Ashok Ogra
Indian Prime Ministers may look all-powerful but they soon realize that the chair transforms an occupant when negotiating complex situations and problems. They begin to learn ‘how to make decisions’ but not necessarily ‘what decisions to make.’
Imagine, Indira Gandhi seriously toying with the idea of ‘retiring from politics’ after the party’s rout at the 1977 polls only to ‘bounce back to power’ in1980; or Rajiv Gandhi who symbolized modern India succumbing to the Muslim clergy in reversing the Shah Bano verdict; V.P.Singh elevating his ‘opportunism’ to ‘principle’ when announcing the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report; an astute politician Narashima Rao, ignoring the advice of his senior cabinet colleagues and instead trusted BJP leaders over the Babri Majid; the avowed pacifist in Vajpayee opting to test nuclear device in 1998; and Manmohan Singh showing decisiveness when sealing the nuclear deal with the United States.
All of our above six Prime Ministers have left the South Block convinced that only they – with its power, privileges and burdens- can truly know what the job is like.
It is left to the noted political commentator, Neerja Chowdhury who, in her just published book HOW PRIME MINISTERS DECIDE, analyses the operating styles of the prime ministers though the prism of the six decisions of historical importance.
After her party was routed during the 1977 election, Mrs. Gandhi mused to close friends at her official residence: ‘I think I will go to the hills and retire there and write my memoirs. After all, what are my needs?’ She went on reflectively: ‘Mera Kharcha hee kya hai (I don’t need much money to live)? I can live very simply.’
Neerja weaves her narration like a story: “Mrs Gandhi took the blame for Sanjay’s death in an air crash upon herself as she had not performed the rituals and prayers at Chamunda temple in Himachal Pradesh- a promise she had made to the temple priest.”
Major differences and cracks had started surfacing in the Janata government soon after it was voted to power in 1977. Mrs. Gandhi, who fully understood the various contours of politics, decided to resurrect herself – first by engaging in political maneuvering (befriending Raj Narain who had defeated her in 1977 election) and later reaching out to RSS. Incidentally, “the RSS thought she (Mrs. Gandhi) was a devout Hindu – she practically visited every major temple in the country after her defeat in 1977- and they praised her for testing nuclear device in 1974, and the creation of Bangladesh. There are some who believe that the RSS helped her return to power in 1980,” Neerja writes.
What the author does not elaborate upon is the trip Mrs. Gandhi visited Belchi in Bihar where nine Harijans were burnt to death by an upper caste mob. This dramatic gesture brought Indira Gandhi back to the centre of the political stage. Her party won 353 seats in the 1980 elections, one more than in the ‘Garibi Hatao’ campaign of 1971.
In spite of looming so large over the landscape, Mrs.Gandhi had to resolve sharp differences between the old guard (represented by the Home Minister P.C.Sethi) and the new ‘baba log’ ( represented by Rajiv, Arun Nehru etc) on how to deal with the Khalistan agitation launched by Bhindrawala. The home ministry was in favour of adopting a conciliatory approach while dealing with the Akalis, with the Rajiv group favouring military intervention. ‘I have told Mummy so many times,’ an exasperated Rajiv told journalist Tavleen Singh, ‘that we must do something. But she listens to her senior advisors. They tell her they shouldn’t do anything that would upset the Sikhs.’
Neerja relates with honesty the flaws and strengths of the youthful leader, Rajiv Gandhi- a leader wishing to develop India in a hurry using new technologies. But one who suffered from lack of serious application, an unwillingness to read policy papers and impromptu decision-making.
Nobody doubted his secular credentials, yet Rajiv could not resist political advice to reverse his stand in the Shah Bano case. To appease the Muslim clergy, his government introduced a bill in Parliament overturning the judgment. He overruled his ministerial colleague Arif Mohammed Khan and few other Muslim intellectuals who openly supported the court verdict.
Neerja reveals an interesting conversation between Sonia and Rajiv: “if you can’t convince me about the Muslim Women’s bill, how are you going to convince the country,”?
Surprisingly, Neerja hasn’t touched upon another equally debatable decision of Rajiv Gandhi to ban Salman Rushdie’s ‘The Satanic Verses’- again playing to the orthodox gallery. It was Vajpayee government that decided not only grant a visa to Salman Rushdie but also ensure that he took the possession of his ancestral house in Solan.
Newly installed Prime Minister VP Singh had got frightened when Devi Lal, who had been dismissed, and to mute the threat from the dissenters, V P Singh lunged for the Mandal Commission Report- ‘opportunism at its apogee’ (Arun Shourie’s phrase).
B G Deshmukh who was the Principal Secretary to V P Singh provides graphic details in one of his books of what transpired at the cabinet meeting held on August 6,1990: “the PM started the deliberations and asked Ram Vilas Paswan, social welfare minister, to comment on the report. Vinod Pande, cabinet secretary, looked as surprised as I was. I said to the Prime Minister that as we had no notice on this subject we should be given time to collect the material and prepare a note for him. He did not agree…. It was obvious that this had been discussed at a meeting the previous evening and had been brought up in the cabinet for formal approval of the government.”
