Y Udaya Chandar
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Russia on 21 May 2018 for an informal summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the city of Sochi. The informal summit had a broad-based agenda of global and regional issues; global terrorism; the situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria; and the Islamic State.
The post-World War II spread of the superpower rivalry prompted the Soviet Union to establish sound relations with India, which followed a non-aligned foreign policy. At the same time, India was suspicious of the emerging security ties between the United States (US) and Pakistan, prompting it to move towards the Soviet Union (USSR), particularly in the post-Stalin period. By the mid-1950s, India and the USSR appeared poised to establish intimate relations.
During the 1962 Chinese invasion, the refusal of the US-led Western camp to assist India in expanding its military capability led to the establishment of formal military cooperation between India and the USSR. In 1962, the countries agreed to begin a programme of close military-technical cooperation. Soviet military contracts usually had favourable financial terms and provided for the licensing of production.
In August 1971, the USSR and India signed the historic Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, in the wake of unprecedented arrival of refugees from East Pakistan into India. India’s long-term self-reliance in military procurement and its search for strategic autonomy guided the country’s security cooperation with the USSR. Still, India did not choose to join the Soviet camp; rather, it sought to use Soviet-supplied arms as a stepping-stone for achieving strategic autonomy.
The political upheaval in East Pakistan adversely affected India’s national security and economy. In the light of this, India and the USSR developed a kind of mutual trust and cooperation, which appeared unshakable and durable until the disintegration of the USSR. Prior to its collapse, the USSR met most of India’s defence needs. By a rough estimate, 60 to 80% of all Indian military hardware originated from the Soviet Union.
With the dissolution of the USSR, the new Russian Federation began to grope for new principles and practices in its foreign relations. At this time, India was kept on the backburner in Moscow’s policy circles. One school of thought concerning future relations with India, headed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, believed that Pakistan was a more valuable asset for fulfilling Russia’s immediate foreign policy and security concerns. Kozyrev and his supporters argued that Pakistan could become an effective middleman for Russia in dealing with Islamic fundamentalists. Consequently, the Russian foreign ministry deemed Pakistan, Iran and Turkey to be higher priorities than relations with India.
In November 1991, about a month before the final dissolution of the USSR, Moscow supported a Pakistan-sponsored UN resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. This was a bit of a political shock to India, as the resolution would mean that India, along with Pakistan, would have to abandon its nuclear ambitions. However, this was related indirectly to the Russian support of the Afghan Government. This proved to be a short-lived exercise.
Another event that added stress to Indo-Russian relations centred on the purchase of cryogenic engines and their related technologies. The contract, signed on 18 January 1991, would have helped India gain knowledge of the Russians’ liquid oxygen propulsion system for cryogenic engines. In gaining access to this technology, India hoped to advance its geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle programme. When the US applied sanctions to Russia in July 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to suspend the transaction with India and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale, so that only the cryogenic engines, and not the technology, would be delivered.
At the same time, yet another controversy, the ‘rupee versus rouble’ debate, negatively affected Indo-Russian relations. This dispute led to the collapse of trade relations between the two countries in 1991-92. After considerable negotiations, a resolution was reached in January 1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion annually, in the form of Indian goods, through 2005. The remaining 37 percent of the debt would be repaid, interest-free, over a span of 45 years.
The 1990s expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the crisis in the Balkans and several other instances of American unilateralism induced Moscow to reprioritise its foreign policy agenda. Those in Moscow who supported closer ties with Asian powers felt vindicated. In January 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s foreign minister, Indo-Russian relations began to change quickly, and for the better. India once again came under Russia’s strategic focus.
As US President Bill Clinton was putting pressure on India on the nuclear issue, Moscow concluded an agreement to build two Russian light-water nuclear reactors in India, in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban. The accord paved the way for the construction of two 1,000-MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam, in Tamil Nadu. While Russia criticised India for its nuclear tests in 1998, it refused to apply any sanctions against the country. Further, Russia fully supported India during the Kargil conflict of 1999 and called upon Pakistan to pull back its troops on its side of Line of Control.
President Putin fully supported Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Government’s position on cross-border terrorism and urged Pakistan to destroy its infrastructure of terrorism. Thus, the USSR and the Russian Federation can be said to have extended a helping hand to India whenever the latter needed it.
One of India’s chief concerns in the early 1990s was its limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Soviet-produced armaments. Its military was facing an immediate crisis. At the other end of the equation, Russian inability to continue supplying the flow of military hardware, coupled with a sharp reduction in Indian military expenditures, ‘weakened the primary bond that had united India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War’. By the mid-1990s, Indo-Russian military cooperation reached new heights.
Since Russia inherited the lion’s share of benefits and burdens of the USSR, Indo-Russian relations have been greatly dominated by the legacy of Indo-Soviet relations. After the breakup of the USSR, the relationship was strained, as India began to diversify its defence purchases away from its earlier, totally Soviet-dominated buying programme.
The fact is that both nations have been extremely preoccupied with internal obstacles in recent decades, even though they continue to devote just enough time to foreign relations that Indo-Russian relations have a rather ‘step-brotherly’ feel. The leaders of both the nations have met on a number of occasions and have promised each other that they will bring bilateral relations to the centre stage. They have also taken pains to mention the incredible affection they have for one another.
President Putin visited New Delhi on 11 December 2014 for the first time after Modi assumed office. Trade and energy cooperation dominated the talks, and they set a target of achieving US$30 billion in bilateral trade by 2025, with an equal amount of investment in each other’s economies.
Set against the backdrop of increasing Western sanctions, Putin had earlier signed gas deals with China worth US$400 billion believed to be heavily tilted in China’s favour. India was keen to strike a similar energy agreement. Both sides have agreed to a joint feasibility study of building a gas pipeline through China, and Putin has vowed to install 10 more nuclear reactors in the next 20 years, including adding more units to the Kudankulam plant in Tamil Nadu.
In the matter of defence ties, Modi reassured Russia, ‘even as India’s options have increased, Russia will continue to remain its top most defence partner’, signalling a long-term defence relationship. Both nations have decided to manufacture a good number of weapons systems in India using Russian know-how. The Brahmos missile system is one of these, but Russia must keep more such systems in the pipeline.
Lately, Russia has also been swinging towards Pakistan. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pakistan on 20 November 2014, the first such visit by a Russian official in this position in more than 40 years, and the two sides inked a defence cooperation pact. These developments have raised concerns in the Indian strategic community, as some see this as a countermove against growing Indo-US defence collaboration.
The primary cause for the emerging triple axis including China, Russia, and Pakistan in South Asia has been to curtail the extension of Indo-US political, economic and military connections. In the post-Cold War era, India has tilted significantly toward the West, a move that has been ostracised by the triumvirate. Hence, in reprisal, Russia’s recent rapprochement with the duo further solidified the Sino-Pakistani geostrategic bond. India’s wide-ranging collaboration with the US, primarily in the post-civil nuclear deal, has led to the budding association of three atomic powers. Under the formation of power blocks, a new geopolitical ‘great game’ has been emerging in the region. India, the leading South Asian player, therefore, has been facing an extremely problematic situation while making a balancing choice between the two hostile powers, China and the US. We must watch and see how India will resolve its predicaments, how far Russia is willing to come to its aid and how the Indo-Russian relationship will bloom.
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