Dwarika Prasad Sharma
In the face of the continual firing and shelling by Pakistani troops across the borders in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian defence forces have struck an offensive defence posture, giving them back more than adequately. The Pakistani army had obviously been feeling humiliated by the pre-dawn surgical strikes by Indian troops across the border into PoK, and the successful operation being immediately brought into the public domain.
The Pakistanis, expectedly, denied the cross-border strikes and accused the Indian Army of a major ceasefire violation, in order to justify its own resort to the extensive indiscriminate firing along the borders. It is obvious that, apart from targeting Indian defence positions, they have been deliberately hitting civilian populations to cause maximum disruption.
The Indian troops have now been conducting surgical strikes of another kind-decimating Pakistani posts with direct fire assaults to silence their guns.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, who had been claiming major credit for the decision on the surgical strikes into the PoK on terrorist camps, and for the present posture of the Indian forces, said on Thursday that the essence of the warfare strategy of any country was “unpredictability” (i.e., surprise) rather than revealing its hand in advance. “Why cannot we say that we are a responsible nuclear power and will not use nuclear weapons irresponsibly, rather than affirming a no-first-use policy?” he said while interacting with reporters.
He, however, cautioned the reporters against jumping to the conclusion that the Government’s nuclear policy had changed. “There is no change at the Government level-it is my personal concept and, at an individual level, I also have feelings,” he said, and added: “I am not saying you go ahead and use it first, but you must call the other country’s bluff.” Parrikar said that the Pakistani defence minister had often been threatening this country with a tactical nuclear weapons use option, but had been “silenced” by the surgical strikes.
The opposition, predictably, went to town baying for his head for making such an “irresponsible” statement. But ask the man-in-the-street, the families of soldiers who died in the Pakistani firing, and the civilian families that suffered the losses of lives, property and crops, and they would say that Pakistan deserves not just word assaults and fire assaults with heavy weapons, but much worse.
In the present posture, the Indian commanders have been matching their words with quick action. After a Pakistani BAT-so-called Border Action Team, which is a mix of special forces commandos and terrorists– killed and mutilated an Indian soldier in Kupwara’s Keran sector, the commanders had said aloud that the perfidy would be more than adequately answered, and our troops decimated four Pakistani posts with direct artillery assault.
After the Uri terrorist attack on an army camp, our army brass had said that there would be retaliation “at a time and place of our own choosing”. The threat was matched with real-time action and the surgical strikes happened. It would appear that Pakistan’s establishment has for now outsourced bluff and bluster to terrorists like Hafiz Sayeed.
It would not be out of place to mention here how, recently, determined Indian border guards went ahead, despite Chinese troops’ attempt at a show-down, to lay water pipes for irrigation at Demchok in eastern Ladakh. The border guards also did not let the Chinese set up tents in front of where they were carrying on their work.
Parrikar is right that “no-first-use” is defensive posturing and akin to revealing your hand in advance. There had been a global hue and cry when India made the nuclear tests in 1998 during the BJP-led regime of Atal Behari Vajpayee. The no-first -use declaration was in a way a defensive “I-am-a-good-boy” affirmation. With the bad boy in our neighbourhood, there has to be a paradigm change not only militarily, but even in our choice of words.
Coming back to Parrikar’s taunt at the Pakistani defence minister’s nuclear option balloon, it must be noted that Pakistan is clandestinely going apace with building up its strategic capabilities, including strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, missiles and delivery systems. And looking to the constant divide between the civilian and military establishments in that country, with the second controlling the nuclear trigger, its potential for mischief should not be underestimated. The source of mischief can also be the extremist rogue elements in the Pakistani army, as well as the possibility of terrorist elements acquiring the dirty bomb.
Pakistan’s military had readied a nuclear-tipped missile to fight back a possible Indian attack during the Kargil crisis in 1999, and the then US president Bill Clinton had conveyed this to the then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who is said to have been “taken aback” by the information. This was revealed by the knowledgeable Pakistani author Hussain Haqqani in his book Pakistan between Mosque and Military. The meeting between Clinton and Sharif took place on July 4, 1999. At the end of the meeting, Sharif agreed to announce Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil in return for Clinton taking personal interest in the resumption of an India-Pakistan dialogue.
On November 3, the Alpha Project of the Centre for Science and Security, King’s College, London, made public a 150-page report titled Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Industries, which deals in detail with that country’s frenetic pursuit to boost its strategic capabilities. It says: “Pakistan’s strategic industries are in a period of substantial growth. Pakistan is continuing to improve its fissile material production facilities; is developing tactical nuclear weapons; and is working on advanced nuclear-delivery systems, probably including submarine-based second-strike capability.”
The report says that the country has been using clandestine methods, like layers of middlemen and front companies, to procure dual-use technology and materials on a massive scale. It says pointedly: “Pakistan claims that it has built a strong record on non-proliferation issues since dismantling the Abdul Qadeer proliferation network. However, Pakistan’s widespread and ongoing use of covert procurement methods for its missile and unguarded nuclear programmes undermines this claim.”
In view of its findings, the Alpha project doubts that Pakistan would have any credibility with any country for supporting its bid for a membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
(The writer is a Senior Journalist)
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