Rekha Chowdhary
The renewed debate on Panchayati Raj institutions in the state provides an opportunity to review the existing structure and replace it with more effective one. Following is a brief analysis of the Panchayati Raj Act of J&K with positive suggestions for changes to be incorporated for effective grass-root democracy.
The Panchayati Raj institutions in Jammu and Kashmir State suffer both from structural as well as operational weaknesses. Structurally, the Panchayati Raj Act 1989, despite the recent amendments (including the 2004 amendment in relation to reservation of seats for the women, SCs and STs; 2011 amendment to provide for the State Election Commission and; more recently passed Act in relation to the State Finance Commission), remains flawed and does not serve the purpose of making the Panchayats the units of self-governance. Unlike the 73rd constitutional amendment of Indian Constitution and the Model Panchayat Act, the Panchayats as per the State Act, are not democratically structured at all the three levels. The principle of direct election of Panchayats, for instance, is applied only at the village level, neither the Block level Panchayat nor the District level Panchayat is comprised of the directly elected representatives of the people. It is only the Chairman of the Block Development Council who is elected but the process of election is not direct but indirect- the Electoral College comprised of the Panches and Sarpanches within that block. Similarly there is no provision for direct election in the District Planning and Development Board. It is only the Vice Chairperson of the Board who is elected, the Electoral College being comprised of the members of the Board itself.
What hampers the democratic structuring of Panchayats at the three levels is the presence of the government officials. The Secretary Panchayat at all the three levels is a government official, the Gram Sevak at the level of the Halqa Panchayat, the Block Development Officer at the Block Development Council Level and the Deputy Commissioner at the level of District Planning and Development Board.
Actually, the concept of Panchayats, in the sense of institutions of self-governance, cannot be applied at all to the block or the District levels, since these levels are comprised more like the administrative extensions of government rather than autonomous bodies of self-governance. This is more so in case of the District Planning and Development Board. Besides, the secretary, the Chairperson of the District Planning and Development Board, is also a nominee of the government. As the practice has been, the Government generally nominates a senior minister to be the chairperson of the Board. Also as per the practice, the meeting of the Board is attended by many senior ministers, including the Chief Minister and the senior bureaucrats. The presence of such high powered government officials and ministers, cannot in any case allow the Panchayat at this level to be a democratic body autonomous of governmental control and influence.
The structure of the District Planning and Development Board, is more in line with the Single Line Administration system that was introduced in the State in mid seventies rather than in line with Panchayati Raj Institution. The idea underlying the Single Line Administration was to decentralise planning to the level of the district and at the time when it was introduced, it was quite a forward looking idea. However, under the scheme of Panchayati Raj institutions, the idea of decentralised planning remains incomplete without its democratic structuring. The idea is to decentralise planning through democratic rather than the administrative structures.
The minimum that is required therefore, is to restructure the Panchayats and make them autonomous of governmental control. To do that, firstly, the principle of direct election would need to be applied to all the three layers of Panchayat, and secondly, the governmental presence would need to be minimised. Not only is it required that the chairperson of the Block Development Council not be nominated by the government, it is also required that the provision of a government functionary as the Secretary of the Panchayat (Gram Sevak at the Halqa level, BDO at the Intermediate level and the Deputy Commissioner at the District level) be reviewed.
The government control over the Panchayat also needs to be reviewed from another perspective. There is a degree of arbitrariness in the constitution of Panchayats in the State. Despite the fact that the Act provides for the continuity of Panchayats by mandating that before the expiry of the term of Panchayats, the next elections are be conducted, it could be possible for the government to ignore this provision and not conduct the elections before the expiry of the term of Panchayats. Since 2006, for five years, there was a vacuum with no elected Panchayats in place. In another manner, the arbitrariness was reflected. Though the Act provides for the three tiers of Panchayat, the government while holding the elections for the Village Panchayats, was not under any obligation to constitute the Block Development Council immediately. The Block Development Council therefore was not constituted in 2001-2006 period and one and half year has passed since the last Panchayat election and BDC is still to be formed.
In this context, it is important to ensure the continuity of Panchayats and not hold their existence to the whims and wishes of the government in power. This may be done either by further strengthening the provision of continuity in the State Act or by mandating it in the Constitution of J&K.