While most of the information that the book contains is common knowledge, but it is the astonishing information, useful context and the interesting sidelights that the author provides that makes her book an engaging and absorbing survey of our six prime ministers.
In the chapter appropriately titled ‘The Prime Minister Who Refused To Decide’ Neerja sheds an unflattering sidelight on PM Narasimha Rao who faced the most serious crisis when Babri Majid was demolished by 1,00,000 unruly kar sevaks on 6 December,1992.
Perhaps Rao did not think it necessary to heed to what L.K.Advani had announced at a press conference held just a month earlier,”I cannot give any guarantee at the moment on what will happen on 6 December. All I know is that we are going to perform kar seva.” ( Ramachandra Guha in India After Gandhi).
What is not clear from the book is whether it was entirely due to the indecisiveness of Rao that led to the demolition or did the PM prefer to remain a mute spectator in the belief the BJP would lose its main political card once for all.
Incidentally, when voted to power in 1991, Narasimha Rao wasn’t the first choice of Sonia Gandhi for the post of PM. It was first offered to S.D.Sharma but he refused due to age related health issues. Similarly, Manmohan Singh too wasn’t the first choice for Finance Minister; it was first offered to noted economist I.G.Patel but he declined the offer.
This book is not necessarily written to be read cover to cover. The table of contents is more of a timeline than a storyline. One can easily choose a Prime Minister’s term or a specific event to know about.
The soft stance that the then foreign minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee took during a cabinet meeting held in April 1979 in respect of India exercising the nuclear option, stands in total contrast to the bold decision he took to go nuclear in 1998. In fact, within hours of taking over, Neerja writes, the Prime Minister had called A.P.J.Abdul Kalam and R.Chidambaram to his office and told them to be ready to test a nuclear device. “The BJP had agreed to put its core commitments- building a Ram temple at Ayodhya, abrogating Article 370 and enacting a uniform Civil Code- on the back burner, to be able to forge alliances with other parties, which had reservations about its Hindu nationalist agenda. But it had managed to persuade its partners to agree to the exercise of the nuclear option.”
What emerges is that Vajpayee of 1998 was convinced that a nuclear deterrent was essential to prevent wars with the country’s hostile neighbors. It is a different matter that within one year of the nuclear test, Pakistan launched massive incursions into the Kargil sector.
Neerja excels as a raconteur, and her style makes characters come alive on the page. Her careful attention to even minor characters effectively carries through a story arc.
“The PM sat on a sofa awaiting word from Pokhran; Advani, Fernandes, Yashwant Sinha, Jaswant Singh sat around the dining table. The banter had slowly died down. Nobody moved. Then came the call that everyone had been waiting for. A tense Brajesh Mishra reached out for the phone after the first ring. ‘First Kalam spoke (to Delhi) in English, then Chidambaram spoke, recounted Santhanam who was …
‘Sir,we have done it,’ Kalam told Mishra. No wonder, Neerja calls Vajpayee ‘The Prime Minister Who Roared.’
In the chapter ‘The Underrated Prime Minister Who Triumphed’, Neera’s account of what transpired behind the scenes that led to the signing of the Indo-US nuclear pact is interspersed with a variety of comments, acute observations, and vignettes of the high and mighty. Since early 2000, the US administration had started recognizing India as a counterweight to an ascendant China in the Asia-Pacific region. Neerja elaborates: “Condoleezza Rice decided to pursue nuclear talks with India as soon as she became secretary of state in January 2005…. Rice told the Indian leaders that George Bush now wanted to go beyond the NSSP forged during Vajpayee’s time. She made a case for quickly concluding the NSSP…. She took Indian officials into confidence that Bush was going to sell F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan and that India,too, could buy ‘advanced weapons.”
We are all aware how the Congress party that was supportive of entering into the nuclear deal with the US, tackled the opposition parties who were vehemently against the deal. Finding the left adamant in their opposition to the deal, it is Sonia Gandhi who finally took a call. The government would be allowed to go to the IAEA and complete negotiations on the safeguards agreement.
Neerja provides graphic details about the negotiations before the deal was signed: “A prolonged session between the two sides took place at the imposing Hyderabad House in Delhi on 2 March, 2006. … there was deadlock over a couple of points which eluded the solution. The tricky one was the US demand that India put its civilian reactors under safeguards permanently. The next morning, the working group met again. Manmohan Singh and George Bush sat in the adjoining room, chatting and waiting for the impasse to dissolve. Finally, there was a breakthrough – and it came after Bush intervened personally.”
However, nothing must have dampened the celebrations in Manmohan Singh’s camp more than Vajpayee’s strident criticism of the deal.
One wishes the author had included the current PM, Narendra Modi, in the book. Perhaps she resisted the temptation because his government was a work in progress. Neerja’s focus is to report the events and not to dissect them. It will certainly help readers better understand how the Prime Ministers govern this complex and diverse country.
I am tempted to quote John Kennedy, who when asked to rank the presidents, said: “Only the president himself can know what his real pressures and his real alternatives are.” It’s this sentiment that virtually all the six Prime Ministers voice at one point or another in this voluminous book, published by Aleph Book Company.
What emerges is that it is lonely at the top?
(The author works for the reputed Apeejay Education, New Delhi)
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