Appointing a CDS

Harsha Kakar

The recent Government announcement stating that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is likely to be appointed next month has retriggered the debate on the same. A team under the National Security Advisor (NSA) had been set up to work out the responsibilities, modalities of appointment and terms of employment for the CDS. It has possibly completed its task and submitted its recommendations to the Government. The Government has therefore asked the three services to submit names of their senior officers who could be considered for the post.
From inputs in the press there are a few aspects of the study which have been released. Firstly, the CDS will have a fixed tenure of two-three years (the period has not been specified). Secondly, like the present service chiefs, he would remain a four-star general. This would ensure that there are no protocol issues between him and the Cabinet Secretary, the senior most bureaucrat, who will remain higher. Thirdly, he would be the first amongst equals.
Finally, he would not command the three services, for the present, but be responsible for planning, procurement and enhancing joint operations (full details of his responsibilities yet to be released). However, he would remain the single point advisor to the Government on military matters.
This implies that the CDS would head the HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), which has remained a toothless body since its inception in 2001, based on the recommendations of the Kargil Committee report. He will control the joint operational commands presently functional. These include the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), Cyber Command, Space Command and Armed Forces Special Operations Command.
The last three commands listed above are presently headed by two-star officers, which could be upgraded, thereby making them more effective. The CDS would also be the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), an appointment which is presently held on rotational basis by the senior most serving chief.
Joint planning, operations and enhancing synergy between the services has been the responsibility of the IDS. Without a CDS, it operated under the COSC, which made its functioning almost redundant, as service HQs considered it as an additional chain in the link to the MoD.
The IDS was designed to be a part of the MoD and not an additional link, an action which the Government ignored, as the IDS remained toothless. Ideally, within the MoD, there should have been two direct verticals reporting to the Defence Minister, the CDS and the Defence Secretary. A headless IDS kept away from the MoD, naturally became a stumbling block, compelling service HQs to ignore its directions.
Hopefully the norms presently evaluated by the committee, headed by the NSA, should have included making the CDS and HQ IDS a part of the MoD. The major benefit which could then flow is that the CDS would represent operational and military specific aspects and convey these directly to the defence minister.The CDS would be responsible to coordinate inputs from the services which concern the defence minister. Further, if it is a part of the MoD, discussions which involve service aspects would have the attendance of a uniformed representative to project their viewpoint.
The first amongst equal rule has been in vogue in the services for some time. The present head of the IDS, a three-star general, is presently the first amongst equals in all vice-chief meetings, disregarding his seniority. The same remains the case with the chairman COSC.
Indian politicians fearing a coup have never considered placing one head over all the three services. Their hesitation has been backed by bureaucrats and service chiefs, who have feared losing control of their service. The air force has never supported the idea of joint commands, though it remains a crying need, due to shortfall of air resources and possibly losing their inherent flexibility.
Hence, the first CDS would cater for procurement, planning and enhancing jointness. These remain vital considering the shrinking defence budget and increasing security challenges. It is possible that subsequently the government would consider and usher in joint commands.
Over time there has been rumour mongering in the press that the first CDS would be the current army chief who completes his tenure on 31st Dec, though the Government has given no hint on the same. Realistically his appointment as a CDS is unlikely, unless the Government twists rules.
One aspect impacting the appointment of the CDS remains unclear and that is the age limit for his appointment. The rule for the cabinet secretary, the senior most civil servant, is a maximum tenure of four years, including any extensions which are granted. Under normal conditions the cabinet secretary is appointed before he reaches the retirement age of 60 and given a fixed tenure. Extensions,though granted, may take his service beyond that age. Service chiefs are appointed for three years or the age of 62, whichever is earlier. Most service chiefs retire at the age of 62. Appointing a retired service chief would imply service till 64-65.
Hence the Government is unlikely to appoint a CDS beyond the age limit of the cabinet secretary for multiple reasons. Firstly, the CDS remains a four-star, below in protocol to the cabinet secretary, hence appointing him post retirement may be incorrect. Secondly, it would open doors for other central service heads to seek a similar age relaxation. Finally, being first amongst equals also implies that seniority levels would be near same.
Therefore, it would most likely be closed to retiring chiefs and open for an individual either presently a serving chief or likely to be appointed as one. It is with this logic that the Government has approached service HQs to submit names of their senior appointments, who could either be appointed as CDS or replace their current chief, if sidestepped as CDS.
Finally, despite whoever is appointed as the CDS, the amalgamation of the IDS into the MoD must remain a priority. It cannot continue as an additional spoke between service HQs and the MoD.
The author is Major General (Retd)
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