Gautam Sen
India`s Defence Minister has observed on 10th November, 2016 that, `there should be a degree of unpredictability when it came to nuclear weapons`, inter-alia elaborating, if a written down strategy exists or if India takes a stand really on a nuclear aspect, it would be actually giving away its strength in this area. The Minister`s observations have however, not indicated what are the precise factors or determinants which have induced him to advocate an `unpredictable` nuclear policy. Is it the recent incidents on the border or Pakistan`s Defence Minister — statements regarding use of tactical nuclear weapons against India in October after hints of retribution from Indian Government sources post-Uri incident, which has been weighed in by the Indian Defence Minister to suggest unpredictability, is not clear. The Minister has however, qualified his observations by stating that these are his personal opinion and not indicative of Government of India`s policy.
India`s nuclear policy or rather nuclear weapons` usage policy, was enunciated in unambiguous terms by the Atal Behari Vajpayee-led National Democratic Front-1 Government through its draft nuclear doctrine released by India`s National Security Advisory Board in April 1999 and later formalized in January 2003. `No-First-Use` (NFU) but substantive nuclear retaliation against an adversary which uses nuclear or chemical and biological weapons against India and its forces, are cardinal elements of this policy. The point to consider now is whether an ambivalent or nebulous policy or doctrine will serve India`s strategic interests better, is safe for its existential security and contributes to a stable Asian albeit overall strategic environment. The strategic scenario in the Asian or even South Asian context, has not evolved in the recent or immediate past to the detriment of India`s interests to the extent that adoption of an `unpredictable` in nuclear policy is warranted.
Moreover, a new aspect seems to have emerged from the Defence Minister`s observations. Whether by an unpredictable nuclear policy the Minister implied ambivalence in posture towards likely nuclear-armed adversaries or, was he advocating that India`s policy should be such that, the adversary`s perceptions are obfuscated on the action India is likely to take if nuclear blackmailed, threatened or actually hit by weapons of mass destruction, is not clear. In this context, it is interesting to refer to Israel, a country deemed effectively nuclear weapons` empowered yet with an officially undeclared status in regard to possession of nuclear weapons. Israeli Government leaders have hinted on some occasions that, while Israel will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, it will also not be the last to respond to nuclear blackmail, use or attempted use of nuclear weapons against it. This is an example of ambivalent nuclear posture while the policy is very clear that, Israel will not allow it to be hit by nuclear weapons and de-facto, even not ruling out `first-use` of nuclear weapons on its part.
Notwithstanding the Minister`s observations being of a personal nature, his considered though impromptu views appear to open up some critical areas of the existing policy for reappraisal including on elements like `NFU`, `Launch-on-Warning` (LoW), etc., particularly when viewed apropos the present ruling party`s manifesto in 2014 advocating revision and the updating of the nuclear doctrine. On the face of it, both abandonment of `NFU` and moving to an `LoW` mode, would necessitate the deployment of India`s nuclear strike forces on a heightened state of alert and sharp calibration of nuclear signaling to the likely adversaries. The strategic relations of India with her expected adversaries are likely to be exacerbated and be on the razor`s edge, consequently. Such an outcome may not be desirable. Therefore, it is of essence that if a reassessment or reappraisal of the existing policy is to be undertaken, it should be carried out at the appropriate policy-making levels within the country`s strategic establishment with informed public opinion factored in, reckoning India`s past experience, and in a decisive time-bound manner.
Furthermore, the uncertainties likely to impinge on India`s strategic milieu while the reappraisal process is on, need to be kept in view, particularly when the environment has been bedeviled by substantial tension over the past few months with our western nuclear-armed adversary. Moreover, there should not be any scope for erroneous judgment or miscalculation on the part of likely adversaries, on the way India`s nuclear policy and doctrine are likely to evolve during the reappraisal period, the occurrence of which would be perilous to its security. Considering the present divisiveness in India`s political milieu, and also the time likely to be taken for arriving at a strategic consensus in an informed manner, the chances are that apropos the reappraisal process, India`s adversaries are likely to underestimate India`s resolve for a nuclear riposte if blackmailed or threatened by nuclear weapons.
In retrospect, it appears that, India`s `NFU` policy has stood the test of time. Even when tensions had escalated between India and Pakistan, nuclear sabre-rattling indulged in by the latter including the threat to resort in nuclear war-fighting by use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter so-called threats posed by India`s superior conventional forces, the latter`s `cold-start` doctrine, etc., the deterrence exerted by India through its existing policy and nuclear capability, held, thereby justifying the efficacy of the `NFU` policy. Furthermore, the existing policy has been in tandem with the ethos of universal disarmament and non-use of nuclear weapons propagated by India at the international level consistently. In this backdrop, a radical shift to India`s nuclear policy, or ambivalence on what the policy is or will be, may not be in the country`s overall interest.
In the totality of the circumstances of the recent past, clarity and consistency in the country`s nuclear policy with a broad-based domestic political consensus as has been feasible till now, would be in India`s national interest and also conducive to strategic stability in its vicinity. A nuclear arsenal which is sufficient in quantity, effectively maintained and efficiently deployed under a robust nuclear command and control structure, are matters which should be the areas of prime concern for the country`s strategic establishment and supreme political authority. This will only enhance the deterrence effect of India`s nuclear military capability.
Some factors which seem to have been underplayed in the existing impromptu strategic discourse are, the economic and psychological impacts of the existing nuclear policy and doctrine. There is no explicit debate in the public and political realms on the explicit and implicit economic implications assuming certain growth trends and developmental prerequisites. It is necessary that these elements be suitably reckoned apropos the existing nuclear policy, nuclear arsenal and concomitant establishment and command structure which have to be compulsorily maintained. A transparent assessment as above will be acceptable to the country at large, and is expected to motivate the people to the cause of development which perforce have to be safeguarded to be enjoyed, if presented cogently and backed up by a political consensus. An appropriate orientation given to the economy with the security related nuclear determinants spelt out, will be more intelligible and acceptable to the people. While there is an apparent need to relate the existing nuclear policy to the people as mentioned above, to engage them and garner their informed support on a wide scale, the acuity of the need would be all the more in the context of reassessment of the policy, and it at all the element of `unpredictability` in policy is introduced.
Finally, the psychological impact on the people of the country, of its nuclear policy, need not be overlooked. The impact assumes a significance of its own when viewed in the backdrop of periodic tensions in India-Pakistan bilateral relations, particularly continuous escalated border skirmishes and deteriorating security scenario in the sensitive Indian states with common boundary with Pakistan and militant activity in close vicinity of the borders. India`s policy should work towards ensuring that the morale of the residents in the above-referred areas is high and the people feel confident of their national government`s security policy including its nuclear posture, particularly when Pakistan`s threats to use of tactical nuclear weapons in expected frontline combat areas, loom large. As part of the counter-measures, the people in the sensitive areas have to be sensitized and psychologically boosted to appreciate their country`s nuclear policy and deterrent posture. An `unpredictable` nuclear policy may not be conducive to such an effort and instead, work to the adversary`s advantage. An `unpredictable` nuclear policy may therefore produce a negative outcome for India and impinge on India`s strategic relations with Pakistan to the former`s disadvantage. So far China which has virtually underwritten Pakistan`s nuclearisation is concerned, India`s `uncertain` policy may induce it to adopt a more strident nuclear posture towards the latter.
(The author is a retired IDAS officer who has served at senior levels in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East and as Internal Financial Adviser in India`s Strategic Forces Command Headquarters.)
The views expressed are the author`s own.
feedbackexcelsior@gmail.com
Follow our WhatsApp channel