Col J P Singh, Retd
16 December 1971, has been written in Golden Letters in the Indian History. This day will remain a ‘Golden Day’, for ever, in the military history of India. It is this day when the ‘Instrument of Surrender’ was presented by Lt Gen A K Niazi, C-in-C of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan before Lt Gen J S Arora, GOC-in-C Eastern Command of the Indian Army at Dacca with a request to accept it. Gen J S Arora, accepted history’s greatest military surrender post World War II on this day. Just after 23 years of its independent identity, ‘Indian Armed Forces’ executed, within ’12 days’ the most decisive liberation campaign in the military history, giving an oppressed nation of 75 million of East Pakistan, its independence. In one lightening strike; it brought a formidable enemy to its knees and took 93,000 of them prisoners. Few campaigns in history have caused as much surprise and speculation as Indian armed forces’ liberation of Bangladesh. Foreign analysts have compared this achievement to German ‘blitzkrieg’ of WW II. ‘The Sunday Times of London’ wrote, “It took 12 days for the Indian Army to smash its way to Dacca, an achievement reminiscent of German Blitzkrieg across France in 1940. The strategy was the same; speed, ferocity and flexibility”. 1971 victory epitomizes the glory of Indian Armed Forces. Since then nation proudly celebrates 16 December as Vijay Diwas all over India. Historic picture shows unprecedented signing ceremony of ‘Document of Surrender’ by top military commanders of barring sides.
The catastrophic events of 1971, which took place in East Pakistan left civilised world aghast. For the veterans who had fought 1965 war and those like me who were fighting 1971 war in the West, it was difficult to understand how a professional Pak Army could be humbled by the same people whom they felt could be crushed with the use of their illusory military might. The detailed analysis of 1971 war suggests that a military solution was applied to a political problem. The intriguing queries worry the mind constantly about cause of debacle of a professional army. Knowing the Pak soldiers, it is hard to believe that their will to fight was so effectively smashed by the Indian Army and Mukti Vahini that they reached a breaking point too early in their own country and in own well prepared defensive positions. Only answer one could get is that it was basically a political problem for which a political solution should have been applied instead of blundering a military solution. The genesis of the crisis, in fact, lay in the illusion that Islam was a greater binding factor than cultural heritage. Pak army was to kill Muslims before that myth was finally exploded. It was Gen Yahaya Khan, who having earlier succeeded in military fields blundered in political field and hence was responsible for the dismemberment of Pakistan and the humiliation of its army.
First ever democratic general election was held in Pakistan in1970. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s party, Awami League, won the mandate by winning 167 National Assembly seats whereas other parties combined won 146 including 88 of Pakistan People’sParty (PPP). But Punjabi dominated polity of the Western Wing refused to hand over power to Bengali politicians. Z A Bhutto, leader of PPP, with lesser number of seats in National Assembly was sworn in as Prime Minister. This led to political discontent and social unrest. Civilians, politicians, students and intelligentsia came on the streets demanding that the results of the election must be honoured. The cultural nationalism was met by brutal suppressive force. An armed conflict broke out between East and West resulting in the secession of East Pakistan. Military action led to flow of refugees, estimated to be about 10 million, flooding into the eastern states of India. Facing a mounting humanitarian and economic crisis, India started actively aiding and organising the Bangladeshi resistance army known as the Mukti Vahini. Pakistan launched a pre-emptive attack on India on 3 December, which triggered Indo-Pak War of 1971.
The political environments in East Pakistan did not warrant the adoption of a course of action which could willy nilly gave a neighbour, a chance, even the remotest and an excuse to intervene militarily. It should have been realised that, if by any chance, India attacked East Pakistan, the pro independence elements in East Pakistan would sabotage Pak military capacity to fight. In that case Pak Army would not only be fighting the Indian Army but also the rebels organized as Mukti Vahini and the civilian saboteurs. It would have been obvious deduction that India would be waiting for an opportunity to exploit a political situation which could be used to attack East Pakistan. That is exactly what happened. Indian Army was offered an opportunity on the platter to inflict deep wounds on the hearts of Pak nation that they will carry the scars of these wounds to the eternity, which would justify avenge of the 1947 and 1965 wars. So long as we keep celebrating Vijay Diwas, their wounds will never heal and that should be the minimum price an irritant adversary should be made to pay. With the fall of Dacca on 16 December 1971, Indian Army had scored a decisive victory over Pakistan with 93,000 soldiers made prisoners. Later an accord was signed between the two on 2 July 1972 at Shimla. It was agreed to exchange all the prisoners, respect the LOC and refrain from use of force or threat in future. It was also agreed to solve issues, if any, by bilateralism. Additionally, Bhutto gave a solemn pledge to accept LOC as de facto border. India released all prisoners in good faith whereas Pakistan released only 617 Indian prisoners while holding back 54 who are still languishing in Pakistani jails. The Indian govt has admitted this fact many times but has failed to secure their release. India failed to use the leverage of 93,000 prisoners to discipline estranged neighbour. A rare opportunity was lost.
Forget establishing permanent peace in the sub-continent, India failed to secure release of all its prisoners, a criminal omission by all accounts. The naivety of Indian delegation can be seen from the fact that it allowed Pakistan to bluff its way through at Shimla. Indian leadership was led into believing Pak sincerity while Pakistan never intended to abide by its promises, both written and verbal. Fruits of hard fought victory in the battlefield were frittered away, once again after 1965 war, on the negotiating table by the bungling leadership.
China had not vacated captured areas in Ladakh sector in 1962 and we were compelled to gave away Hajipir after capturing it in fierce hand to hand fight in 1965. Having lost chunk of our land to China and Pakistan in previous wars, we made Pakistan lose its Eastern Wing. It took the world by surprise. US tried to intimidate India by sending its 7th Fleet into Indian Ocean. But the political and military leadership stood like a rock in the face of American threat. Credit for Indian victory of 1971 goes to Indian Armed Forces’ lightning offensive in the East in synergy with Mukti Vahini of East Pakistan. After 1962 debacle we had already redeemed our honour to an extent during the 1965 war. Ultimate was achieved in 1971. It would have been obvious that India would be waiting for an opportunity to exploit any political / military situation in the neighbourhood which could be used to establish India as reckonable military power in the sub-continent. This opportunity came on 26 March 1971when Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of East Pakistan declared Eastern Wing as independent nation of Bangladesh.
There has been immense speculation as to why Pak Army collapsed in Bangladesh. It was because of its moral degradation. After months of brutalities, looting and raping, from highest to the lowest rank, Pak Army had become partly dehumanised. In almost all the cantonments, hundreds of young women had been kept for sexual pleasure and in many cases they were bayoneted or shot as replacements were brought. Mass slaughter, burning and looting was carried out till the last day. Those who have seen this happening can understand why Pak Army collapsed. It was because of moral degradation that it had forsaken its professional mettle. The other reason was ‘vastly superior planning, direction and execution of the campaign by India because of a sense of vision, carefully defined objective and inspiring leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi and Field Marshal Manekshaw.
Witnessing glaring setbacks in defence preparedness on the LOC culminating into Samba incident (and Hiranagar); query from civil society is, “are we weaker or stronger than1971 when we inflicted crushing defeat on Pak Army in East Pakistan and liberated Bangladesh? Can we defeat Pakistan now if a war is thrust upon us?” The answer resoundingly is that we are much stronger and can easily defeat Pak Army if a war is thrust upon us.
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