Gautam Sen
India has converted the Ladakh portion of Jammu & Kashmir state to a Union Territory (UT) and as per the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 and the consequent Gazette Notification declaring that the UT will come into existence on 31st October, 2019. This administrative-cum-constitutional action may be considered to have had an impact on China because of the fact that part of this prospective UT is claimed by China and the Aksai Chin in north-eastern portion of Ladakh is de-facto under China`s military control deemed illegal by India. China`s foreign minister has specifically highlighted this aspect in his public pronouncements as well as after interactions with Pakistan`s foreign minister and during India`s foreign minister, Jaishankar`s recent visit to China. Despite such public protestations, China did not issue any diplomatic demarche to India nor initially give a notice for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting in the matter. However, subsequent to Pakistan foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi`s visit to China in the second week of August this year, China adopted an active approach conjointly with Pakistan to test opinion of the UNSC members – primarily of the major powers, in the matter during the in-camera UNSC meeting on 16th August, 2019.
The method and extent of China`s public action on Ladakh was initially measured and quite low-key, but was scaled up to give a diplomatic boost to Pakistan. Therefore, it will quite pragmatic to construe that, whenever an opportunity arises, China will step in support of its all-weather ally, Pakistan. India should therefore proceed on the premise or a bottom-line that, in matters connected with Pakistan where China`s strategic interests are involved like in Kashmir-a territory adjacent to its ethnically troublesome Muslim-dominated province of Xiangjiang, Beijing will adopt convergent policies internationally with Pakistan. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned developments, there has also not been much lateral movement of Chinese military forces deployed along the Sino-Indian border of Ladakh nor any aggressive move by that country`s People Liberation Army border deployed units, or any substantive violation of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement concluded between the two countries in October 2013 . The ground situation from border management angle, in the eastern sector along the Line of Actual (LAC) control, has also been calm. In a scenario as above, New Delhi may not have cause to worry on the Chinese immediate and near-future postures and action vis-à-vis Ladakh UT. The disposition of opposing military forces of India and China along the Sino-Indian border in Ladakh is quite balanced also, and should not give rise to any immediate anxiety, even after Sino-Pak diplomatic maneuverings within and outside the United Nations forum.
India however, should be cautious in dealing with the ethnic situation, social issues, border area development matters and infrastructure development aspects, post-Ladakh`s UT status. A thrust in funding of schemes and projects is expected to ensue. Government of India, first of all, should keep the autonomous development councils of Leh and Kargill in the forefront of the programme, scheme and project formulation process. Execution should be done in likewise manner. China may not view a locally or regionally spurred development initiative askance or through a hostile prism. An attempt to open up some sort of mutually beneficial dialogue between the communities and people on both sides of the Ladakh frontier, while undertaking development works in Ladakh UT, may be way of ensuring strategic stability in the Sino-Indian border region in Ladakh. This may be achievable without lowering of guard by the defence or border security forces of both the countries. Beijing would consider such approaches reassuring, may be comfortable with such local-level interaction. In other words, within such a framework of interaction, China`s apparent hostility on the conversion of UT and New Delhi`s direct control of Ladakh for the present, and its limited hostile posturing would not derail Sino-Indian relations and disturb the overall architecture of bilateral relations.
In the above backdrop, it is for consideration whether India should modify its present posture on the China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC). India gradually altering its posture on CPEC may be a realistic option under certain circumstances. India`s main objection to the CPEC stems from the corridor being routed through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) considered as part of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. India endorsing the CPEC, subject to Pakistan accepting formally the division of the former princely state along the presently delineated Line of Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement, may not be a chimera but a pragmatic and attainable strategic trade-off. It will be an achievement for India if China`s commitment in the matter could be suitably leveraged. In such a scenario, a cartographic formalization of the Sino-Indian boundary and conversion of the LAC to a regular international border in the western sector, may be a feasible proposition.
It will be in the strategic interests of both India and China to maintain the status quo in the western peripheral region of China including Xinjiang and Aksai Chin, and in the Indian-controlled Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh areas. It will an achievement of both the present Indian and Chinese ruling leadership, if a modus vivendi encompassing the above is worked out. The other major international powers with interest in the region ie. Russia and USA, may welcome such an outcome. While the military-political oligarchy in Pakistan will be unwilling to give up Pakistan`s claim to the whole of Jammu & Kashmir area, it will be a test of resilience, diplomatic skill and foresight of the present Indian government leadership if it can steer the course of events in that direction in concert with China. A major sacrifice which the present Indian government will have to make is to surrender its claim on POK and tone down its posture and approach on the Tibet issue and accept the harsh control which China exercises on its restive Xinjiang province.
Whatever happens, Beijing is not expected to tolerate any loosening of its administrative grip and military control on any part of its sovereign territory which includes Xinjiang and Aksai Chin which is strategically placed in relation to regions in ferment like Tibet and the above-referred province. The present public ferment in its Hongkong territory, is another cause of anxiety for Beijing. In such circumstances, India has to work out its policies and postures towards China, reckoning the above ie. pragmatically accepting China`s complete sovereign control over the above-mentioned territories, but without compromising on similar control it has to have over the new UTs of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. The incumbent government at New Delhi is on the threshold of an immense opportunity of resolving the Jammu & Kashmir issue for all times to come. This entails foregoing the claim on POK for international recognition including of Pakistan`s under the aegis of China, and preferably Russia and USA, and enforcing with international acceptance India`s rightful sovereign control of the part of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir presently in its administrative control. The noises Beijing is presently making and consequent posture being adopted, is not to feign anxiety on India`s recent constitutional and administration action on Jammu & Kashmir. China`s worry needs to be countenanced. But, opportunities are also on the anvil, which New Delhi with its suave and mature foreign minister and former foreign secretary, should be able to avail of.
(The author is retired IDAS officer)
(The views are personal!)
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