Praveen Davar
The 50th anniversary of 1965 Indo-Pak war was observed in a befitting manner by the Defence Forces this year. Six years from now it will be the fiftieth anniversary of the 1971 war which most likely will be celebrated on a much bigger scale as it was the country’s greatest military victory ever. Unfortunately, however, the war which gave us the state of J&K, though truncated, is all but forgotten.
The day India became free, on Aug 15, 1947, J&K, like Hyderabad and Junagadh, and unlike over 500 other princely states, had not acceded to either India or Pakistan. Its Maharaja, Hari Singh, was reluctant to join either of the dominions and wished to keep his state independent. Anticipating threat from Pakistan Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru on September 1947 wrote to Home Minister Sardar Patel to prevail upon Hari Singh to release Sheikh Abdullah who, as leader of popular rising against the Maharaja, had been imprisoned by him. Nehru felt that without the cooperation of Abdullah who had the full support of the people, the state administration will not be able to meet Pakistan’s imminent threat. It will also facilitate the accession of J&K to India.
On 22 October 1947, over 5000 tribesmen, with weapons and transport supplied by the Pakistan Army, entered Kashmir and seized Muzaffarabad, Domel, Uri and surged towards Srinagar. Two days later the Maharaja offered to accede to India and asked for immediate military assistance. V. P. Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States flew to Jammu and got the instrument of succession signed by the Maharaja on Oct 26. The emergency meeting of the Defence Committee comprising Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh, despite initial resistance from Lord Mountbatten, The Chairman of Defence Committee, ordered troops in the valley to evict the invaders.
Operation J&K commenced at first light on the morning of October 27. One after another more than a hundred planes , both civilian (BOAC) and military (RIAF), flew out of Safdarjung Airport, ferrying weapons, rations and troops of the Sikh regiment led by Lt Col Ranjit Rai who was one of the first soldiers to sacrifice his life, but not before his unit had succeeded in establishing a bridge head on the Baramula-Srinagar road which halted the invasion and saved Srinagar.
Writes M.J. Akbar in ‘Nehru – The Making of India,’ : “ Fortunately the Prime Minister understood what was happening as soon as he got the news and he wasted not a moment in his response. As it turned out if Nehru had dithered even for a couple of hours, Srinagar would have fallen, and all would have been lost.”
On hearing that Indian troops had landed in Srinagar Jinnah ordered General Gracy, acting Chief of the Pakistan Army (both India and Pakistan had British officers in top echelons) to move his troops into Kashmir on Rawalpindi-Srinagar road towards Banihal pass and cut off Kashmir from Jammu and the rest of India. Fortunately for India Gracy refused. He did so at the behest of Mountbatten and Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck (the Supreme Commander of both India and Pakistn armies.) ‘ The advantage of having Mountbatten as Governor General became apparent.’
Mountbatten and his chief of staff Ismay flew to Lahore on 1 November. They spent over three hours with Jinnah discussing Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir. When Mountbatten suggested impartial plebiscites the Quid-e-Azam spurned the proposal, arguing that ‘ it was redundant and undesirable to have a plebiscite when it was quite clear that states should go according to their majority population, and if India would give him accession of Kashmir he would offer to urge the accession of Junagadh direct to India’.
Jinnah claimed that Kashmir’s accession was the product of a long intrigue and was brought about forcibly. For the fighting to cease, the two sides should withdraw immediately and simultaneously. Asked why he objected ‘so strongly’ to a plebiscite, Jinnah replied that with Indian troops in Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah in power, “the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan.” Mountbatten countered that they could invite the United Nations to conduct and ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. Mountbatten discussed the plebiscite proposal with Jinnah before taking Nehru and Patel into confidence.
On 8 November Nehru wrote to Liaquat Ali enumerating India’s proposals: Pakistan should publicly compel the raiders to withdraw; India would withdraw its troops as soon as the raiders withdrew and law and order was restored; both govenments should make a joint request to the UN to hold a plebiscite at the earliest. By mid-November Indian forces had retaken Uri and secured the valley. The invaders had, however, continued their advance in Poonch and Mirpur areas. With the assistance of the local rebels they had captured Bhimbar, Rajouri, and Rawalakot. They now posed a serious threat to the state forces’ garrisons in Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch and Naushera. In Gilgit the Scouts, led by a British officer, staged a coup and declared their allegiance to Pakistan. On 24 December Indian forces at Jhangar were evicted by a determined attack. The raiders now had a free run of the road connecting Mirpur-Jhangar-Kotli-Poonch.
The Prime Minister and his senior colleagues decided that if Uri fell Indian forces would have to enter Pakistan. Nehru directed the army chief to be prepared for every contingency and to be prepared soon. He intended to adopt two parallel courses of action: reference to the UN, and “complete military preparations to meet any possible contingency.” Over the next couple of days Naushera held and there was no imminent danger to Uri. By the end of December there was no pressing need for an attack into Pakistan.
Later India’s military position had improved. Jhangar was captured in March and Rajouri taken next. By early March the threat to the lines of communication from Jammu to Naushera was neutralized. Indian forces were now poised for the “spring offensive.” Concurrently, the possibility of military action against Hyderabad came to the fore.
On 18 May 1948 India launched a two-pronged offensive:one along the Uri-Domel road, the other towards Tithwal and thence to Muzaffarbad and Domel. The presence of Pakistani forces blunted the offensive by early June. The only significant success was the capture of Tithwal.
Having closely examined the situation Nehru was convinced that ‘our defence requirements along East Punjab frontier…. and need to maintain forces in Hyderabad leave practically no margin for reinforceing troops in Kashmir. He concluded that the only practical solution was a compromise “ on the basis of the … existing military situation.” Patel too felt that partition offered a “permanent, immediate and realistic settlement.”
The army concentrated on limited offensives in the Ladakh and Jammu sectors. By the end of November 1948 Indian forces recaptured Dras and Kargil, securing the route from the valley to Ladakh. Simultaneously they took Mendhar and linked up with the Poonch garrison, so lifting the year long siege. Having fully secured Ladakh and Rajouri Poonch India accepted ceasefire for which international pressure had been building up and could not be resisted any longer. The guns fell silent on the last night of 1948 and ceasfire became effective from Jan 1949.
India agreed to a plebiscite subject to certain very specific conditions, the most important of which was that Pakistan should withdraw all its troops and vacate the entire territory of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. This Pakistan refused to do and still refuses to do. According to top diplomat J.N. Dixit: “ An even more interesting factor, which is not widely known, is that Sheikh Abdullah himself was not very keen that Indian forces retrieve the western areas of the state from Pakistani troops. The reason was that he was not sure of his popularity with and acceptance by the people who now inhabited Pakistan-occupied areas of Kashmir. His leadership and his political party, the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, did not have the same support in those areas which they had in the rest of Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah therefore endorsed India referring the case to the UN Security Council instead of having to cope with a portion of the state which would have opposed him after the completion of the military operations.”
To sum up, the decision makers for handling J&K crisis were Nehru, Patel and Mountbatten who made the most of an extremely difficult situation with the popular support of Sheikh Abdullah and above all, the brave soldiers of the Indian Army. The partition of J&K proposed by Nehru in 1948, and put forward again by AB Vajpayee during his premiership half a century later, remains the only lasting solution for a durable peace in the subcontinent.
(The writer, an ex Army Officer, is Member, National Commission for Minorities.)
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