At the operational level, the biggest issue remains the powerlessness of the Panchayats. From 2001 to 2006, though the Halqa Panchayats were the only democratically constituted layer of Panchayat, these were not empowered. While the powers mentioned in the Act were not operationalised, additionally notified powers (in 2003) were also not made available. If Panchayats remained functional, these were only in relation to the Centrally Sponsored Schemes, for which it was mandatory that the Panchayats be involved. If there was anything more pathetic than the powerlessness of the Panchayats, it was the absence of funding. Again, the only funding that was available to the Panchayat was that which was tied with some Centrally Sponsored Schemes. Other than that neither the Panchayats were provided basic funding by the state nor were these directed to raise their own resources. This story, more or less, remains the same after the 2011 elections. There are pronouncements regarding devolution of powers and empowerment of Panchayats, and yet, the Panchayats remain powerless.
While much of the problem of the powerlessness of Panchayats rests with the unwillingness of the parallel administrative and higher governmental structures to transfer real powers to the Panchayats, there is a structural problem in the Act as well. The PRIs in the state are not structured on the basis of federal principles. The principle of devolution of powers between the state and Panchayats is not reflected in the Act in any manner. The Act provides the powers of the three tiers of the Panchayat, but it does not in any case guarantee that there is no overlapping of functions and powers between the administrative and field agencies under the control of the State government and the Panchayats.
The process of devolution of powers requires the transfer of functions, staff support and resources. Also it is important to identify activities related to devolved functions and assign the same to the appropriate Panchayat. It is important that the PRIs are given clear roles and activities related to their devolved functions are clearly identified. This clarity of roles for the Panchayats is missing in the State. The State Act provides for the functions of each level of Panchayats but the process of devolution does not involve activity mapping. The process of coordination with respect to their functions is not clearly laid out. Even when the government makes pronouncements for the devolution of powers, this does not automatically empower the Panchayats. Since many of the functions assigned to the Panchayats are already in the sphere of the field administration, it is important that with the specification of powers of Panchayats, there be simultaneously withdrawal of powers from the administrative agencies. With the administrative agencies already entrenched in the rural areas, the Panchayats cannot be playing any meaningful role there. This is more so, when the Panchayats are starved of funding and are dependent on the same administrative agencies. Hence unless a clear specification of powers of Panchayats is done and these specified powers are withdrawn from the administrative agencies, the powers, whether mentioned in the Act or in the various Orders and notifications of the government would not be available to Panchayats. The process of empowerment of Panchayats therefore requires more fundamental changes in the administrative setup in the rural areas.
More importantly, there is no process of devolution of funds. In the absence of the Finance Commission there is no other system for fixing minimum amount of grant-in-aid by the State. Nor has there been any specific source of income for the Panchayats. Even though the taxation power is detailed in the Act, the Panchayats cannot not use this power of taxation to generate resources. While most of the funds are actually at the disposal of the district and block level administrative functionaries, the Panchayats have been generally starved of the funds. Apart from the funding that comes with the centrally sponsored schemes, there is not much money available for the Panchayats.
It seems that due to the conflict situation of the state, the institutionalisation of Panchayati Raj has not taken place according to a cohesive logic. The decision to institute Panchayati Raj rather than having its own logic, appears to be based on exterior compulsions. There is a general feeling in the state that the Panchayats have been constituted mainly under the pressure of the Centre. That it is out of fear of the loss of the Central grants that Panchayats are constituted. This lack of a cohesive logic gets reflected at many points. For instance, there has been a slow recognition and acceptance that seats through direct elections be reserved for women and other marginal classes. However, when an amendment was introduced for that purpose in 2004, such reservation was limited to the level of Panches and was not extended to the level of Sarpanches. It was further specified only at the level of Village Panchayat and not at the other two levels. Similarly, when the provision for Gram Sabha was incorporated in the Act, the powers of the Gram Sabha were not detailed. Gram Sabha which should have been the most powerful body demanding accountability from the Panches and Sarpanches, remains subordinated to the Panchayats.
What needs to be kept in mind while restructuring the Panchayati Raj Institutions in the state – is that the ideal of Panchayati Raj Institutions is not based merely upon decentralisation of administrative powers. It is a much more radical an idea. It represents three things: first, it stands for extension of the federal logic and viewing Panchayats as third tier of federal system; second, Panchayats as representing the logic of democratic governance and extending such governance to the grass-root level and, third, Panchayats as providing opportunities to the oppressed sections of society, including the SCs, STs and women, to be represented in the power structure.
(Email: rekchowdhary@gmail.com )
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