Vishal Sharma
The situation unravelling in Kashmir is a poignant throwback to the early days of the dreaded militancy in the nineties. There is a genuine concern verging on fear that it may indeed lurch back to turbulence this time. Some people may turn around and argue that such prognosis is frozen in time; and that the hoary past may not revisit us at all or any time sooner. But they forget that history has an uncanny nature of repeating itself just when it is least expected.
It is true that quite often a violent incident in the recent past in the valley has been labelled as a preface to the impending turbulence of the variety witnessed in the nineties. And that the prescience of the arm chair oracles has not come true. This time, though, there appears to be a steady shift towards a discourse that is more skewed in favour of bloody reprisals. Culture of non-violence is perceived to have furthered the cause of status-quo. Mandarins of the movement, who constitute its most radical and strident vanguard, have begun realizing that if the norms of the exchanges with the adversary were not changed quickly, there may not be left any cause at all worth making exchanges for.
For more than a decade after ideologically driven extremism went off boil, separatists have chosen to be dictated by the circumstances. They have not gone looking for a cause. When circumstances have thrown up one, they have capitalized on it and mobilized the masses around it. All this while, they had hoped that the fatigue that had set in after the bloody insurgency waned will give way to inertia of disenchantment with the status quoists and the people will gravitate towards their fold. In a sense, as in a racy thriller, they had bet on a mandatory intervening lull before the plot again thickened and held the followers in thrall.
There are three reasons why I find the plot may thicken in the manner it did in the nineties. First and foremost is the Afzal Guru’s hanging. Guru’s hanging has given an alibi, raison detre and a cause of action all at once to the separatists that they could have most certainly done without. Separatists would not have thought even in their wildest dreams that none but the government itself would pull their cause from mothballs. Trust Indians to teach a thing or two about how to make a martyr out of a terrorist.
It is an understatement to say that Guru’s hanging was completely mishandled. There were three clear missteps that should have been avoided. One, the delay in hanging him should have been avoided. There was no point in letting the matter endlessly spun out under the veneer of mercy pleas. If his conviction had been followed by execution immediately after it was pronounced, the extent of the fall out would have been contained considerably.
Second, even if he was to be given a chance under mercy plea provisions, his case should have been fast tracked as an exception ahead of others citing the extraordinary nature of the case. In case the government had stepped on the gas, as it were, in this case, the time lag that it had had to face between his conviction and execution would have been of only a few months. That would have also taken the sting out of any accompanying or consequential protests. As it is, the delay only led the people to not only question the integrity of trial, but also such points as if indeed he deserved the capital punishment when he was only complicit and not executor.
Third, of course, was denying him the last meeting with his family. Frankly, there was no plausible reason to deny him one final glimpse of his family. Such a rendezvous could easily have been surreptiously arranged by the Government. Denial of a family farewell was inhumane, to say the least.
Guru’s hanging has come as a strong rallying point for the separatists. From being divided as an ideological house, they have come together under one umbrella to demand his remains besides challenging the conviction itself. For the last two decades, there had not been a bigger cause for these people to enable them to rise over their egos and varied ideological underpinnings. In Guru’s death, on the other hand, they have found both life and redemption for their cause. This is ominous, particulary from the view point of the damage that it can wreak both politically and sociologically in the valley
Second is the resolution passed by the Pakistani Parliament condemning the Guru’s hanging and pitching for returning his mortal remains to his family. It may appear strange that Pakistan has done what it has done, particularly when apparently it had so much going on the ongoing peace process with India and it was seen to be genuinely pushing for keeping it on. Remember, when India had made shrill noises in the wake of beheading of his soldiers in the border skirmishes, its foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, had urged India to not allow the peace process to be derailed by it. She had done so even when Pakistan had lost as many or perhaps more troopers in those bloody exchanges. Hadn’t it appeared to most of us then that the zebra in Pakistan had finally decided to wipe its stripes. It all appears to have happened only yesterday even though it transpired a few weeks back. But in strategic affairs, weeks count for lot. And of course they have in this case given that Pakistan has changed tack.
Pakistan has lived by moments in its history. It has seized them as and when they have presented them. Trouble is that it has often picked the wrong ones and been at the receiving end. This, however, has not deterred it. In Kashmir, it sees a spontaneous disenchantment that could easily blow up. It discerns that the fatigue that had ushered in from the late nineties onwards has started to wear thin and the people are spoiling for a rebellious fight. Another round of bloddy battle perhaps. It does not want to let go off this opportunity as it sees in it another chance of realizing its unfinished agenda.
Third and the most important reason is the strategic leverage that Pakistan would get at its western borders once the NATO forces exit Afghanistan.
The time for India is at a premium in so far as putting in place both the tactical and strategic measures in place are concerned. Indian response has to be both on the military and civilian fronts. On the civilian side, in the short term, it needs to involve panchyats in launching a massive developmental offensive. The development effort has to be people led and not officers led. If it requires rejigging the development paradigm, so be it. In the long term, panchayats, urban local bodies and hill councils need to be at the forefront of the developmental efforts. The effort at this point in time is not as much people owned and people led. There is too much discretion based on party and regional affiliations. If the stakes of the people in the developmental initiatives are steadily increased, the billing of the trouble makers amongst the masses will surely take a tumble.
On the law and order front, in the near term, central forces should be withdrawn only to do what in military parlance are called advance recce and post- engagement mopping operations, frontal fight by the Army being restricted only to such operations as can’t be done without its specialised skills. The fight against the militants for the most part should be led by the local police. In the long term, the above tactical approach should be made a permanent SOP with the counterinsurgency grid in the state. Given that central police forces are often exposed to stone pelting by the youth by virtue of being located in the hinterland, the government would be well advised to do appropriate tactical relocations to avoid as much eye ball contact with the agitating youth as possible.
India needs to think on its feet to preempt Pakistan. If it remains caught in the complacency engendered by its size and the secular credentials, it may likely find that the faultlines, as spotlighted by the recent bombings in some cities, in its geographical and psychological union may unravel and lead to the breaking point.
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