A. C. Chaturvedi
The Pathankot incident, though many weeks old, has still to see the final picture as the elements are steadily put together and has opened, perhaps very timely, a whole set of vertical and horizontal dimensions for review and recasting to “harden our security structure” which should move beyond breakdown maintenance to robust preventive maintenance mode.
Though of a different time and setting, the Pearl Harbor episode of the second world war must be among the most eloquent comprehensive lessons of all times in immediate and long term consequences of lowering the guard , and downplaying or not responding full strength to even inexplicit indicators of imminent threats.
Targeted hostile actions originating from across the border at fairly regular intervals over the past sometime, and getting away with a measure of success, is a disturbing scenario. The “terrorists” may not have achieved their primary objectives , but they have made a loud statement of their capacity to reach their target and to take a toll of our civil and uniformed personnel.
In the Pathankot case they were able to get across all the three “filters”-the international border, the hinterland and the installation perimeter. The SP under NIA questioning was certainly not on any supervisory policing duty of any kind. The basic system, such as it was, did not stand the test of a real situation that was almost repeating itself and came out as inadequate and vulnerable, the martyrdom of brave personnel notwithstanding.
Timely induction of specialist NSG, Garuda and Army elements inside the airbase saved the situation ,confining and neutralizing the terrorists, Air Force helicopters providing force-multiplication.
With the visit of Defence Minister and subsequently PM himself to the airbase transborder terrorism and related matters should be receiving the kind of serious attention deserved. Defence establishments in the region would similarly be, hopefully, getting an intensive overhaul in terms of security practices.
Security is intrinsically preventive and would normally be designed and maintained for ‘bad case scenario’, with ‘worst case’ catered for and responses identified. In critical locations there is no place for notional security–it is either there or it is not.
In all manned systems, fatigue tends to set in sooner or later and attention to detail tends to diminish into amnesia of sorts. The system of ‘inspection and supervision’ at several levels was part of uniformed organizations to generate ‘wake-up calls’ on a regular basis. “Work not checked is work not done” is one of the axioms. That applies strongly to out-of-sight deployments. An eminent British aircraft accident investigation expert summed up his long experience in-“Don’t assume, just be certain”.
The basics in security are fairly well known-anonymity control and access control together with defence in depth. Putting devices, which are eventually passive, and persons in place is seldom sufficient. Procedures are the vital third element that link and energize the other two and enable identification of faults in the incipient stage.
It has been noted across case studies that human element tends to be the weakest link in a security arrangement, largely due to acts of inadvertent or advertent omission. Faulty implementation or lack of close and constant supervision make for potential failure. Vulnerability tests, or mock drills, are needed from time to time and serve as periodical health check ups. Terrorist organization, by whatever name known, will continue to be there across the border and LOC for a long time. The nexus between the Pak military – who also have extensive commercial interests – and the radical jehadi groups actively nurtured and partnered by them is thick set and they rule the roost, even in the eyes of moderate Pakistanis, and have no interest in good relations with India. There is no earthly reason, diplomatic forward movement included, for us to have any degree of “stand down” on the borders and the border belt where peace is an exception and armed infiltration attempts the rule. This is particularly so for J&K and Punjab.
There is a larger facet. Media reports draw attention to synergy issues on the civil side also. Thus the flyover opposite the Pathankot airbase commands quite a view of the area inside the gates. Perhaps unknown to the NHA, this problem has already been solved long back in Jammu and much earlier in Srinagar by using steel-sheet screens in appropriate places to shut out physical and visual access to the protected places. A Delhi newspaper has carried photo reports of illegal structures coming up very close to airbase boundaries at Chandigarh, Ambala, Halwara and other places in the region. This points to an entirely new dimension of security threat not underlined earlier, and the responsibility lies with the local revenue administration here and in all similar locations in the country. Perhaps a new Central enactment on this matter is seriously called for without which local lapses would continue taking place, facilitating criminal trespass and serious consequences thereof.
Traditional policing, originating from the British times, laid great emphasis on prevention, and ‘beat’ patrolling especially at and through night ,with due supervision by officers, that also meant deterrence for outlaws in the territorial jurisdiction. Patrolling in a appropriate mode is, simply, pre-emptive possession and domination of space that might otherwise be used by criminal elements. Terrorists are ‘habitual criminals’. Half of territorial policing is district Special Branch and thana work which cannot afford to close down at nightfall. Manpower supplement is not a real issue in the present times.
There is no substitute for local policing and its good health, as the most primary building block and requirement of law and order and national security, is a fundamental issue. Central forces and agencies only provide the supplement and augmentation of the nature needed by the states. Thus the CRPF role in turning the tide in Punjab in tandem with the state police in the 80s is well known, and their contribution in J&K is valueable.
Intelligence and security advisories from central agencies to the states have been a standard practice all along ; whether these are just routinely endorsed down the line or actively shared, pursued and reviewed makes quite a difference.
Seldom it is that happenings in an area, specially in rural parts, are not part of the local “folk knowledge” or “open secrets” there and in the neighborhood thereof. Information flow to police stations tends to be natural unless shut out or degraded by incompetence. There is no limit to its nature or quality. In J&K itself the institution of ‘kar-e-khas’ at the thana level has a splendid past, the district special branch apart.
National highway here has been a regular element of the activities of Pakistan based terrorists because of the short timeframe required, multiplicity of ingress options, the lateral mobility provided by the highway and the presence of critical and sensitive locations thereon.
In the context of Dinanagar and Pathankot it can be seen that some of Punjab area lies on the right side (J&K side) of the Ravi river and this includes places like Narote Jaimal Singh and, closer to the border, Bamiyal. Detached from the Punjab “mainland” this pocket might well be a shadow zone for the normal territorial administration. Reportedly the ingress route taken for both the Punjab incidents, this link via Kolian bridge over Ravi bye passes J&K and makes for a direct movement to national highways in Punjab and also to adjoining HP.
A chain is only as strong as the weakest link(s). That’s a timeless axiom. A ‘system’ is a delusion unless all the subsystems have been monitored and ‘certified’ on a regular basis to be active and alert. There is no substitute for management-by-walking-around at all operating levels of responsibility.
The territorial police have to be geared up and oriented to be good Second Responders against illegal movement into border belts. Hinterland policing, though a state domain, cannot go without a revision of deployment pattern synchronizing and dovetailing with the two other elements – arrangement at the borders on the one side and vital installations on the other.
A matter equally of letter and spirit, security of identified critical and vital areas in the present context ultimately boils down to anonymity control by all means and in all manner in terms of ‘persons, places or things’. The time frame, in national interest, is ‘here and now’.
(The author is former Direcotr General of Police)
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com
Trending Now
E-Paper
Follow our WhatsApp channel