Asad Mirza
In a sweeping step to modernise their alliance in the face of mounting security threats in Asia, particularly the South China Sea, US and Japan have announced plans to further the bilateral military cooperation.
The United States has announced that it will overhaul its military forces in Japan as the two countries move to deepen defence cooperation, Washington and Tokyo said Sunday, 28 July 2024. The announcement comes in the background of increased Chines belligerence in the South China Sea (SCS) and asserting territorial claims in the SCS, while North Korea continues its illegal weapons programme – while both strengthen ties with Russia as it wages war in Ukraine.
The new US-Jap plans were announced by the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and their Japanese counterparts Minoru Kihara and Yoko Kamikawa after a meeting in Tokyo, where they also called China’s “political, economic, and military coercion” the “greatest strategic challenge” in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
Undeniably, the latest American move is likely to fuel the ire of Beijing, which has watched warily as the US has bolstered ties with regional allies in a region, where observers say China seeks to be the dominant power – and where it accuses the US of fostering a Cold War-style bloc mentality.
Under the new plan, US forces in Japan would be “reconstituted” as a joint force headquarters reporting to the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command to “facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies,” according to the statement.
In a press conference following the meeting, Austin hailed the countries’ move to “modernise” their alliance command and control as an “historic decision.”“This will be the most significant change to US Forces Japan since its creation, and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years,” Austin said.
He pointed both to the “upgrade” of US Forces in Japan with “expanded missions and operational responsibilities,” and Japan’s new Joint Operations Command, saying that the countries were reinforcing their “combined ability to deter and respond to coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”
Behind the scenes activities between the top officials of the two countries were on, since the April summit in Washington between US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, where the two vowed to upgrade their respective command-and-control framework “to strengthen deterrence and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific in the face of pressing regional security challenges.”
However, the US maintains that it has no plans to integrate Japanese forces into the US commands.
At present, US Forces Japan (USFJ), is headquarterat Yokota Air Base, and consists of approximately 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan under a 1960 mutual cooperation and security treaty.
The expected reconfiguration comes as Japan shifts its defence posture, veering away from the pacifist constitution imposed on it by the United States in the aftermath of World War II, with a plan to boost defence spending to about 2% of its GDP by 2027 and acquire counter strike capabilities.
These moves have cemented Japan’s centrality to Washington’s regional security strategy and its push for increased coordination with allies and partners amid rising regional tensions – and as the US increasingly sees security in Europe and Asia as intertwined in the wake of the war in Ukraine.
The tensions in the region are not just confined to the SCS, but Chinese activities in the East China Sea, Chinese support to Russia in its war against Ukraine, Russia’s support to the N Korean missile programme and the issue of Taiwan’s independence, all add up to the American worries for the region, and its plans for the Pacific and the Indo-Pacific, both.
The latest move is being seen in the backdrop of these regional flashpoints and the American response to them, besides containing China. In diplomatic language China was repeatedly mentioned in the joint statement, as the ministers outlined shared concerns including what they described as Beijing’s “intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo,” in the East China Sea, its “threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea,” and its “support for Russia’s defence industrial base.”
Western leaders have accused Beijing of “enabling” Moscow’s war in Ukraine through the provision of dual-use goods, a charge Beijing denies.
However, countering concerns about the new Command structure, based on any Chinese worries, Austin said, “It’s based on our desire and our ability to work closer together and to be more effective.” The ministers also said Taiwan’s “political transition period should not be used as a pretext for provocative actions across the Taiwan Strait.”
In the statement, the ministers also condemned North Korea’s missile testing and nuclear weapons programmes, condemning deepening Russia-North Korea cooperation, including Russia’s “procurement of ballistic missiles and other materiel from North Korea” for use in Ukraine.
Before the ministerial meeting on Sunday, the Defence chiefs from the United States, Japan and South Korea, met for the first time in Tokyo, which shows another sign of the tightening coordination of regional US allies.
The Defence Chiefs meeting was preceded by a landmark summit between the three countries held by Biden at Camp David, last year. The increased trilateral coordination between the US, Japan and South Korea shows the real concern, shared by both Seoul and Tokyo – both long-standing US allies –as working to put aside historic animosity and mistrust to better address shared security threats.
However, the reality is completely different. America’s allies in Asia have no mutual obligation to defend each other, as do members of NATO. Right now USFJ is mainly an administrative headquarters for units based in the country, and to liaise with the Japanese government.
As the Financial Times puts it succinctly, conventionally America has seen its role as the “spear” that would take on Chinese forces, whereas the Japanese would act as the “shield” to defend its territory and American bases. Whether such a distinction can be maintained in an all-out war over Taiwan, or any Chinese attack against any regional country, or any big assault is doubtful.