Neeraj Singh Manhas
On July 1st, China’s Communist Party marked its centennial anniversary. It has always referred to itself as “great, wonderful, and accurate.” And as the party enters its second century, it has reason to be proud. Not only has it endured considerably longer than many of its opponents expected, but it now looks to be reviving. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, many commentators predicted the collapse of the second big communist state. Consider how incorrect they were when President Joe Biden felt compelled to proclaim not only that America was at odds with China, but also that many of the globe questioned “whether or not democracies can compete” during a June 13th meeting.
China has been controlled by a single party for 72 years without a mandate from people. That does not constitute a world record. Lenin and his pitiful successors ruled Moscow somewhat longer, as did North Korea’s Workers’ Party. However, no other dictatorship has been able to convert itself, as China did under Mao Zedong, into the world’s second-largest economy, with cutting-edge technology and infrastructure that puts America’s crumbling roads and railroads to shame. China’s Communists are the most successful authoritarians in the world.
Three factors have contributed to the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to retain power. To begin, it is brutal. Yes, it hesitated before suppressing the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. However, it ultimately responded to bullhorns with gunshots, terrorising the country until it submitted.
China’s current authorities have no qualms about the slaughter. On the contrary, President Xi Jinping laments the fall of the Soviet Union as a result of its leaders’ inability to “stand up and resist” during a key period. Which means that, unlike us, they lacked the courage to murder defenceless protestors with machineguns.
A second factor that contributes to the party’s survival is its ideological adaptability. Within a few years after Mao’s 1976 demise, a new leader, Deng Xiaoping, began dismantling the late chairman’s productivity-draining “people’s communes” and putting market forces to work in rural areas. Maoists winced, but productivity increased dramatically. Following Tiananmen Square and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng battled against Maoist zealots and embraced capitalism with even more zeal. This resulted in the shutdown of several state-owned enterprises and the privatisation of housing. Thousands of people were laid off, yet China flourished.
The party has changed again under Mr Xi, this time toward doctrinal rigidity. His immediate predecessors tolerated some modest opposition; he has stifled it. Mao is once again hailed. Party cadres are indoctrinated with “Xi Jinping thinking.” Purges of deviant and corrupt officials have taken place in the bureaucracy, army, and police. Large corporations are being reined in. Mr Xi has rebuilt the party from the ground up, establishing a network of neighbourhood spies and infiltrating private businesses with cadres to monitor them. Since Mao’s era, society has never been more closely controlled.
The third reason for the party’s success is that China has not devolved into a pure kleptocracy in which riches is vacuumed up by the well-connected. Corruption has grown widespread, and the wealthiest families are truly extremely wealthy. However, many people perceived improvements in their lives as well, and the party was astute enough to accept their requests. It removed rural taxes and established a social system that offers pensions and subsidised health care to all citizens. Although the advantages were not plentiful, they were much appreciated.
Western commentators have identified several grounds to forecast the downfall of Chinese communism throughout the years. Surely, the control that a one-party state necessitated was incompatible with the liberty demanded by a modern economy? China’s economic development must eventually slow, resulting in disillusionment and unrest. And, even if it did not, the huge middle class that such expansion spawned would eventually demand further freedoms—all the more so given that so many of their children had first-hand experience with democracy through their education in the West.
These forecasts have been shattered by the Communist Party’s continued popularity. Numerous Chinese credit it with improving their standard of living. True, China’s workforce is ageing, decreasing, and accustomed to absurdly early retirement, but these are the kinds of challenges that any government, authoritarian or not, encounters. Economic growth appears to be robust for the foreseeable future.
Numerous Chinese likewise appreciate the party’s hegemony. Consider how swiftly China eliminated covid-19 and accelerated its economic growth, despite Western countries’ stumbles, they argue. They salivate at the prospect of China regaining its prestige and weight in the globe. It appeals to the nationalism stoked by the party. State-controlled media confuse the party with the nation and its culture, portraying America as a place of racial riots and mass shootings. They argue that the alternative to one-party governance is anarchy.
When dissension begins to build, Mr Xi employs technology to quell it. Chinese streets are densely packed with cameras, many of which are augmented with facial recognition software. Social media platforms are monitored and restricted. Officials have the option of resolving issues quickly or persecuting those who raise them. Those who hold erroneous beliefs risk losing their employment and freedom. The cost of the party’s victory has been horrific, in the form of ruthless repression.
No party can last indefinitely
Mr Xi’s greatest risk comes not from the public, but from within the party. Despite his best efforts, it is plagued by factionalism, betrayal, and ideological laziness. Rivals have been arrested on charges of conspiring to seize power. Chinese politics are more opaque than they have been in decades, but Mr Xi’s ceaseless purges indicate that he sees additional hidden adversaries.
The most insecure period is likely to be the succession. Nobody knows who will succeed Mr Xi, or even what transition protocols will apply. In 2018, when he abolished presidential term limits, he signalled his desire to remain in power permanently. However, this may exacerbate the instability of the ultimate move. Although danger to the party does not always result in the enlightened leadership that libertarians seek, even this Chinese dynasty will eventually come to an end.
(The author is is a Doctoral Scholar in International Relations at Sardar Patel University, Gujarat. The author can be contacted at gcneeraj777@gmail.com)
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