COLOMBO, Dec 26: The India-Sri Lanka bilateral relationship was put to test in 2021 after Colombo unilaterally reneged on a tripartite deal with India and Japan to build a deep-sea container port here, and frequent incidents involving Indian fishermen as well as China’s growing footprints in this country.
The year began with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar visiting Sri Lanka in early January, saying “I am starting 2021 with a visit to Colombo, a visit to India’s closest maritime neighbour and partner.”
Jaishankar, who met Sri Lanka’s top leadership, also noted that it was gratifying to note that the COVID-19 pandemic has not been able to make a dent in India-Sri Lanka bilateral cooperation.
But the positive momentum in ties generated by the visit was disturbed by the death of four Indian fishermen in January following a collision between their vessel and a Sri Lankan naval craft.
India registered a strong protest in Colombo as well in New Delhi, emphasising the need to deal with issues pertaining to fishermen in a humanitarian manner.
In December, India expressed concern over the detention of 68 Tamil Nadu fishermen from December 18 to 20 by Sri Lankan authorities and took up the issue of their “early release”.
The fishermen issue remains a major irritant in bilateral ties.
During the Covid pandemic period, India kept its air space open for travel for specific and urgent medical needs of Sri Lanka.
As part of the Indian government’s Vaccine Maitri humanitarian initiative to provide COVID-19 vaccines to countries around the world, India gifted 500,000 doses of Covishield vaccine to the island nation, prompting it to launch its national coronavirus immunisation campaign.
Meanwhile, in a big jolt to India’s investment plans in Sri Lanka, the Rajapaksa government unilaterally reneged on a tripartite deal with India and Japan to build the strategic deep-sea container port.
Sri Lanka, which had agreed in 2019 to develop the East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo port with India and Japan, scrapped the deal and termed the ECT “a wholly owned container terminal of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority.”
Colombo said it would instead develop the port’s West Container Terminal (WCT) with investment from India and Japan. More to India’s displeasure, China in November clinched the contract to develop the ECT.
As the ECT/WCT issue was brewing, Colombo announced that the government had successfully ended talks with the Indian government to end the leasing of World War II oil storage tanks in the eastern port of Trincomalee.
Sri Lanka in 2003 had leased out 99 oil tanks to the Indian Oil Corporation for 30 years for an annual payment of USD 100,000.
In 2021, Sri Lanka faced pressure from the international community on its human rights record, especially during the armed conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
As the UN called for sanctions and international criminal court procedure against those responsible for rights violations during the armed conflict with the LTTE in 2009, India abstained from a crucial vote on Sri Lanka’s rights record at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva in March.
But New Delhi urged Colombo to fulfil its commitments to carry forward the process of reconciliation and address the aspirations of the Tamil community.
Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla visited Sri Lanka in October and assured the Sri Lanakan leadership that India will leave no stone unturned in mitigating the adverse impact of the Covid 19 restrictions on bilateral socio-economic engagement and will stand together with Government of Sri Lanka in its efforts for post-Covid recovery.
During his meeting with President Rajapaksa, he assured India that Sri Lanka would not be allowed to be used for “any activity” that could pose a threat to India’s security.
He explained Colombo’s ties with China in a “comprehensive manner” and exchanged views on a wide range of issues, including post-pandemic revival of the economy.
Rajapaksa elaborated on the need to re-establish the friendship and relations between India and Sri Lanka that existed in the 1960s and 70s.
The year was also a test of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s personal capabilities as a novice politician.
The 72-year-old former military officer had never been a member of any political party or got involved in any electoral politics other than extending the moral support to his older brother Mahinda, the leader of the Rajapaksa dynasty.
Each passing day was a trial for the president as he was faced with tackling the pandemic, key foreign policy issues, and the regional tensions caused by Sri Lanka’s leaning towards China.
Sri Lanka’s powerful Rajapaksa dynasty, which has consolidated its grip over power in the last couple of years, is known for its tilt towards China.
Though China is one of the biggest investors in various infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, there has been criticism — both locally and internationally — and growing concerns that Beijing has lured Colombo into a debt trap. Ironically, that has not stopped Sri Lanka from drifting towards China for economic support.
As Sri Lanka’s energy security is threatened by the unprecedented foreign exchange crisis, minister of finance and the third big Rajapaksa in the government Basil Rajapaksa visited India to negotiate a special credit line from Delhi to facilitate oil imports.
Sri Lankan officials, despite the bumpy ride of ties with India, stayed optimistic of receiving Indian aid.
“India is our closest neighbour and we value their cooperation very much,” Sri Lankan foreign ministry’s top bureaucrat Jayanath Colombage has often said on the bilateral relationship. (PTI)
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