Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh
Traditionally, India has had an erratic relationship with Myanmar that posited our operational requirements to cozy up with the Myanmar junta (to take on the North East-centric insurgent elements on the Myanmar side of the border), at odds with our more internationalist and avowedly diplomatic stance of supporting the pro-democracy strain of Aung San Suu Kyi’s struggle. The confusion from this moral dichotomy drove the Myanmar junta into the willing arms of the Chinese with whom it shares a 2185 km border – China suffered no such moral compunctions and with its famed realpolitik approach, prioritized the geo-political relevance of the ‘second coast’ on the Indian Ocean, captive natural resources of Myanmar and a hungry market for Chinese exports, to establish its own multihued hegemony. So, in Myanmar’slong spell of international isolation and seclusion, China became it principal partner of relevance and legitimacy.
Strategically, Myanmar made imminent sense for the Chinese with a pliant junta-regime and a geography that afforded a potential ‘pearl’port-base in Sittwe to provide logistics for the critical SLOC’s (Shipping Sea Lanes of Communication). This was part of the China’s global strategy of ‘String of Pearls’ that envisaged, intermittent ports along the Asian coastline, with the Dragon’sfirm trade/naval footprint, from the Hainan Island in the South China Sea up to Sudan in Africa. Even creative engineering solutionslike a canal through the Kra Isthmus in Thailand bypassing the restive, narrow and vulnerable Straits of Malacca was mooted by the Chinese to secure its trade and energy options, superimposing the relevance of Myanmar in the Chinese strategic jigsaw.
For the Myanmar junta, international legitimacy aside, Myanmar had the ongoing infamy ofhosting one of the world’s ‘longest running insurgencies’. There are over 135 Government recognized ethnic groups,with the predominance of the Bamars at approx. 65 per cent – leading to fears of ‘Burmainsation’,that led to armed ethnicity-based insurgent groups of various Myanmar’s minorities. These local insurgent groups imposed taxes in their respective domains and dabbled in drug trafficking to facilitate the purchase of weaponry from the black markets of Cambodia, China and Thailand. Given the lack of international support options for a junta-style-Government, it becamefertile ground for tactical arrangements, intrigues and bloody suppressions – just the kind of environment that the Chinese revel in and exploit to create a vassal nation. Chinese are past masters in the game of checks and balances to ensure perpetual control and it tactically managed covert relationships with some of Myanmar’s ethnic-based insurgent groups (especially those with shared Chinese ethnicity) to ensure a counter-lever to the Tatmadaw (as the Myanmar Military or juntais locally known).
The United Wa State Army (UWSA), representing the Wa Chinese ethnicity, are running a parallel Government in the Eastern Shan Statewith an estimated 25,000 insurgent-soldiers under its count, that is the most prominent Chinese pawn in Myanmar’s domestic affairs. However, the perversions and contradictions of the Myanmar’s muddle ensures that whilst, there is a tactical ceasefire between the Myanmar junta and the UWSA – it does not stop the Myanmar junta from aligning with UWSA for either taking on other insurgent groups like the Shan State Army or partaking the financially lucrative drug-trafficking operations with neighbouring countries or indeed, gun running (UWSA is the most active conduit for supplying arms to the Indian insurgent groups of Naga, Manipuri or Assam centricity).
However, in 2011 the junta took backseat with the civilian Government of the moderate and reformist President, Thein Sein (former General himself who came in through the USDP party in 2011 – a junta supported party, as the more popular Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD had boycotted the elections). His impact was felt immediately with a more ‘balanced’ outlook ensuing between Beijing and Delhi. Warming up to the Western powers and calling off, a controversial Chinese-led hydra project were symptomatic of the new direction sought, marking a studied changeto the blind adherence to Beijing’s diktat. But, given the multiplicity of interlinked insurgencies, the Chinese remain an active component of the Myanmar puzzle with enough Chinese assets (both economic and military) to arm-twist the Myanmar Governments, as and when required.
The Indians have come a long way from the virtual free-for-all, for its insurgent groups on the Myanmar side of the border in the pre-90’s, to the concerns tentative understanding of the 90’s,which was marred by the botched ‘Operation Golden Bird’ in 1995 – a rare joint operation of the Indian and Myanmar Army to ambush insurgents, only to have a quintessential Indian story of political Delhi prematurely announcing its decision to honour Aung San Suu Kyi with a civilian award at the very same time the joint military operation of the Indian Defence Forces and the Myanmar juntawas on, resulting in the miffed Myanmar junta pulling out of the operation mid-course and allowing an escape route to the insurgents.Last year, owing to the dynamic and evolutionary changes of the ‘opening up’ of Myanmar and the enhanced confidence building measures, a surgical strike in June last year during the ‘hot pursuit’ of the Myanmar based Indian insurgents was made possible – signaling a tacit understanding between the Indians and the Myanmar military.
Now that Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD has taken over with an ostensibly civilian Government (with her as the ‘State Counsellor of Myanmar’, since she is still technically debarred from assuming the post of President), the reins of power in the transition from the military-centric to the democratically elected government is still settling in nervously, albeit, with Myanmar military still retaining certain important powers and positions (Ministers of Defence, Home & Border Affairs will remain the prerogative of the Myanmar Military). Constitutional safeguards aside, myriad armed insurgencies and local outfits against the fears of “Burmanisation” will necessitate adequate firepower and relevance for the Myanmar military, irrespective of the new civilian dispensation or the erstwhile pure military-led governments. Politically, India will be naturally positioned to an amiable equation in the new civilian government, given its historical pro-democracy stand, yet, it will have to tread with extreme caution given the duality of power and the uncertainty of the future in Myanmar which is undergoing a hitherto, forgotten tryst with popular democracy and its imperatives. The reconciliation between the political and military powers in Myanmar will be tricky and a delicate experience and it would be imprudent to be seen taking sides in the inevitable conflicts of interest during the this transition of power in Myanmar – what ought to remain of singular importance for us is the ability to manage our ownsecurityconcerns and operational capabilitiesin Myanmar, either singularly or jointly in order to neutralize the insurgent infrastructure that are inimical to Indian security.
(The author is former
Lt Governor of Andaman Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com
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