By Harihar Swarup
Haryana has delivered a historic verdict. Never before has any party come to power for three consecutive terms. Everyone, from ground reports to exit polls, predicted a massive majority for the Congress. How did the BJP managed to pull off such an impressive victory?
It might be tempting to read the increase in the BJP’s vote share (compared to last time) and the massive seat tally as a pro-incumbent vote. Some may also argue that perhaps the choice of Nayab Singh Saini to replace chief minister Manohar Lal Khattar as CM helped ward off anti-incumbency to a certain degree.
However, it would be naïve to argue that there wasn’t any serious discontent with the BJP government in the state. Haryana was the site of protests against several moves of the Centre—the farm laws and the Agnipath scheme. Unemployment and economic anxiety among a section of voters is the reality across India, and Haryana is no exception. And the way wrestlers protesting against the BJP and Wrestling Federation of India heavyweight Brij Bhushan Sharan were treated by police, must have added some level of resentment against the BJP in the state. Finally, the Lok Sabha elections signalled an erosion in the BJP Dalit votes base and Rahul Gandhi’s caste census demand too saw some traction in the state.
In hindsight, it would appear that this sentiment was more pronounced among voters from the Jat community. Not surprisingly, the dominant caste anywhere is more vocal and their desires get echoed more openly. The Congress gained 11 Percentage points from its 2019 vote share in this election compared to just three percentage points for the BJP. So, it is possible that the swing of votes on the ground made everyone feel a wave in favour of the Congress. But the rallying of Jats voters towards the Congress is likely to have produced a counter-consolidation of the non-dominant castes.
The changing distribution of votes is at the heart of both long-term social alignment and immediate election results. The Congress before Bhupinder Singh Hooda became the CM in 2005, had a broader social base, while the Indian National Lok Dal relied a lot more on Jat votes. The BJP’s rise in the state politics was largely based on using this wedge at a time when INLD was in decline and Congress was becoming more Jat-centric.
Though the BJP’s lead over the Congress in terms of vote share in this election is barely one per cent point, the seat share tells a completely different story. The BJP, in 2014 won 47 seats with 33 per cent votes: however, it could win only 40 seats despite winning 36 percentage votes in 2019. The INLD and its breakaway faction the Jannayak party are declining in strength—from 33 per cent to 25 per cent in 2014, and 17 percent in 2019, their share is now down five per cent. This has given the BJP an edge in converting seats at a higher rate.
Some commentators also indirectly indicated another chink in the Congress armour—the party getting complacent and getting caught in its own illusory web of being the default beneficiary of its opponents’ weakness. Much like that happened in Chattisgarh in 2023, where a Congress victory seemed like a foregone conclusion. The BJP recognized that it was on a weaker wicket. The party strategized with better SWOT analysis, micromanagement of constituencies, including independents and the smaller parties, and took advantage of the factional feud within Congress. The power tussle between TS Singhdeo and Bhupesh Baghel in Chhattisgarh was replayed with Hooda and Kumari Selja in Haryana. (IPA
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