
Additionally, the operational responsibility of the port has been transferred from Singapore’s PSA (Port of Singapore Authority) to China’s Overseas Port Holding. Recall, this was thanks to a fallout between the Pakistan Navy and the PSA over land transfers, security issues and lack of infrastructure.
Pertinently, China is encountering opposition from the Baloch people, who have objected to the taking over of their traditional lands. Moreover, with the war in Afghanistan reaching an end, the region is likely to see more violence.
Against this backdrop, the port’s strategic value is the driving factor for Beijing. Further, China’s increased dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf area is set to reach 70 per cent by 2015. Whereby, its involvement in Gwadar is guided by its interest in turning the port into a transit terminal for Iranian and African crude oil imports.
At the same time, the Gwadar Port could also be used for transporting oil and gas from the port to China’s Xinjiang province. This could insulate Beijing from the turbulent waters of the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea.
Presently, Indian ships, among others, patrol the Strait of Malacca as an anti-piracy measure. In South China Sea, China is involved in territorial dispute with many countries. In case of a conflict, it would be easy to shut energy supplies to mainland China. Thus, if a pipeline is built, the shortest route to West Asia could be realized bolstering energy security.
Interestingly, Beijing has been working to develop a string of harbours in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, a region traditionally considered India’s backyard. Needless to say, Beijing’s funding of construction and modernization of ports in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Seychelles and now Pakistan should be viewed in this perspective.
In Bangladesh, China has agreed to help finance Rs 46, 675.5 crore for the expansion of the Chittagong port which handles 90 per cent of the nation’s foreign trade. There have been speculations that it may lead to transfer of port rights to the PLA Navy.
In Sri Lanka, China has been constructing a deep-water port in Hambantota. These ports are of utmost use to build oil pipelines to mainland China to ensure its energy supplies but they have raised New Delhi’s ante as most Indian ships going from the eastern and western sea board must go around Sri Lanka.
Notably, even as China claims the economic value of the ports, speculations run rife that these would be developed into naval bases. Moreover, the quest for energy security pitches both countries against each other. The move is interpreted as China’s strategy to control sea lanes.
Clearly, these developments should also be viewed under the prism of Chinese diplomacy working its way towards scoring its presence among India’s neighbours to outpace New Delhi’s influence in the region.
This is not all. According to various intelligence agencies in the larger scheme of things, the ‘China factor’ is responsible for island country Maldives scrapping its airport deal with an Indian company. Interpreted as Beijing’s effort to dominate the strategically-important sea lanes of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
There is no gainsaying, that India has only itself to blame by blundering by failing to assert itself in the region. It has failed in being pro-active vis-à-vis strategic projects in the region, where more than mere economic interests are at stake.
Shockingly, New Delhi has been slow to make its mark in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. Remember, the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline which was originally planned to extend from Pakistan to India was opposed by the US because of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
Further, after New Delhi withdrew in 2009, Beijing showed interest to not only join the project but also build an Iran-Pakistan-China gas pipeline, which could provide it secure over-land gas supply. Presently, India is engaged in developing Iran’s Chabahar port which would also provide it access to countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan by-passing Pakistani territory.
Clearly, both Gwadar and Chabahar are likely to emerge as assets of strategic competition in the region. However, Chahabar remains a long term project, especially when compared to the Chinese speed of finishing projects. Yet, maritime opposition is intensifying as Indian and Chinese navies show each other flags often in the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
In the ultimate, no matter Beijing’s denial of pursuing strategic interests in the garb of pushing development in the region, its unilateral move to build dams over the Brahmaputra gives currency to Indian concerns. China has announced to build three hydro-power bases on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, at Dagu, Jiacha and Jiexu without consulting or sharing information with New Delhi.
Unlike the past when India downplayed the threat that dams construction posed, this time its opposition is sharp. Said New Delhi, “India had established user rights to the river” and Beijing should ensure that India’s downstream interests are not harmed by any activities in up-stream areas. Never mind, Beijing allying Indian concern by averring that nothing would be done on trans-border rivers to hurt the interests of lower riparian countries like India. INFA
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