K.N. Pandita
India and Pakistan both lack energy resources to meet domestic requirements. They depend on oil and natural gas imports from neighbouring Gulf countries. Iraq was India’s premier supplier of crude oil until the war broke out in that country and the US put an end to Saddam’s regime. Thereafter India looked to other suppliers including Iran.
Pakistan’s good relations with Saudi Arabia have proved highly rewarding for her. Apart from oil concessions, thousands of Pakistani skilled and non-skilled workers found employment in Saudi Arabia and the littoral states. Their remittances form a big chunk of Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings.
For more than a decade, there has been the talk of export of gas from Southern Iranian gas fields to Pakistan and India. It is called Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) project. Several tripartite meetings took place over a period of time in which ins and outs of supply of Iranian gas to these energy-starved South Asian countries were discussed. This seemed an alluring project. While Iran and Pakistan proceeded with the proposal of laying gas pipeline on their respective sides, India had reservations.
India was apprehensive of security of contemplated overland pipeline which would pass through Pakistan’s turbulent province of Baluchistan. Apart from this, traditional acrimonious relations between India and Pakistan were also a reason for India to drag her feet. She withheld nod to the project.
Yet the most important factor that dampened the spirit of sponsors was the insistence of the US not to go ahead with the proposal. In the aftermath of the incident of 4 November 1979 in which Iranian students led by pasdaraan (national guards) sacked the US embassy in Teheran and took 60 of its inmates as hostages, leading to imposition of sanctions against Iran, Washington saw to it that Iran was economically squeezed. It would obstruct flow of enormous gas revenue to Iran if supplies to Pakistan and India materialized.
Under US pressure, India did not show much interest in the IPI project apparently for reasons of security threat and high delivery costs. At one point of time, she proposed laying under-sea gas pipeline as an alternative to overland pipeline to alley security apprehensions. Iran is reported to have even agreed to provide a loan for the under-water project. However, after India concluded nuclear deal with the US, she almost abandoned the idea of IPI.
Pakistan pursued the project despite tacit opposition by Washington. Finally an agreement was signed between Iran and Pakistan in which terms and conditions were set forth. Signing of the agreement was announced with much fanfare. Pakistan agreed to complete the laying of gas pipeline on her side by the end of December 2013. Iran agreed to offer US$500 million by way of loan for Pakistan laying the gas pipeline on her side.
A piquant situation has developed in the case of IP pipeline project. Recently Iranian Deputy Oil Minister Ali Majedi suddenly announced cancelation of the loan and added that Iran reserved the right of demanding from Pakistan the compensation for not completing pipe laying task as per the agreement. No reaction has come so far from Pakistan.
Iranian sources say that in view of sanctions still in place, Iranian economy is in a bad shape and cannot make any loans available to the party. But keen observers are not satisfied with this argument. The fact is that lately Pakistan is reported to have developed nuclear weapons for delivery to Saudi monarchy.
If this is true, and of course, Americans are not unaware of this development, the premise is that it may have considerable impact on Iranian nuclear deal. Washington loses the moral ground for a stupendous ten-year long effort of conducting secret and tortuous talks with Iran for making her agree to the capping of nuclear weapon production programme. In the process, the ultimate position will be that Iran’s bomb producing effort is rolled back while the Saudi monarchy acquires nuclear weapon through Pakistani channel.
Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia have never been cordial. However, despite brutal attacks by Sunni fanatical organizations in Pakistan on her Shia population and their demand to declare the Shia as non-Muslims, this atrocity has not generated as much of fierce reaction in Iran as would be expected. Embattled Iran would not want to open another front as she was already preoccupied with her conflict with the US and sanctions imposed on her.
Remember Saudi Arabia has financed Pakistan’s nuclear capability to a large extent. The possibility of Iran hardening her posture on nuclear and other issues in the backdrop of disclosure about Pak readiness to supply nukes to Saudi Arabia cannot be ruled out. For Iran clandestine nuclear proliferation that puts its arch rival Saudi Arabia in a commanding position in the Middle East does not preclude the potential of bring about strain on Iran-US move towards détente. Additionally, it does not augur well for Iran-Pakistan relations. Iran will be justified even in asking the US to define her position vis-à-vis nuclearized Saudi Arabia. This can be irksome to the US.
Situation in the region becomes fluid after the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan-Taliban Afghanistan (Talibanistan)-Saudi triumvirate will pose new challenges to Iran. Saudi’s have already hinted at “new defence doctrine”.
It virtually means new defence and strategic alignments in the Asian region. Iran and India will have to re-formulate their respective role and policies to counter any attempt that may deal a blow to their national interests and regional balance of power.
India is unlikely to react to these far-reaching changes in regional strategy until parliamentary election, scheduled for March-April 2014 is over and new government is formed in New Delhi. But what is most likely to happen is deepening of Indo-Iranian collaboration in defence and economic fields especially in joint patrolling of the gulf and beyond. However, India may not warm up to IPI even if there is no US pressure. At the same time, the TAPI pipeline remains in doldrums unless political situation in Afghanistan becomes clear in the aftermath of the withdrawal of NATO forces by the end of 2014.