Changing dimensions of warfare

Bhopinder Singh
1971 Indo-Pak war was arguably the last full-fledged conventional war between two countries that was not restrained to a sector (e.g. “Falklands” or “Kargil”), or involved proxies and private militias (e.g. Middle Eastern wars or the Af-Pak region). Since 1971, nine countries are known to be nuclear armed (US, Russia, UK, France, Germany, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) and all of them have been involved in some military conflict, either on their borders, or at some combat deployment,internationally. The logic of nuclear capability and the doctrine of deterrence, which assumes an protective shield from a hostile nations, given the credible threat of a retaliatory havoc by the nuclear capable nation, has not held its line as these nine nations have been attacked or have willy-nilly attacked each other through amorphous, though deadly “not-state” actors. This unconventional absence of a definitive “state face” to the enemy has led to conflicts that are asymmetric, unanticipated, borderless and undistinguishable in pattern or domain.
Conventional military superiority(“cold-war” thinking of matching divisions-to-divisions or firepower benchmarking) may have allowed the US-led 34 coalition forces in the First Gulf War (1990-91) to seize back Kuwait from Iraq in approx. 100 hours of actual ground campaign (after five weeks of persistent aerial and naval bombardment to “soften” the enemy)- but since then, “holding” ground in Iraq against the multitude of Islamist organisations like the Al Qaida, ISIS or the Shia Militias, has bogged-down the mighty US military in a bloody quagmire of perennial incertitude. Modern mutations of conflict has emerged in similar patterns with Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria, annexation of Crimea in the War of Donbass or nearer home in the fractious Af-Pak region. Heavily armed militias and groups of religious or regional denominations take on the “State” might in a modern “Hybrid” warfare to undermine the conventional sovereignty.
Portents of this asymmetric irregularity prevails in the conflict zones of the Kashmir valley with the accompanying phenomenon’s of “surgical strikes” across LOC, “cyber warfare” a la the Burhan Wani’s, societal “sleeper cells” who offer invaluable cover, usage of contact-less “drones” to carry out reconnaissance and the deliberate “civilian crowdsourcing” at the time and place of ongoing operations. These operational ambiguities challenge the trained instincts, processes and equipment of the conventional armed forces deployed in these territories. Unfortunately the conflict targets have also got redefined to include “soft spots” that are beyond the purview of traditional security points and are usually in the high density civilian areas to maximize the “hit count”. It is said that the adoption of sophisticated technology, means and intelligence by these terror groups is increasingly outpacing the ability of the conventional forces to keep pace in the counter-terrorism domain, at least in the third world countries.
Usually, these terror outfits have benign sovereign benefactors who offer safe havens, financial or military aid, training and moral/diplomatic support to prop their relevance, protection and justification. Pakistan’s recentjoint statement by all political parties barely conceals the intent and form of support when they reiterated, “We express Pakistan’s continued and unwavering support to provide political, moral and diplomatic support to the people of Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir in their just struggle for self-determination”.The holistic task of the building pressure against such interfering situations calls for a combination approach of seeking international isolation (e.g. the attempts to designate the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief, Maulana Masood Azar as a terrorist, which has run the expected wall of “cover-fire”,by Chinese protection), “naming and shaming” at multilateral forums (e.g. the speeches made by the Indian delegates at the UN) and the more military means of engaging physically with the terrorists on the national soil or indeed, in the form of “surgical strikes” across the LOC, as was conducted recently by the Indian Special Forces,in the wake of Uri retaliation.
Militarily too, this calls for redefining the established doctrines, SOP manuals and operational readiness parameters as the unidimensional and conventional outlook has to make way for an integrated realm of advanced intelligence, cyber domination, fleet footed mobility, urban warfare training and high intensity firepower, protective shields and psychological imperatives.The US military budgeting has envisaged 13.7% allocation or $5.8 billion towards the realm of cybersecurity – an ode to specters of “Cyber Pearl Harbours”, a danger that Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta had alluded to, “”[Attackers] could derail passenger trains, or even more dangerous, derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country”. While acquiring 36 Rafael fighters is the rightful perspective of ensuring dissuasive deterrent, it should not downplay the basic ground realities like the Pampore terror attack, wherein the 8 CRPF soldiers were killed by Lashkar terrorists in an unprotected bus – the subsequent solution for which was mulled around affixing metal sheets on the sides to give “some protection”. It is this lack of ideal counter-insurgency gear, specialist units (like the ones used in the “surgical strikes”), cyber technology to intercept intelligence and the seamless operational integration of all security forces that needs to be achieved and deployed. Today, conventional structures, philosophies and equipment’s are taking on 4th generation warfare, which has no defined contours of operation. The proverbial “leaner and meaner” army that is frequently bandied about needs an strategic thought that encompasses the military tenets of achieving “tooth-to-tail” ratio, and the same is not just an headcount reduction exercise with the removal of “telephone operators”, as was alluded by the incumbent Defence Minister. This has to be thought-through with parallel input-output analysis that ensures the requisite firepower, deterrence and edge to the Armed Forces, even as it reduces the numbers, arithmetically.
Terms of engagement and military operations are evolving. The future conflicts and wars amongst nations and terror organizations will be fundamentally non-linear and the same calls for urgent rethinking of the formation, training and equipment of the Armed Forces.
(The author is former Lt Governor of Andaman &                         Nicobar Islands & Puducherry)
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