Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
The biggest operational achievement in J&K in the counter terror or counter infiltration domains that I can recall was a total of 40 terrorists killed. It was in Poonch way back in the early Nineties; an entire track of terrorists was duped into walking into an Indian Army ambush after they had crossed the LoC with ease. Thereafter, through the Nineties and this millennium the Army has executed some outstanding operations on both sides of the Pir Panjal range. Figuratively I can remember the number six as the most important. That is because the moment six or more terrorists were eliminated the operation was considered highly successful. It was not an uncommon figure and there were many operations in which even 10 to 15 terrorists were eliminated at the higher reaches in inhospitable terrain. The operations around Beerwah (Budgam) in 2003, deep in the hinterland, also led to the elimination of an entire track of 10 terrorists who had infiltrated through Gulmarg.
All the above were things of the past, at least over ten years ago. The new era of terrorism brought with it smaller numbers. As the strength of terrorists reduced due to controls over infiltration and recruitment the terrorist strategy changed too. Concentration of not more than two or at a limit three terrorists became the norm. From 2009 onwards the figure six became less frequent although there were stray cases when the Army and the Special Operations Group (SOG) were fortunate in getting a lucky break with intelligence.
Even through the last two years it has been a rarity to find a concentration of anything more than four terrorists together. Now suddenly on 31 Mar 2018 one finds the elimination of 12 terrorists in two engagements at Dragad and Kachdoora villages in Shupiyan; one more terrorist was killed at Petha Dialgam in Anantnag. The Army too has suffered three fatalities among its soldiers. How does one view these developments?
There could be a temptation to brush aside these events with a brusque ‘too early to predict’ approach. However, pragmatic observers who keep a watch over Kashmir can deduce much from these indicators. It’s a lot to do with ‘safe houses’. There was always a problem with foreign terrorists (FTs) who were insensitive and had no qualms about ill-treating the locals, their own hosts. Women were never safe with their presence in hideouts painstakingly built inside safe houses. Thus safe houses for FTs came at a premium as much did information about such hideouts, available to the security forces (SF). Once in safe houses it’s a question of how long can they risk being static at one place? Information about presence of ‘mehman bhai’ (guests from Pakistan) often leaks out. Thus the need for frequent movement to other safe houses. The more such movement the greater is the risk of running into Army ambushes and getting eliminated. To have a large number of safe houses there is a need of money because buying loyalty is also essential in a murky world where money can play a major role on either side. When money reduces the numbers of safe houses also reduce. What needs to be remembered about safe houses is that they need infrastructural modification with underground shelter and facilities for clandestine storage of weapons and explosives; this needs money besides that required for buying loyalty and resources such as food.
Terrorists cannot live in mountain and jungle hideouts forever. They have to emerge and to execute actions they need to come down near villages and towns. That is when these safe houses come handy. However, if money flow reduces, the entire concept of the safe house gets compromised. Fewer safe houses mean that even the limited number of terrorists (numbers are always debatable) have to live in larger numbers; meaning that where two or three lived, now five to six or more will live. The meaning of this should be obvious.
In South Kashmir the above analogy also applies but to a lesser extent. Here the LTs are ‘boys’ with greater local support. They can sustain with lesser money flow. The ‘fish out of water’ and ‘drying out the pond’ to isolate terrorists, the concepts SF follow, are much more difficult to apply because of the affinity with the populace. Yet the principle of concentrating in numbers no larger than three equally applies here.
So the fact that the SF in recent operations could home on to seven terrorists in one place and five in another should lead to some deductions. First that the SF were plain lucky to get intelligence about a possible temporary concentration for strategizing and planning; terrorists have to do that in the absence of internet or mobile networks or for fear of monitoring of the network. However, luck can also be viewed as a case of better and quicker intelligence, as also excellent cooperation among the various players. Second, it can be ascribed to over confidence of the LTs in the loyalty of the populace among whom they exist; compromise in loyalty means better intelligence for the SF. Third and very importantly, it can be ascribed to the drying out of finances which does not permit sufficient safe houses to facilitate distribution of terrorists in smaller numbers. The last should be a major lesson in view of the National Investigation Agency’s continuous monitoring and busting of financial conduits.
Cooperation among the SF has risen to a much higher level but two challenges in the way ahead remain. First are the casualty figures which have been mounting through 2017 and now in 2018. The assumption that the LT does not have the capability and will to fight is now a misnomer. The same vigour and zeal has been displayed as has been on display by FTs. No doubt a part of this motivation comes from the infusion of religious zeal into the game. The turnout at funerals of LTs has also contributed towards a quasi-religious and sub nationalist motivation. Second is the near continuous and spontaneous concentration of mobs at encounter sites in South Kashmir. While the SF have devised SOPs to counter these they are not always entirely successful. The DG Police, Mr SP Vaid has said on record that at one of the encounter sites operations had to be prematurely ceased to prevent more civilian casualties. A total of four civilians died in these disturbances and at least a hundred are known to have been injured.
While expression of apprehension of a hot summer in the Valley is rife it is more important to be aware of a couple of things. First, the strength of terrorists in the Valley could be higher than the numbers being put out and therefore the degree of preparedness and expectation of violence too should be higher. Second, much will depend on the control of infiltration and local recruitment, both of which need to be the priority over the next six months. Third, the nature of violence could undergo change at some stage. I say this with a bit of trepidation because as mobs embolden, LTs fear less for life and the according of iconic status to the ‘boys’ killed for the cause rises, we could be heading towards a period where the entry of the suicide bomber could not be far away. This is something we need to be extremely watchful about. Suicide bombers paralyzed the operational environment in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This sets the stage for an analysis of the non-robust domain of operations because as the SF strive to achieve higher levels of military domination they cannot forget that soft power involving outreach and winning back the populace still remains the ultimate aim of all sub conventional operations. Intertwined in this essay above are relevant aspects which need greater analysis. Whatever the uninformed street may keep stating the SF is fully aware of the doctrine of sub conventional operations. Through the coming summer the interplay of hard and soft power must be the norm with a full understanding and cooperation of all stakeholders.
The Author is former GOC of Srinagar based 15 Corps
(In arrangment with swarajya.com)
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