Col Ajay K Raina, SM
One sector where the present dispensation at Delhi has really made an unmissable mark is in the field of infrastructure development. Those who have had time and fortune of travelling across the country, especially by road, will vouch for the fact that Bharat now has some of the world-class infrastructure assets. Of course, there are a few slips here and there; not to forget that there are insider elements who are hell-bent upon destroying such critical assets. Political mudslinging notwithstanding, the fact remains that our landscape has changed at a pace never seen before.
The strategically important region of the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir, consequently, has also seen its share of development in the field. Changes are noticeable here, too. However, what works well for any other state, say Madhya Pradesh, may not really work here. Unfortunately, it appears that a certain template is being applied across the nation without understanding the long-term implications of such projects in certain sensitive areas. At the same time, Delhi’s never-ending fixation with a particular region of the UT continues to thrive. A combo of these two factors has created a situation wherein the planners and the decisionmakers at the highest levels need to take a pause, rethink and realign their thinking and approach to this particular sector before it is too late.
To support the point being made, we need to look at an ambitious multi-tunnel project between Srinagar and Dras. The much-hyped Zoji La tunnel project(Z-Morh tunnel is part of the same project) appears to be a game changer in many ways. As such, the narrative built around the project obviously leaves no space for a counterargument, so to say. Who can ever object to a project that will, among other things, ensure two major things-almost a year-long connectivity of Ladakh with rest of Bharat and enabling unhindered movement of defence forces as and when a need so arises. In the backdrop of the fact that China remains our prime threat, such a project is nothing less than an enabler and a force multiplier when it comes to war fighting in the higher Himalayas.
BUT here lies a catch. The year-round connectivity between the UT of J&K and UT of Ladakh, could also have been ensured by executing another project the survey of which was done a few decades ago. That project offers a completely different alignment. To understand the alignment being mentioned, one needs to read about the daring campaigns undertaken by the great Dogra commander, General Zorawar Singh some 190 years ago. Kishtwar in Jammu offers two approaches to Ladakh, one linking it with Suru Valley in Kargil District and the other one with Zanskar in the same district. The latter alignment has a big factor in its favour since Zanskar is now well-connected with Leh in addition to its traditional linkage with Kargil town via Pensi La. Of course, while picking up either of the two alignments, one has to drill through the Great Himalayan Range (GHR) below Umasi La or Bhot Khol La, exactly similar to the tunnels being drilled beneath Zoji La, that itself lies on the GHR.
If that be so, what is the catch then, one may ask. Well, here comes the strategic approach to developmental economics. To understand the point, let’s revisit the two main aims of Zoji La project. The first one is creating an almost all-weather connectivity with Ladakh. Both Zoji La and Kishtwar options stand equal on this part. Ladakh would have got connected via Kishtwar as well, if not better than via Kashmir. But the second point is vital and that concerns the move of our defence forces into the Himalayan highlands in case of a conflict with Pakistan or China or both. Between a route that involves driving through a troubled geography (terrorists, IEDs, hostile crowd behaviour) and a route through a comparatively peaceful region, one doesn’t have to be a nuclear scientist to pick the better choice. Further, once troops are across Zoji La, they remain susceptible to hostile interference because the highway connecting Srinagar with Kargil runs very close to the Line of Control (LC). Readers would remember the 1999 Kargil Conflict. Even beyond Kargil, if one travels to Leh via Batalik, the mountain features across the LC remain in sight over quite a distance. Now, compare this with entering Ladakh from the South, ie either Suru Valley or Zanskar. There is no such threat to the move of the convoys. In other words, a convoy starting from Jammu in the morning can reach a point in Kargil via Kishtwar without any interference (terrorists or crowds or Pakistan) by the evening. On the other hand, via Kashmir and Zoji La, there is a time penalty of a minimum 24 or may be 36 hours to reach Kargil, not to mention an ever-present threat to the security of such convoys. The recent killing of seven men working on Zoji La project also illustrates the dangers involved to the defenceless labourers who sweat for a region that often comes across as short on gratitude.
Our common sense tells us such a distinction and such implications are not hard to decipher. One wonders if a major stakeholder, ie, our defence forces, are even consulted while green lighting such projects! Another fact that needs attention here is thepotential of Kishtwar as a base for our attack helicopters that can operate with impunity and reach nooks and crannies of Kargil district in virtual no time while remaining out of harm during the peace time. Don’t such issues merit consideration, especially when the survey of an alternate route via Kishtwar was conducted during Mrs Gandhi’s time as the PM of the nation? Of course, with the well-debated Indira-Sheikh accord of mid-1970s, it was obvious that the iron lady couldn’t afford to annoy an ever-demanding local political partner. Fast forward to 2020s and the same fixation appears to hold the key. Instead of opening doors to unimaginable development in an underdeveloped region (Doda-Kishtwar) in the shadow of the Pir Panjal Range, planners have obviously opted to appease a region that, in any case, always gets the cherry on the cake, the cake and even its cream!Some may point to the electoral promises of 2021 and 2024. As a layman, the author has no hesitation in saying that even if both the projects are cleared, the interse priority should have been given to the one via Kishtwar. This delay, assuming electoral promises will be kept, of over two decades will have its costs in the time to come. After the recent thaw along the Line of Actual Control, it would be foolish to dream of an everlasting peace on our northern borders. The best we have is a window of two-three years. Will Kishtwar be connected with Ladakh by then? Only time will tell.
As a closing note, it needs to be realised that to counter any conflict within the borders of our nation, the first and the foremost step should be isolating and reducing the area of the conflict zone. By creating highways through Peer-ki-Gali and Sinthan Pass, have we ignored this basic thumb rule of fighting terrorism inside our land? Does the template being applied elsewhere need to be applied in toto here, too? Isn’t there a need to be aware of double-edged assets? Such are points to ponder. And to do that, we need to take a pause, rethink and realign our thought process.
(The author is a military historian and the Founder Trustee of the Military History Research Foundation ®, India)
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